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Our major findings include: (1) the threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal—most major 
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of risk does not square with fiscal politics that seek to spread security funding among many 
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passengers in surveillance has benefits, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit; (6) the role 
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uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible benefits of increased attention 
to and spending on transit security may be a reduction in transit-related person and property crimes.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(CNN)—U.S. mass transit systems were put on higher alert after Thursday’s bombings in 
London, with officials in major cities urging Americans to go about their business but be on 
the lookout for anything suspicious… New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly told CNN 
his officers were “doing everything that’s prudent, everything that we reasonably can do to 
protect the city.” But he said it was impossible to put a police officer “on every train all the 
time, or one on every station all the time.”
(http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/07/07/us.response/; Posted: Thursday, July 7, 2005, 
11:41 pm EDT (03:41 GMT))
While the most significant terrorist attacks—such as the sarin attack in Tokyo or the bombing 
of the Paris Metro—garnered worldwide public attention during the 1990s, popular and 
political response in the United States was generally muted. Perhaps this was because attacks 
on U.S. transit systems were still quite rare; perhaps this was due to Americans’ legendary 
parochialism; or perhaps it simply reflected wishful thinking. Whatever the reasons for this 
indifference, it was not justified.
During the mid-1990s, four separate acts of terrorism and extreme violence on U.S. transit 
and rail systems killed fourteen and injured more than one thousand.* While police and 
intelligence officials who oversee transit properties grew much more vigilant and vocal in the 
late-1990s in calling for increased attention to the vulnerability of public transit systems to 
terrorist acts, the issue still had not caught the attention of most transit passengers, voters, 
members of the media, or elected officials.
This all changed, of course, on September 11, 2001. While the focus of the 9/11 attacks was 
on a different part of the transportation system, the effects on the affected public transit 
systems were dramatic and, in the case of New York, long-lasting. The vulnerability of open, 
accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts was cast in the sharpest 
possible relief. Concern over the vulnerability of transit systems has been heightened further 
by the more recent, deadly, March 11, 2004, attacks on commuter rail trains in Madrid, Spain, 
and the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground and bus systems. The London attacks, 
in particular, dominated news coverage for at least a week and raised popular concern over 
* Annabelle Boyd and John P. Sullivan, “Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism,” in TCRP Synthesis 
27. Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, 1997.
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transit terrorism in the United States such that transit security in the United States is now 
widely viewed as an important public policy issue.
The attention and subsequent fear generated by these attacks have clearly motivated 
policymakers into action. Indeed, one of the more sobering lessons from the research reported 
here is that significant system- or industry-wide changes in security planning have often 
required either prolonged exposure to lower-scale attacks (such as those perpetrated by the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) against transit systems in greater London) or a mass casualty 
event (such as in Tokyo, Madrid, or most recently, London). Absent such events, concerns—
even repeated, dire warnings by vigilant police and intelligence officials—have too often gone 
unheeded by many elected officials.
Research Approach
Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part 
of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security in 
several ways. Perhaps most important, we employ a wide array of approaches and methods to 
examine a complicated issue: How are transit managers around the United States and around 
the world working to better protect their systems and passengers from terrorist attacks? To 
address this question, we have pursued a multipronged research approach.
1. We reviewed and synthesized nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism 
and updated previous efforts to systematically chronicle previous terrorist attacks on 
transit systems around the globe.
2. We complemented these detailed case studies and interviews with a comprehensive survey 
of 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States regarding prior threats and 
attacks, past and current security planning and policing efforts, and approaches to four 
security strategies: policing, technology/hardware, public education/outreach, and crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED).
3. We conducted detailed interviews with federal officials here in the United States 
responsible for overseeing transit security, and with transit industry representatives both 
here and abroad, to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning.
4. We conducted detailed case studies of terrorist attacks on transit systems in London (prior 
to July 2005), Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. These case studies 
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involved reviews of documentary evidence and other written materials, and in-depth 
interviews with transit officials and other key stakeholders.
Thus, our multipronged research approach is both domestic and international, as well as 
qualitative and quantitative, all in an effort to increase the reliability of our findings on this 
complex issue.
A second distinguishing feature of this research reflects the experience and expertise of the 
research team. We are scholars of architecture and urban design, civil and transportation 
engineering, and transportation and urban planning, and not intelligence, policing, or 
security. We have, therefore, approached this research from the perspective of the people who 
finance, design, build, operate, and use public transit systems, rather than from the 
perspective of those who police them.
For example, the role of system design in transit security has received far less attention in most 
previous research on transit security than policing or surveillance. A specific focus of this work 
is on system design. We conducted inspections of transit stations in each of the systems 
studied, and we collected detailed information on attitudes toward and applications of CPTED 
strategies in our survey of U.S. transit operators.
A third and final distinguishing feature of this research is that it updates the findings and 
conclusions of many previous studies in this fast moving and rapidly evolving literature. We 
found from our survey, for example, that security planning efforts have progressed 
significantly at U.S. transit systems since a 2002 U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) survey of transit operators was published in 2003.
Layout of the Study
The study is composed of six sections. Following the introduction, the second section presents 
a comprehensive look at “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of 
the Literature.” This research-literature review gives particular emphasis to design strategies. 
Building on two earlier Mineta Transportation Institute reports, the section includes a history 
and chronology of terrorist attacks on railway systems, extending the inventory of terrorist 
attacks to 2004,† and providing basic information about the medium of attack, the type of 
† But not including the July 2005 terrorist attacks in London, which occurred too close to the publication 
date of this report to be analyzed as part of this research.
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transit system attacked (heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail), and the impact of the attack 
(number of casualties).
The next section, “Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit 
Operators,” presents the results of a Web-based survey administered to 120 transit agencies in 
108 cities in the United States. The survey assesses (1) how the threat of terrorism affects the 
transportation security decisions of agencies; (2) how such decisions have changed after the 
events of September 11, 2001; (3) how agencies effectively identify and assess vulnerabilities 
in their transportation systems; (4) what measures they are taking to increase transit security; 
and (5) the relative importance they place on different security strategies such as CPTED, 
public education and user outreach, policing, and security hardware and technology.
Transit agencies do not operate in a policy vacuum. Their planning efforts against terrorism 
are determined largely by policies and funding allocations at the state and federal levels. The 
fourth section, “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews 
with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” assesses the federal government’s role in the security of urban rail 
transit in the United States. Drawing from interviews with officials in a number of federal 
agencies, this section discusses and analyzes initiatives taken by the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration. The 
section also reports on interviews with officials from the American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA) and security personnel from Amtrak, the New York Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (MTA), and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
“Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents,” the next section, draws from the literature 
and first-hand interviews with transit officials in five cities—London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, 
and Madrid—to present five case studies of contemporary terrorist incidents: (1) the terrorist 
attacks waged by the Irish Republican Army against the London Underground, (2) the Fulton 
Street Station fire bombing in New York, (3) the sarin chemical agent release by members of 
the Aum Shinrikyo cult on the Tokyo subway system, (4) the bombings on the Paris rail 
system by Algerian terrorists, and (5) the Al Qaeda attack on the Madrid rail line. The case 
studies detail the incidents and discuss the emergency and long-term design and policy 
responses to them.
The last section, “Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies,” reports on interviews 
with transit officials from Paris, Tokyo, London, Madrid, and Brussels to better assess the role 
of transit system design and operation in both exacerbating and minimizing terrorist attacks. 
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This section also compares transit security policies in different countries and elaborates the 
goals of the different international transit agencies, their security measures and strategies, and 
the challenges they face in securing their systems.
From the hundreds of pages of interview transcripts, survey results, and fieldwork notes, we 
distill the analyses in these six sections into what we see as twelve important lessons from the 
recent experience of efforts to prepare for, discourage, mitigate, and respond to terrorist attacks 
on urban public transit systems around the world.
Findings: A Dozen Lessons Learned
1. Public transit systems are open, dynamic, and inherently vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks; they simply cannot be closed and secured like other parts of the 
transportation system.
Public transit systems are a central part of urban life. They assemble strangers from diverse 
economic, social, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and convey them though a wide array of 
neighborhoods and districts. They are, by definition, open, dynamic systems that cannot be 
closed and regulated like the air transport system.‡ Such sentiments were expressed repeatedly 
by the hundreds of people interviewed and surveyed for this research. Not surprisingly, most 
of the transit managers and security officials who responded to our survey viewed their transit 
systems as “very vulnerable” to terrorist attacks. 
While public officials understandably call for efforts to make transit systems 100 percent safe, 
it is simply impossible to secure the thousands of bus stops, hundreds of miles of bus routes, 
many dozens of miles of rail rights-of-way, and the hundreds of stations used daily by millions 
of passengers in most large metropolitan areas. The challenge is especially daunting given a 
growing wave of suicide bombers who are willing to risk capture or death to execute an attack. 
According to an official interviewed in Madrid, 
I have to say that security does not exist. What does exist are methods to lessen 
insecurity. You never know what is going to happen. I am telling you this because 
‡ While some intercity and commuter rail systems, because they handle fewer, longer-distance passengers, 
have instituted airport-like screening of passengers and their baggage, such efforts could not be extended to 
local transit operations serving dozens, hundreds, and even thousands of stops.
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when the politicians tell you that these methods will guarantee our security, it is all 
false.
Said another Madrid official, 
You should accept that there is an inherent vulnerability to the system, and if you 
want to run an open mass transit system you live with the vulnerabilities and try to 
tackle them through intelligence and stopping these people before they actually get 
in.
Such sentiments raise legitimate, and perhaps troubling, questions about whether transit 
security planning efforts are perceived by transit officials as more symbolically effective (at 
creating a sense of safety among the public) than substantively effective (in reducing the 
likelihood and/or magnitude of a terrorist attack). At the very least, they reflect the daunting 
challenges to security planning for open, accessible transit systems.
2. The threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal; most attacks in the 
developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities.
While the chronology of terrorist attacks on transit systems reviewed in the section “Securing 
Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of the Literature” documents 
hundreds of incidents occurring over many decades, the deadliest and most politically 
influential of these have occurred on the largest transit systems in the most politically and 
economically powerful world cities, such as London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris, and 
Tokyo. This suggests that efforts to combat transit terrorism should be focused on cities and 
transit systems where the likelihood and potential effects of terrorism are greatest.
This observed asymmetry of risk likely reflects both the symbolic importance of particular 
world cities, and the fact that transit use tends to be concentrated in the largest and most 
densely developed metropolitan areas. As noted in the third section, “Securing Transit Systems 
in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators,” the ten largest U.S. transit systems 
(operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to the 
Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the hundreds of remaining transit systems 
carry the remaining 35 percent. Of all 2002 U.S. transit trips, 39 percent occurred in one 
metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips were carried by just one 
system, the New York MTA.**
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While the most dramatic attacks have occurred mostly on major systems in world cities, this 
does not mean, of course, that local bus service or smaller cities are safe from attack. In the 
developing world, terrorist attacks on transit are more likely to occur on buses than on trains. 
Further, as noted in the sections “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A 
Review of the Literature,” and “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: 
Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” security experts report that some terrorists have on 
occasion chosen to attack unexpected targets in order to elevate fear and anxiety among the 
general population. But while smaller U.S. cities—like Oklahoma City—are clearly not safe 
from terrorist attacks, the very small role played by public transit in these cities (where the 
mode share of trips can dip below 1 percent) suggests that they are a far less likely venue for an 
attack than larger cities where the role and visibility of public transit are proportionally much 
greater.
3. The asymmetry of transit terrorism risk is at odds with a political system of public 
finance that favors distributing funding somewhat equally across jurisdictions.
Given the observed asymmetry of risk, how should security resources be deployed? If strategic 
transit security policies start from the premise that attacks will inevitably occur, then 
“success” is not elimination of all attacks, but preventing and/or minimizing the most 
damaging attacks, which are most likely and most deadly on the largest transit systems. While 
focusing security efforts on large transit systems in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los 
Angeles, for example, may motivate terrorists to shift their focus to smaller systems and 
smaller cities, such a shift could be viewed as evidence of success in securing the most 
symbolically significant and attractive targets.
However, there is a strong tendency in the public finance of transportation, and indeed in most 
realms of public finance, to distribute funding widely among political districts and 
jurisdictions. This helps to explain why federal per-rider transit subsidies tend to be far higher 
in places like Chapel Hill, North Carolina, than in places like New York City. This natural 
tendency to spread out money evenly does not square with the asymmetry of transit systems’ 
risk of terrorist attack, and may undermine the effectiveness of federal and state transit 
security policies and programs. Thus, despite New York’s domination of U.S. public transit 
patronage, it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress—comprising entirely geographically based 
**American Public Transportation Association, “Transit Agency Data,” http://www.apta.com/research/stats.
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representatives concerned with the distribution of resources among their competing 
jurisdictions—will see fit to devote a third or more of all federal transit security resources to 
the New York metropolitan area.
4. Transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of 
increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers.
Transit managers are in the business of attracting and conveying paying customers. They 
endeavor to provide safe, fast, and reliable service at a reasonable price, but transit systems 
worldwide have struggled in a losing, century-long battle with private vehicles for market 
share in urban travel—especially in most U.S. cities. Thus, from the perspective of transit 
system planners and managers, safety and security are important, albeit intermediate, means 
to the end goal of carrying passengers. As one transit industry official put it, “What’s 
important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible for satisfying the 
mobility needs of citizens. They are not security agencies.” 
With respect to the sometimes competing objectives of maximizing security versus 
maximizing ridership, one London interviewee noted,
Our primary function is to get loads of people to use trains. Security, I would 
suggest, is still seen as a secondary but integral function. So you won’t have the 
world’s most secure station built, but you’ll have the world’s most cost-effective 
station built with security enhancements.
Calls for increased attention to security have come in recent years from passengers, the media, 
local officials, and state and federal governments. With respect to the latter, mandates for 
regular and comprehensive security planning, more formalized safety and emergency response 
procedures, increased policing and surveillance, and so on were criticized by many of the 
transit officials we interviewed (both domestic and international) as unfunded mandates that 
strain already depleted transit system budgets. Indeed, the need for increased security funding 
was the central finding of the 2003 GAO study of transit security in the United States, and 
such calls for increased funding were echoed in this research.
According to one transit official interviewed, transit terrorism is a tremendous burden for 
agencies because they “have to be lucky all the time, while the terrorists only have to be lucky 
once.” Regarding the need for public subsidies to support security expenditures, another 
interviewee noted, “In the end, public transport is a business…There comes a point at which 
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the businessman will say that the security measures will cost him more than the revenues. The 
key issue for addressing risk is to get things down to ‘ALARP’ as we call it, ‘as low as 
reasonably practical.’”
In addition to concerns over the costs of security programs, many of the transit officials also 
expressed concerns over the uncertain nature of the risks and the uncertain effectiveness of 
increased security expenditures. “How,” several of those interviewed asked, “should systems 
evaluate costs and benefits in such uncertain environments?” Further, what techniques or 
approaches offer systems the most security bang for the buck? In response to such questions, 
the transit systems examined for this study have pursued an array of ways to prioritize 
expenditures on security:
• customizing security measures based on a detailed evaluation of risk for each site (Paris).
• assessing risks based on station location, socio-demographics of the region, and 
delinquency rates of surrounding population (Madrid).††
• focusing efforts on terminal stations, the most heavily patronized stations, and stations near 
government buildings (Tokyo).
• giving top priority to securing sites with concentrations of hazardous materials (Paris).
• conducting public surveys of riders’ perceptions and concerns to help prioritize needs 
(Madrid).
5. Given the varying roles and mandates of agencies of the central government 
(ministries, federal agencies, and so on), intelligence services, police agencies, and 
transit operators on matters of security, close coordination and cooperation are 
critical to effective transit security planning. 
Many of our interviewees spoke of the need for a multilayered and multipronged system of 
security in which various agencies play very different roles. Many transit officials with whom 
we spoke suggested that interagency cooperation is common to the industry, which bodes well 
for increased coordination with police and security agencies in the years ahead. One U.S. 
transit industry representative put it this way:
†† Said one Spanish official we interviewed: “…a station in the Basque country is not the same as a station in 
Andalusia in South Spain.”
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The transit industry, because it’s public, is very mutually supportive. Transit 
agencies aren’t in competition with each other. In fact, we have a long history of 
aiding one another with training programs. Even if you’ve hired a consultant to 
help you with a program, we’ve seen people really sharing that program or that 
information. One of the roles that [the American Public Transportation Association 
plays is that] we’re a conduit for the sharing of a lot of that information.
Many of those interviewed emphasized the importance of clearly defining roles and 
responsibilities among actors. Several also stressed the need for frequent and regular 
interaction among agencies to share information and agree on common strategies and tactics. 
Concluded one London interviewee,
Partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time 
to meet your counterpart in different agencies.... Resilience is about coordinating 
and facilitating efforts of all the disparate, separate agencies to ensure better quality 
of performance, aiding and leading to a more effective prevention or recovery than 
might otherwise be the case.
Finally, several of the transit officials interviewed noted that APTA, the leading U.S. transit 
industry organization, has come to play an increasingly central security coordinating and 
information-brokering role, and, in doing so, has come to more closely resemble the activities 
of the International Union of Public Transport (UITP) outside of the United States.
6. An important benefit of improved coordination is standardization of emergency 
training, security audits, and disaster preparedness procedures, and the issuance of 
common guidelines about security.
While the airline industry has adopted common international security standards and 
procedures, many other modes—and in particular public transit—have not done so. For 
example, several of our European interviewees noted that while many European Union (EU) 
member countries have developed highly integrated international passenger rail service, 
similarly integrated systems of rail security have been slow in coming.
Likewise, while the many transit agencies typically operating in larger metropolitan areas have 
developed reciprocal integrated fare and passenger information protocols, efforts to integrate 
and standardize security practices and procedures among transit systems within metropolitan 
areas and between them are relatively new.
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Such standardization can be particularly helpful to smaller transit operators that do not have 
the resources to independently develop security standards and procedures. For example, 
standardizing safety guidelines and signage, the structure and content of security 
announcements, and the marking of emergency exits on trains and in stations can all help 
passengers avoid confusion in times of emergency. Likewise, standardizing security training of 
personnel—drivers, supervisors, and managers—can improve coordination with police, fire, 
and intelligence officials in times of emergency. Many of the respondents from U.S. transit 
agencies surveyed for this research noted that, under the guidance of the federal government, 
standardized security plans and training programs were being integrated into already 
established emergency response training programs traditionally aimed at responding to 
personal and property crime and smaller-scale emergencies.
7. Despite significant progress in increasing coordination between transit and police/ 
intelligence agencies, much work remains.
Despite significant and ongoing efforts to improve the coordination and cooperation between 
the many, largely independent transit agencies operating in large U.S. metropolitan areas, 
seamless integration of routes, schedules, and fares has long proven elusive. Given the widely 
divergent goals and objectives of public transit and police/intelligence agencies, the challenges 
to increased coordination and cooperation are even greater.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to improved coordination identified in this study concerns 
ambiguity and uncertainty over lines of authority and responsibility. Put simply, it is not 
always clear who is responsible for what. Said one European transit industry representative we 
interviewed,
The public authorities are responsible for security. If there is a terrorist incident or 
attack, the transit authorities are responsible for restoring traffic as soon as possible. 
They [the transit agencies] should also help the public authorities to organize first 
aid and emergency response, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or 
to investigate the threat.
Despite the many challenges, nearly everyone queried agreed that increased coordination was 
needed. Such coordination can take many forms: (1) coordination between neighboring 
transit agencies; (2) coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement officials; (3) 
information sharing with the media and the public; (4) the improved dissemination of best 
practices in security planning; (5) consistent emergency response procedures and protocols; 
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(6) improved integration of different security-related technologies; and (7) increased 
international cooperation in sharing information and best practices. With regard to the 
latter, one official interviewed noted, “The threat is international and the way you need to 
deal with it is an international effort,” although several other interviewees cautioned that 
while international threats call for international collaboration, security measures should not 
be applied equally in al l  places;  they should be customized according to local  
organizational/governmental structures, transit system size, age, and characteristics, and the 
specifics of local cultures and norms.
8. Passenger education and outreach is a challenge; informed passengers can increase 
surveillance and safety, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit.
Although most of the officials surveyed and interviewed agreed that public education and 
outreach had become an important part of transit security planning, respondents were in 
general more ambivalent about education and outreach than about policing, technologies, or 
CPTED. In particular, many cited the challenge of raising awareness without raising fear. One 
of the officials we interviewed in Madrid said that their goal following the March 11, 2004, 
attacks was to augment feelings of security and diminish feelings of insecurity: “The methods 
we chose and implemented after the March attack were not so much about combating 
terrorism; rather they were used to help riders recover a feeling of security.”
While our interviews suggest that passenger outreach efforts on security have been more 
common outside the United States, nearly all those to whom we spoke agreed that it is a 
delicate balance between creating a perception of excessive, pervasive security (which is both 
costly and can incite fear among passengers) and too little security (which can promote a sense 
of danger and unchecked lawlessness). Said one transit industry official, “You have to reassure 
but not scare off passengers, because if you exceed a certain level [of police activity] it might 
be considered that you are in a very insecure place.”
Enlisting the public’s help in security surveillance can be effective, but entails risks. Excessive 
marketing of vigilance can create an environment of paranoia, where everything and everyone 
can be viewed as potential threats. Such paranoia can suppress ridership while overwhelming 
transit officials with security tips, and panicked passengers can compound damage after an 
attack.
 Executive Summary
Mineta Transportation Institute
13
Further, a strong emphasis on police and public surveillance can lead to social profiling, and 
with it losses of privacy and civil rights. Said one interviewee,
Here [in Spain] there would be a lot of problems and it wouldn’t be convenient to 
start screening passengers. People will not accept being identified, profiled, and 
searched, even if it is a random manner, because when you select, you elect and you 
have to do this with a certain objective and clear parameters. You will be accused of 
discrimination because this is labeling, marking people with certain physical 
features.
9. The role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is 
waxing.
Most of our survey and interview respondents were familiar with the concept of CPTED, and 
most viewed CPTED—which considers how the physical design of spaces can affect both the 
likelihood and impact of criminal or terrorist activity—as an important longer-term strategy 
to address both crime and terrorism on transit systems. According to the respondents to our 
survey, CPTED was given much less weight in security planning prior to 9/11. Since 9/11, 
however, over 80 percent of the respondents now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very 
effective strategy in preventing terrorist attacks. This ranking of effectiveness is similar to 
both policing and security hardware and technology strategies, and well ahead of public 
education and outreach.
According to one of our interviewees in Madrid, “Security is based on prevention, and 
prevention begins with design. A station designed without security criteria would be much 
more insecure and expensive to protect.”
While the potential effectiveness of CPTED was widely touted by those queried, many also 
noted that design is a longer-term strategy. CPTED strategies can be cost-effectively 
incorporated into new stations and terminals, such as in the new Météor and Eole Lines in 
Paris, the new Line 11 in Madrid, and the new Bilbao subway in Spain. On the other hand, 
most interviewees thought retrofitting old stations to be extremely costly for the most part. 
Concluded one interviewee regarding the retrofit of older stations, “The best you can do is to 
use some passive methods such as mirrors, cameras, and increased lighting.”
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Even among officials interviewed who work primarily in policing and security, knowledge of 
and enthusiasm for CPTED principles was widespread. For example, one London transit police 
official said,
If you take a station like Baker Street, it’s very dark [and listed as a historically 
significant] building so there are limitations on what can be done to change the 
appearance and structure. Not very much can be done at all. We’d like better 
lighting, more CCTV [closed-circuit television]. We’d like cleaner lines. Any 
vending machines that are brought in, we’d like them to have sloping tops so 
nothing can be put on top of them. We’d like them to be totally accessible or 
totally enclosed so they’re easy to search or impossible to put something in. We 
look at tamper-evident seals [on entryways to areas closed to the public], which 
can’t be physically locked. When it comes to new stations, bigger, brighter areas, 
clear sight lines, certainly those are the kinds of things that we would seek to 
influence. 
10. Since 9/11, transit agencies are more likely to adopt comprehensive, multipronged  
approaches to security planning than in years past. 
Our survey and interviews focused in detail on four types of security strategies—policing, 
technology, education and outreach, and CPTED. We found that attention to all these 
strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half of the respondents now view all four 
strategies as central or significant parts of security planning efforts.
Prior to 9/11, most of the respondents to our national survey of large transit operators said 
they had emphasized policing and hardware/technology in security planning, and placed far 
less stock in either public education or CPTED. While the survey respondents believed that 
the importance of policing and hardware/technology increased after 9/11, their assessments of 
the importance of public education and, especially, CPTED increased even more.
This broad support for all four security strategies reflects a consensus among those surveyed 
and interviewed regarding the need for a comprehensive, multipronged approach to transit 
security planning. Several interviewees cautioned against becoming too reliant on just one or 
two strategies. As one of our London interviewees noted,
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Each one (strategy) on its own can’t work in isolation. I don’t think that one of 
them sits out on its own. You’ve got to do each one. And you’ve got to have an 
element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or crime in general.
11. The public transit industry is vulnerable to security policies or programs that 
reduce the speed, comfort, or convenience of transit, and may benefit significantly 
from policies that increase the attractiveness of transit.
Despite significant public investments over the past three decades, public transit systems 
around the United States continue to lose market share to private vehicles. Many transit 
systems have made important strides in increasing the comfort, safety, and convenience of 
using transit, but matching the speed and flexibility of private autos remains a challenge. 
Transit security policies and programs that increase the hassle of, or delays in, riding buses and 
trains may significantly undermine an already vulnerable and distressed industry. For example, 
the random bag and parcel inspections instituted on the New York transit system following 
the July 2005 attacks on the London public transit systems will add stress and delays on the 
United States’ most heavily patronized transit system—stress and delays that inevitably make 
traveling by other modes relatively more attractive.
Many transit system managers said that new security measures should enhance the perceived 
safety and attractiveness of their systems, and not add to delays, inconvenience, or perceptions 
of heightened risk. The importance of creating safe, attractive systems for passengers, report 
some transit officials, is sometimes lost on security officials; as one interviewee from London 
said prior to the July 2005 attacks,
It’s trying to balance providing maximum security while still providing the kind of 
service people expect. People still want to go from point A to point B as fast as 
possible. They don’t want to be delayed, even for security reasons. So that’s the 
balance…it’s still a struggle… I think that is something that in the future has to 
evolve, to where you have that perfect balance where you can say, “I think we’re 
providing as much security as we can,” but it’s also seamless to the customer so you 
don’t have an operational slowdown.
12. Given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible 
benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a 
reduction in transit-related personal and property crimes.
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Terrorist attacks on transit systems in the United States and abroad have increased in recent 
years in both frequency and severity. Likewise, public and political concern over the issue has 
skyrocketed since 9/11. The fact remains, however, that transit patrons remain far more likely 
to be victimized by personal crime than a terrorist act. 
According to Federal Transit Administration data, an average of 279 people have been killed 
on or by public transit each year over the past decade. In addition, an annual average of 18,748 
people have been injured on or by public transit over the same period. Crimes ostensibly 
unrelated to transit use—such as being robbed or killed while waiting at a bus stop—would 
push these figures far higher. This means that, between September 11, 2001, and August 11, 
2005, more than 1,100 people have been killed on or by public transit, and more than 75,000 
have been injured on or by transit in the United States‡‡
Further, studies have repeatedly shown that fear of crime is a significant deterrent to transit 
use for many people.*** So while political attention and public resources are currently focused 
on transit terrorism, reductions of personal and property crimes on public transit systems 
could prove to be a significant collateral benefit of safer, more secure public transit systems.
In both our review of the research literature and in several of our interviews were repeated 
suggestions for a “dual-use strategy,” whereby antiterrorism measures may be effective in 
reducing transit crime. Coincident with new security measures on the Tokyo Metro, both 
robberies and thefts are down substantially. Likewise, fewer crimes were reported in the period 
following the implementation of random parcel inspections in Madrid.
Such complementary benefits, however, are not assured without careful attention to 
congruency between anticrime and antiterrorism measures. Some of those interviewed 
suggested that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts are not always reciprocal and 
complementary. “By preparing your system to react to terrorist attacks, you also prepare it to 
react to different types of crime…But the other way around is not always true” (Madrid transit 
official).
‡‡ Federal Transit Administration, “Transit Safety and Security Statistics,” accessed http://transit-
safety.volpe.dot.gov/Data/Samis.asp.
*** David Hartgen, Gerald Ingalls and Timothy Owens, Public Fear of Crime and Its Role in Public Transit Use, 
Raleigh, NC: University of North Carolina, Center for Interdisciplinary Transportation Studies, 1993; and 
G. Lynch and S. Atkins, “The Influence of Personal Security Fears on Women’s Travel Patterns,” 
Transportation 15, 2001.
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However, others argued that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts worked very much hand in 
hand. Said one London transit official: 
It’s easier for a terrorist to operate in an environment that is disorderly, that does 
not give the appearance that someone is in charge; the area does not look secure. 
Actually taking care of the little things, and insuring that there is order and 
maintenance, sends a signal that it’s hard to operate illegally or carry out an attack 
in this environment. There’s a deterrent effect.
Postscript
Whether these findings are discouraging or heartening depends on one’s perspective. The 
stakes are high, the risks uncertain, and the solutions unclear. The July 7 and 21, 2005, 
subway and bus attacks in London offer a sobering reminder that transit systems remain 
inherently vulnerable to terrorist actions, even on systems where security and vigilance have 
been the modus operandi for decades. While public transit systems are likely to remain 
attractive and vulnerable targets for terrorists, U.S. transit systems are today better 
coordinated, policed, monitored, and designed, and staff and passengers are better informed 
and prepared than just a few years ago. How effective these efforts will be (or have already 
been) in deterring or minimizing a terrorist attack is unclear. What is clear, however, is that 
crimes of all types—political, personal, and property—drive riders away from transit systems. 
So if the recent rise in transit security planning deters a major terrorist attack, or simply the 
activities of a lone pickpocket, the transit industry will be better off as a result.
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INTRODUCTION
For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public 
transportation offers an ideal target. 
—Jenkins and Gerston, 2001
The events of September 11, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security and terrorism 
to the forefront of civil society. While transportation security officials had been aware of the 
possible threat of terrorist attacks on transportation networks for some time, these tragic 
events revealed both vulnerabilities in security systems and the previously unimaginable 
consequences of such breaches. Public surface transportation systems are especially attractive 
targets for would-be terrorists wanting to cause the maximum amount of disruption and 
harm.1 Such systems serve very large numbers of people over extensive networks of stations, 
stops, and facilities. In the United States, 74 rail transit systems operate 18,000 vehicles in 38 
cities; collectively, these systems carry 3.4 billion passenger trips annually. The wide use of rail 
transit systems by many segments of the public makes them especially attractive targets for 
terrorists wanting to maximize disruption and harm. Accordingly, concerns about transit 
security rank high among transportation officials and transit riders.
The vulnerability of railway systems lies in the fact that they are very open and accessible, with 
fixed, predictable routes and access points. Their openness and anonymity make it easy for 
potential terrorists to hide in crowds without arousing suspicion. Securing such open and 
public systems presents a series of problems. The volume of passengers makes it impossible for 
transit operators to employ many of the security tactics used by commercial aviation.2
Preventive security measures on public transit, such as the screening of passengers and luggage 
with X-ray machines and metal detectors, hand searches, passenger profiling, chemical- and 
bomb-sniffing dogs, and armed guards, would lead to intolerable delays and costs. The need 
for transit agencies to offer transit systems that are accessible, convenient, and affordable for 
daily users thus conflicts with many security goals. In cities around the globe, people choose 
between public transit and private automobiles for many trips. Private vehicle use is growing 
in most cities, resulting in worsening congestion and air pollution. Attractive, convenient 
public transit systems help to mitigate many of the problems of widespread auto use, and 
provide mobility for those who do not have access to automobiles, including the young, 
elderly, disabled, and poor. Security measures that cause inconvenience, delay, or added cost to 
travel by public transit are likely to shift travelers and cities toward greater dependence on 
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private vehicles. Therefore, balancing transit riders’ desire for convenience, accessibility, and 
affordability with security measures presents a challenge to transit operators.3
A 1997 survey sponsored by the Transportation Research Board assessed both the perceptions 
of transit system managers regarding terrorism and security as well as the status of agencies’ 
existing emergency preparedness, planning, and response procedures. Over 40 U.S. 
transportation agencies participated in the survey, including agencies that provide rail service 
and coordinate bus systems. Urban and commuter rail systems ranked the highest in terms of 
the perceived risk as targets of terrorism. Detonation of explosive devices was perceived to pose 
the greatest threat to transit systems. A majority of the agencies surveyed had actually dealt 
with bomb threats in addition to a variety of other security threats.4
Transit Security in an International Context   
Security on mass transit is a global issue. Indeed, many transit systems around the world have 
been victimized by terrorists, including the railway systems of New York, London, Paris, 
Tokyo, Madrid, and Moscow. An analysis of terrorist attack trends indicates that their lethality 
has increased over time. In addition, the number of attacks against transportation systems 
increased in the 1990s. In 1991, transportation systems were the target of 20 percent of all 
violent attacks. This rose to almost 40 percent by 1998. Jenkins’ (1997, 2001) comprehensive 
chronology of 900 terrorist attacks involving surface transportation from 1920 to 2000 
provides an analytical model useful in identifying the most salient patterns and trends. He 
finds that about two-thirds of the attacks were intended to kill people (as opposed to simply 
disrupting transit operations), while 37 percent of the attacks actually resulted in fatalities. Of 
the incidents with fatalities, about three-fourths caused more than one death, and 23 percent 
caused 10 or more deaths.
International case studies of surface transportation systems that have suffered terrorist attacks 
can offer examples of both vulnerabilities to terrorist threats, and effective measures for their 
prevention, mitigation, and response. Such case studies offer lessons on preparedness, response, 
and recovery that may apply to other transportation systems with similar physical and 
organizational characteristics, including those in the United States. While some case studies of 
transit terrorist attacks exist, such as Jenkins (1997) or Jenkins and Gerston (2001), they are 
almost exclusively descriptive narratives of the events or assessments of the police and 
emergency responses that followed them. The existing literature on transit terrorism does not 
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identify and compare the social and environmental characteristics of the transit systems that 
have been hit by terrorism, or the strategies that transit agencies around the world are 
adopting to offer protection to their riders. While intelligence systems have globalized rapidly 
in response to recent terrorist attacks, planning to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks on 
transit systems is far more insular. Additionally, most research on transit terrorism has 
centered on the role of policing and technology in mitigating terrorist attacks.5 There has 
been far less investigation of how system design and public education may be employed to 
both reduce the likelihood of attacks and minimize the impact of attacks when they occur. 
Resources such as the public outreach tool kit for “Transit Watch” and the Volpe Center’s 
“Security Design Considerations for Transit Vehicles and Facilities” have more recently been 
funded by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).
Conceptual Model of Transit Terrorist Events
Following the July 2005 bombings in London, concerns with transit security rank very high 
among transportation officials and transit riders. Deterring and minimizing terrorist attacks 
involves assessments of vulnerabilities, the mitigation of weaknesses in the system, and the 
development of effective response and emergency plans. Yet planning for transit security to 
date has largely been ad hoc and often ambiguous. For example, surface transportation security 
tends to focus less on deterrence and more on mitigation, quick response, and the rapid 
restoration of services after an incident.
In contrast, the study that follows examines and compares responses to transit terrorist 
incidents, conceptualizing a process that extends over a very long time frame, approximating 
the life of the transit system. The analysis of international terrorist incidents that follows has 
gathered information relevant to each of the four stages described below:
Stage One—Planning, Designing, and Building: It is important to incorporate into the 
planning and physical design of a transit system the best current knowledge of terrorist 
threats, thereby minimizing through system design the potential damage of incidents that 
could occur at any time, even decades later. The choice of materials for the construction of 
stations and vehicles, for example, should be made on the basis of full consideration of terrorist 
attacks; the provision of ventilation systems should include considerations of fire suppression, 
anthrax, and possible chemical attacks; the selection of computerized communications and 
control systems should be informed by their potential vulnerabilities; and the architecture of 
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stops, stations, and vehicles should incorporate design principles that minimize their 
vulnerabilities, maximize their ability to continue functioning under difficult circumstances, 
and facilitate responses by emergency personnel.
Stage Two—Planning for Incident Response: The vulnerability of transit systems to 
terrorist attacks should be reviewed periodically throughout the operational life of a transit 
system so security officials can refine planning in response to evolving threats. For example, 
interagency cooperation should be encouraged and staff training should be updated. Sufficient 
information also must be provided to passengers so, in the event of an incident, they will know 
how to respond. In addition to the actions of transit operators and their funding agencies, law 
enforcement and intelligence efforts by agencies charged with counterterrorism should be 
ongoing.
Stage Three—Immediate Response to Incidents: If and when an incident occurs, the 
immediate response—including clearance, search, rescue, recovery, and the restoration of 
service—constitutes a critical stage. While the actions in this stage may last only a few weeks, 
they provide invaluable information for security planners as terrorist incidents are such 
infrequent events. With respect to this research, deconstructing the role of system design and 
operations in exacerbating or minimizing the effects of the attack can be used to help plan and 
operate safer public transit systems in the future and provide for continuity of operations in 
emergency situations.
Stage Four—Long-Term Recovery: The final stage in responding to a terrorist incident may 
last for years, and constitutes the redesign, reconstruction, and operation of the system under 
new rules and procedures that are influenced by the incident and what has been learned during 
the planning and rebuilding process. This stage also involves restoring public trust in the 
security of the transit system.
Scope of the Problem, This Research, and Policy Responses
The goal of this study, which uses transit authorities and transportation agencies as units of 
analysis, is to research global responses to the threat of transit terrorism by: 
• comparing policies and strategies employed by transit agencies in the United States and 
around the world. 
• contrasting the larger policy framework of transit security funding as exercised by different 
transit authorities and ministries of transport. 
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• evaluating the importance of transit station design for transit security.
• assessing the lessons learned from the different contexts for a more effective future response 
and prevention of terrorist attacks.
Implicit in our research design—and indeed in nearly all policy discussions surrounding the 
issue of transit security—is that public transit systems, or transportation and infrastructure 
systems more broadly, are the right way to think about the problem, the appropriate unit of 
analysis for study, and the correct venue for policymaking. At the very least, such assumptions 
warrant reflection.
We can think about three ways that acts of terrorism intersect with transportation systems:
• when transportation is the means by which a terrorist attack is executed.
• when transportation is the end, or target, of a terrorist attack. 
• when the crowds that many transportation modes generate are the focus of a terrorist attack. 
Examples of transportation as the means of a terrorist attack include the use of cars, buses, or 
trains to convey explosives, or when cars, buses, or planes are used as weapons. Examples of 
transportation as the end of a terrorist attack include attacks on bridges or tunnels to disrupt 
transit, railroad, or highway operations, exact economic costs, and attract attention. In each of 
these cases, the unique characteristics of transportation (and other infrastructure) networks 
define many aspects of the attacks, emergency response, and system protection. As such, the 
logic of defining both the problem and proposed policy solutions in terms of transportation, or 
in our case public transit, is clear.
But when crowds are the target, which is the case in many recent suicide bomb attacks, the 
logic of defining the problem and its solutions in terms of transportation is less clear. Airports, 
rail stations, and bus and ferry terminals all congregate large numbers of people in small, often 
enclosed, spaces. But such crowding is in no way unique to transportation stations and 
terminals. Skyscrapers, shopping malls, and major shows, concerts, and sporting events 
likewise congregate large numbers of people in small spaces—as do major celebrations (such as 
the 4th of July on the Mall in Washington, D.C.) and parades (such as the Tournament of 
Roses on New Year’s Day). In such cases, even if it were possible to completely close and secure 
public transit systems, the potential venues for tragic and devastating attacks on large crowds 
of people would hardly be dented. Thus, while public transit systems may currently be a 
favored venue of terrorists in search of crowds to attack, one cannot assume that securing or 
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eliminating crowds on public transit would in any way end or mitigate such attacks. Public 
assembly is a defining characteristic of free and open civil societies, and the consequences of 
closing, securing, or eliminating large gatherings of people reach well beyond the scope of this 
study or of the transportation sector.
Methodology 
The study has gathered research data from numerous sources, including the following:
• primary and secondary documents and archival information relating to terrorist incidents.
• visits to sites of terrorist attacks in New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, and Madrid.
• interviews with officials of transit agencies in these same cities.
• interviews with officials from ministries of transport and federal transportation authorities 
in five countries (United States, England, France, Japan, Spain).
• interviews with officials from two nongovernmental public interest groups, the American 
Public Transportation Association (APTA), based in Washington, D.C., and the 
International Union of Public Transport (UITP), based in Brussels.
• a survey of 120 transit agencies in cities throughout the United States.
Layout of the Study
The study is composed of six sections. Following the introduction, the second section presents 
a comprehensive look at “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of 
the Literature.” This research-literature review gives particular emphasis to design strategies. 
Drawing from two Mineta Transportation Institute reports, this section includes an overview 
of the history and chronology of terrorist attacks on railway systems, extending the inventory 
of terrorist attacks to 2004, and providing basic information about the medium of attack, the 
type of transit system attacked (heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail), and the impact of the 
attack (number of casualties).
The next section, “Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit 
Operators,” presents the results of a Web-based survey administered to 120 transit agencies in 
108 cities in the United States. The survey assesses (1) how the threat of terrorism affects the 
transportation security decisions of agencies; (2) how such decisions have changed after the 
events of September 11, 2001; (3) how agencies effectively identify and assess vulnerabilities 
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in their transportation systems; (4) what measures they are taking to increase transit security; 
and (5) the relative importance they place on different security strategies such as crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), public education and user outreach, 
policing, and security hardware and technology.
Transit agencies do not operate in a policy vacuum. Their planning efforts against terrorism 
are determined largely by policies and funding allocations at the state and federal levels. The 
fourth section, “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews 
with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” assesses the federal government’s role in the security of urban rail 
transit in the United States. Drawing from interviews with officials in a number of federal 
agencies, this section discusses and analyzes initiatives taken by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and the Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA). The section also reports on interviews with officials from the American 
Public Transportation Association (APTA) and security personnel from Amtrak, the New York 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), and the Port Authority of New York and New 
Jersey (PATH).
“Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents,” the next section, draws from the literature 
and first-hand interviews with transit officials in five cities—London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, 
and Madrid—to present five case studies of contemporary terrorist incidents: (1) the terrorist 
attacks waged by the Irish Republican Army against the London Underground; (2) the Fulton 
Street Station fire bombing in New York; (3) the sarin chemical agent release by members of 
the Aum Shinrikyo cult on the Tokyo subway system; (4) the bombings on the Paris rail 
system by Algerian terrorists, and (5) the Al Qaeda attack on the Madrid subway. The case 
studies detail the incidents and discuss the emergency and long-term design and policy 
responses to them.
The last section, “Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies,” reports on interviews 
with transit officials from Paris, Tokyo, London, Madrid, and Brussels to better assess the role 
of transit system design and operation in both exacerbating and minimizing terrorist attacks. 
This section also compares transit security policies in different countries and elaborates the 
goals of the different international transit agencies, their security measures and strategies, and 
the challenges they face in securing their systems.
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From the hundreds of pages of interview transcripts, survey results, and fieldwork notes, we 
distill twelve important lessons, which are summarized in the concluding section of this 
report.
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SECURING URBAN RAIL TRANSIT SYSTEMS AGAINST 
TERRORISM: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This section examines the current research literature on design and planning for terrorist 
attacks on urban rail systems. There is little dispute that urban rail transportation systems are 
uniquely attractive to those seeking to cause maximum disruption and harm. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issues regular threat assessments that place transit, particularly 
rail transit, at the top of their list of likely targets.6 These systems are made vulnerable by the 
very qualities that make them invaluable to the functioning of our most populous and 
economically critical metropolitan cores: their ability to move large volumes of people 
predictably and reliably to a large number of locations in the heart of the metropolitan region.
Efficient transit systems require an openness that prevents agencies and governments from 
adopting many of the terrorism prevention strategies used in aviation.7 Additionally, those 
charged with protecting transit systems from terrorist attack are often challenged by the scale 
and interdependency of many of these systems, which can include miles and miles of track in 
addition to stations and rolling stock. Finally, while the threat of terror has loomed large in the 
public mind since the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., attacks on transit 
occur rather rarely. This makes it difficult to justify cost or gauge the effectiveness of any 
particular strategy.8 Nevertheless, some very recent major terrorist attacks on railways in 
Madrid, Moscow, and London have raised major concerns about the vulnerability of mass 
transit systems.
In light of these complicating factors, it is not surprising that strategies to protect transit from 
terrorist attack historically have been reactive and ad hoc. Research in this area, consequently, 
has focused on policing, response, and rapid restoration of service. Only recently have 
researchers and transit systems turned their attention to long-range security planning that 
incorporates the terrorist threat.9 The focus on guidelines to help management and develop 
procedures gives agencies tools to assess their needs and develop solutions in the context of 
their transit systems’ unique configurations of threat, risk, and function. However, for 
information on specific measures and strategies, transit agencies must turn to other literatures 
provided by the building trades, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and 
the General Services Administration (GSA). Certainly, the diversity of transit systems and the 
uniqueness of each transit environment have frustrated efforts to develop comprehensive 
guidelines on specific security strategies and individual measures.
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An ad hoc, reactive approach may have served urban rail transit in an era when the threat of 
terror was more diffuse and remote. Indeed, further research may reveal that a solid response 
and recovery program is transit’s best defense. However, such research has not yet been done. 
Additionally, there has been far less investigation of how design may be employed to reduce 
the likelihood of attack and minimize the impact of attacks when they occur. Therefore, this 
review will pay particular attention to these longer-term design countermeasures. 
Scope of the Literature 
Research relevant to urban rail transit security consists of work in a number of disparate 
disciplines: risk assessment, transit safety planning, emergency response, crime prevention, 
urban design, and architecture. Materials include government guidelines, specifications and 
briefings from various federal and state agencies, best practice compendia, academic research, 
and industry and academic journals. With some notable exceptions, only very recently have 
researchers examined the threat of rail transit terrorism.10 Late in 2003, the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) unveiled a Website devoted to transit security (http://transit-
safety.volpe.dot.gov/Security/Default.asp), which assembles many of these varied threads. The 
Website is a valuable resource that makes available the FTA’s publications on the subjects of 
safety, security, and emergency preparedness, but it also reveals gaps in the literature. Another 
task of this review will be to examine the utility and potential pitfalls of adapting strategies 
for addressing the problem of transit terrorism from nonterrorism and nontransit situations. 
Case Studies and the History of Transit Terrorism
Curiously, much of the national policy literature that discusses terrorism generally does not 
dwell on transit terrorism.11 In fact, most of the literature on transportation terrorism tends to 
focus on aviation and cargo, despite the fact that mass transit is clearly a target and carries 
more passengers annually than air transport. A 2000 article in Transportation Research News 
with the auspicious title “Transportation Security: Agenda for the 21st Century” made no 
mention of rail transit security issues.12 
However, recent deadly attacks on subways in Moscow and Madrid, the impact of the events of 
September 11, 2001, on the transit systems of New York and Washington D.C., and the 
memory of terrorist attacks on subways in London, Tokyo, and Paris have heightened 
awareness of rail transit operators of the threat of terrorism. While the magnitude of the threat 
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is the subject of some debate, there is no longer a question that terrorism poses a challenge to 
urban rail transit systems. Jenkins’ research for the Mineta Transportation Institute, which 
presents a chronology of terrorist attacks on surface transportation systems from 1920 through 
2000, concludes that terrorist attacks on transit targets worldwide have increased in frequency 
and lethality over the past 25 years.13 Nontransit events such as the Oklahoma City attack, 
the Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta, and the September 11, 2001, attack on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon, reveal that the United States is vulnerable to both domestic 
and international terrorism. Further, while transit systems in the United States have not been 
the targets of sustained terrorist campaigns, a majority of the agencies surveyed in a 1997 
Transportation Research Board study had actually dealt with bomb threats in addition to a 
variety of other security threats.14 
For transit operators, the consequences of large-scale violence, or even the threat of such 
violence, is too dire to allow us to justify debates over the strict definitions of terrorism. The 
FBI’s official definition of terrorism is laid out in the Code of Federal Regulations as “a violent 
act or an act dangerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or 
of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social goals.”15 The terrorist threat to transit is not 
limited to plots by international organizations. In fact, even in the United States, the vast 
majority of terrorist acts are carried out by domestic terrorists such as neo-Nazis, antiabortion 
extremists, right-wing antigovernment militants, and far-left environmentalists.16 Although 
urban rail transit has not been a primary target of such terrorists, the 1995 derailment of 
Amtrak’s Sunset Limited by right-wing militants drew awareness to the possibility of such an 
attack. Because transit agencies are more concerned with effect, rather than motivation, they 
also analyze acts of “quasiterrorism,” such as the 1994 Fulton Street firebombing in the New 
York City subway.17 Bomb threats and acts of mass violence not intended to further political 
goals are no less crippling to a transit system than nominal terrorist acts. 
Chronology
Jenkins and Gerston’s research sheds light on the nature of the terrorist threat facing transit 
systems.18 Their work—which examines both rail and bus transit—comprises three volumes 
presenting case studies, an extensive chronology, and an executive overview. The chronology 
includes more than 800 separate incidents of terrorist attacks and other “significant criminal 
incidents” involving public transportation, culled from news accounts, books, and databases 
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compiled by the U.S government, the RAND Corporation, and the Kroll-O’Gara Company 
(see Appendix A). Roughly half of these incidents involved rail and half bus transit. Bombings 
are the most common mode of attack. Other tactics include ambushes and armed assaults, 
sabotage, hostage taking, and standoff attacks in which terrorists fire guns from a distance. 
The 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway was the only incident of chemical or biological 
attack. However, the attack, which killed twelve people and injured thousands of others, has 
prompted many transit systems in the industrialized world to include such a scenario in their 
security planning. 
Jenkins discerned a number of important trends in transit, which is thought to make up a 
third of all terrorist targets worldwide. The findings on the lethality of transit terrorism are 
disturbing. While only 20 percent of all terrorist incidents involve fatalities, 35 percent of the 
attacks reported in the 1997 document resulted in one or more deaths. In the 2001 document, 
the percent of fatal attacks rose to 43 percent. While Jenkins cautions that the data are 
difficult to compile comprehensively, the combined chronology results in a rate of lethality of 
37 percent. Of the 641 incidents reported in the 1997 report, 80 percent involved more than 
one fatality and 30 percent more than ten. While transit terrorism has increased in the past 25 
years, it remained stable during the 42 months between the 1997 and 2001 reports. Jenkins 
noted that changes in the reporting of terrorist acts may have been a factor.19
The implications for the United States and comparable developed nations are less dire, 
however, than the numbers above would suggest. Two-thirds of attacks occur in countries with 
ongoing civil wars or terrorist campaigns. India, Pakistan, Cambodia, Angola, and Israel have 
suffered the greatest number of fatal attacks. Consideration of total attacks changes the 
rankings somewhat: Israel, India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Egypt. As a reference to 
the magnitude, 493 people were killed in 54 incidents in India that occurred from 1920 to 
1997. The median fatal incident involved four deaths, and the maximum was more than one 
hundred. In some sense, it would appear that terrorism on transit is analogous to crime on 
transit, in that transit crime generally reflects the level of crime of the larger urban area in 
which it is situated. Jenkins concluded that if such countries were left out of the analysis, the 
threat would look quite different. Attacks would be less lethal and predictable, and Japan and 
Germany would move to the top of the list.
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Case Studies
Jenkins’ 1997 Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities details 
the experience of four transit systems that were targets of terrorism: the New York City 
Transit Authority (NYCTA), the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), 
the Réseau Express Régional (RER) in Paris, and Amtrak’s Sunset Limited. Jenkins’ follow-up 
report, Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing 
Research on Best Security Practices, documents London’s experience with the IRA’s seven-year 
bombing campaign, and the sarin attack on a Tokyo subway in March of 1995.20 It also 
reviews the security strategies of greater San Francisco’s Bay Area Rapid Transit District 
(BART) and the Valley Transportation Authority (VTA) in Silicon Valley. While these last two 
systems have not been the target of any terrorist threat, the authors hoped to shed light on 
levels of preparedness that may be more useful to the majority of transit agencies outside the 
largest urban areas. All the research was conducted prior to the 9/11 attacks of 2001. 
To make comparison and future analysis easier, Jenkins and Gerston applied a consistent 
format to all eight of the case studies. The format included a description of the system, 
existing security elements, crisis management planning, liaisons with authorities, and an 
account of the immediate response to the threat or attack. Existing security elements described 
are threat assessment, organization and personnel, environmental design, technology, 
emergency communications, response, recovery, and the role of the public. Response elements 
included additional security measures put in place after the communication of threat or attack, 
emergency response, restoration of services, lessons learned, and problem areas. The 
applicability of these categories to each of the case studies varies, as does the depth to which 
they are discussed. However, the format allows the researchers to distill from them a number 
of “desirable attributes of security.” Coordination with authorities is deemed to be most 
important, followed by dedicated security personnel, security technology, advanced planning, 
environmental design, communications, training, and public involvement.
In addition to Jenkins and Gerston’s work, case studies are also available from other sources. 
The Federal Highway Administration offers a series of reports, Effects of Catastrophic Events on 
Transportation System Management, two of which deal with New York’s and Washington’s 
transportation response to the events of September 11, 2001.21 The New York report notes 
that, despite the significant damage to the PATH World Trade Center Station and the 
Cortland Street subway station, there were no transit-related injuries or deaths. Credit is given 
to the immediate activation of rehearsed emergency procedures by the transit agencies. 
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Finally, Whent’s presentation, “Control of Public Space,” to the American Public 
Transportation Association’s 1999 annual conference, provides a particularly insightful case 
study of London’s antiterror transit strategy.22 The safety and security strategy employed by 
railway networks in England, Scotland, Wales, and throughout the London Underground, 
called “Control of Public Space,” was developed in response to the seven-year bombing 
campaign carried out by the IRA from 1991 to 1998.
Over the course of the seven-year campaign, three people were killed and sixty-seven were 
injured. The system received 7,000 bomb threats, forty-nine of which resulted in actual 
detonations. In spite of this, the system was able to operate effectively, which Whent directly 
credits to the safety and security strategy. By 1994, three years after the initiation of the 
Control of Public Space strategy, no bombs were placed in railways stations. Although the 
IRA continued to issue bomb threats, service was disrupted for less than 1.8 percent of the 
called-in threats. Whent’s rough estimate of the saving in economic damage was millions of 
pounds. He describes the concept of Control of Public Space as “one station stop before zero 
tolerance.” Under this theory, data collection, as well as coordination among agencies and the 
public, helped to pinpoint concentrations of antisocial behavior where resources could be 
concentrated before the commission of any crime or bombing. 
This is similar to New York’s crime tracking and accountability CompStat program. 
Measurable performance indicators were developed at the outset and reviewed throughout the 
campaign. The first three of these goals were increasing passenger satisfaction, revenue, and 
the number of rail users. This is in line with the CPTED principle that security should first 
support the function of an environment, rather than be an end unto itself. Separating security 
from an environment’s primary function increases the danger, particularly relevant to transit, 
that security measures themselves will exact too high a cost on the environment that the 
security strategy is attempting to protect. The next three goals were increasing arrests and the 
number of detected offenses, and decreasing the number of offenses reported. Among the other 
strategies that the scheme employed were removal of trash cans from stations, immediate 
removal of unsupervised packages, announcements and public notices on trains and stations, 
computer-assisted analysis of threats and bombings, contingency planning, regular searching 
of facilities, and extensive use of computer-assisted closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems.
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Framework for Addressing Rail Transit Terrorism
The overall framework for conceptualizing rail transit security against terrorism has 
traditionally drawn on agencies’ experience with safety, crime prevention, and emergency 
response.23 However, the threat of terrorism is differentiated from all these prior concerns. The 
type of security concerns transit agencies have confronted in the past, largely personal and 
property crimes, typically did not result in the need to mobilize a coordinated emergency 
response effort by the system as a whole. Natural disasters and safety failures were more likely 
to trigger such a response, but are not deliberate crimes. As the threat of terrorism increases, 
agencies are charged with incorporating elements of all three—safety, crime prevention, and 
emergency preparedness—into a comprehensive planning effort.
The transit industry began to formally address issues of emergency preparedness and security 
in the early 1990s with the development and implementation of the APTA Rail Safety Audit 
Program. Within the prescribed elements set out for system safety programs plans, were 
elements specifically noted for emergency preparedness and response and security. This 
standardized approach to system safety became imbedded in regulation by the FTA (49CFR/ 
Part 659). Subsequently, in a partnership between APTA, commuter railroads, and the FRA, a 
similar program, the Commuter Rail Safety Management Program (including elements 
pertaining to emergency response and preparedness and security) was implemented in 1996. 
An additional program for bus operations, known as the APTA Bus Safety Management 
Program, was introduced in 1997.
Initially, the process of planning for terrorist threats against transit targets involved three 
broad categories of consideration: prevention, response, and recovery.24 
Prevention includes design, technology, policing, and public education. In the open 
environment of a transit system, prevention may be too optimistic an expectation when faced 
with a determined attacker. In this case, a more accurate way to conceive of the security 
function of prevention is to consider strategies to detect the threat and deter or delay its 
realization. Policing, technology, and design strategies are all geared to these two functions. 
The response effort comprises planning for disaster, conducting drills, and designing to 
facilitate evacuation and minimize damage. Recovery planning focuses on rapid service 
restoration. By getting the system up and running to minimize disruption, transit agencies 
reduce the reward of the terrorist act. Within these three broad categories, the literature has 
given the most attention to response and policing strategies. They are logical first steps that 
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are easily folded into existing programs that have long been in place to address more common 
incidences of crime and natural disasters. Given the cost of planning, design, and construction, 
system design responses tend to be or are limited in scale and ad hoc in nature. Often such 
strategies are sought in the immediate aftermath of an attack or in response to an immediate 
threat. For example, immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority placed New Jersey barriers around the perimeter of Grand Central Station, and 
many systems removed trash bins from stations.
With a longer time horizon, transit operators must now identify what strategies are likely to 
be most useful given varying levels of threat, vulnerability, and value associated with a system 
and its components. The literature has begun to reflect this shift with a number of studies that 
seek to apply risk assessment methodologies used by the military, government agencies, and 
industry to the context of urban rail transit terrorism.25 These frameworks come under the 
titles of “hazard analysis,” “risk and threat assessment,” and “systems approach.” Given the 
diversity of transit systems’ designs and needs for security, these frameworks give only general 
guidance on individual strategies. Rather, they provide procedures to support agency decision 
making around security.
The FTA first began to comprehensively address transit security related to crime with its 1983 
publication, Transit Security: A Description of Problems and Countermeasures, by Mauri, Cooney, 
and Prowe.26 The report’s findings are based on a literature review, site visits and interviews at 
thirteen transit systems, and contact with nontransit organizations with knowledge of security. 
The report uses the framework of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reporting (UCR) Program, which provides categories and classifications for criminal acts. 
Terrorism and sabotage had not yet appeared on transit agencies’ radar screens as a serious 
concern. Instead, the focus was on protecting passengers from individual violence and theft, 
and on protecting the system from vandalism and theft. When asked about situations 
involving bomb threats and terrorism, the agencies said they would rely on the police. 
The most comprehensive of these frameworks applicable to urban rail transit is listed in the 
FTA’s 2003 publication, Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning 
Guide.27 The guide deals explicitly, but not exclusively, with terrorist threats against rail and 
bus transit. However, more frequently occurring crime and emergency responses to natural 
disasters are the basic justifications of these preparations. This is the FTA’s main guidance on 
transit security and the first to marry crime prevention with emergency response. It advocates 
a systems approach that combines the practices of emergency response planning and criminal 
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security planning. System security has been defined in previous documents as “the application 
of operating, technical, and management techniques and principles to the security aspects of a 
system throughout its life to reduce threats and vulnerabilities to the most practical level 
possible through the most effective use of resources.”28 
The current framework has refined the broad three-phase approach mentioned earlier to 
include five “Elements of Protection.”29 These elements include security planning, security 
management, emergency response, physical security and procedures, and threat and 
vulnerability resolution. The guide provides step-by-step procedures for threat and 
vulnerability resolution and security planning, necessary for implementation of the other three 
elements. While transit agencies must turn to other sources for more comprehensive guidance 
for the implementation of specific strategies, the guide does introduce available techniques for 
implementing security management, emergency response, and physical security measures.
The main component chapters provide detailed methods for developing a Security and 
Emergency Preparedness Program (SEPP). Under the federal State Safety Oversight Rule, 
thirty-two transit systems in nineteen states and the District of Columbia must have a SEPP in 
place. The directive that required the FTA to establish these rules was codified into the Federal 
Transit Act in 49 U.S. Code, section 5330. The final rule is codified in 49 CFR Part 659, and 
is referred to as the State Safety Oversight Rule or Part 659. The information on SEPP 
programs details how agencies develop internal management systems and external 
coordination systems with local law enforcement as well as state and federal agencies.
To support the development of a SEPP, the guide covers procedures for conducting capability 
assessments as well as threat and vulnerability assessments. A major goal of these assessments 
is to rationalize the process of providing security, making it more cost effective and 
sustainable. They are designed to enable transit operators to strike a balance between security 
needs and practices and available resources. A capabilities assessment is proposed as a way for 
transit operators to assess their current procedures and resources to reduce the threat of crime 
and terror; respond to incidents that do occur; protect passengers, personnel, and the system 
itself during emergencies; and assist the community in emergency response. A threat and 
vulnerability assessment is used to analyze the likelihood that a specific threat will occur. The 
five elements to be included in a threat and vulnerability assessment are asset analysis, target 
and threat identification, vulnerability assessment, consequence analysis, and countermeasure 
recommendation. The guide and the accompanying CD-ROM provide checklists to 
summarize the issues to be considered in all these assessments.
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The final chapter of the guide offers an overview of available design and technology strategies 
to improve security, and briefly describes some of the crime prevention through environmental 
design (CPTED) and situational crime prevention (SCP) principles and design strategies 
commonly used in transportation environments: concentric security zones and spatial 
transitions, natural surveillance, access control, territorial behavior strategies, and good 
lighting. These principles will be discussed further in the next section.
The sequence of government publications leading up to the Public Transportation System Security 
and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide illustrates just how recently terrorism has emerged as 
a major threat to the security of the U.S. transit environment. The 2003 guide builds on 
several previous government reports: Transit System Security Program Planning Guide by Balog, 
Schwarz, and Doyle, 1994; Perspectives on Transit Security in the 1990s by Boyd, Maier, and J. 
Kenney, 1996; Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism by Boyd and Sullivan, 1997; and the 
Transit Security Handbook by Boyd, 1998. Terrorism is mentioned only in passing in both a 
1994 guide by Balog, Schwartz, and Doyle, and in a 1996 survey by Boyd, Maier, and Kenny. 
However, by 1997, with Boyd and Sullivan’s report, terrorism had become a serious enough 
concern to warrant its own Transit Cooperative Research Program Synthesis report.30
While the Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide and its 
predecessor documents are intended to assist established agencies in meeting state and federal 
requirements for system security and safety, the FTA also provides guidance for voluntary 
safety and security certification in the development of transit projects, both new starts and 
extensions. Handbook for Transit Safety and Security Certification was developed cooperatively by 
the FTA and the American Public Transportation Association.31 Again, because of the 
diversity of transit systems, the role of this document is to provide agencies with an 
organizational and management framework that supports the decision making processes 
necessary to ensure that new projects are as safe, secure, and cost-effective as possible. Most 
systems engage in some form of self-certification procedure, but this document is intended to 
help them more fully integrate emerging safety and security considerations into those 
procedures. While the handbook does not include direct design guidance, it provides useful 
insight into the categories of design elements of transit projects for which safety and security 
are a major concern.
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Designing for Security
Such frameworks provide useful tools for agencies seeking to define the overall scope of their 
antiterrorism efforts and enable them to begin to prioritize their approach. However, the 
strategies agencies choose will, by necessity, be specific to their situations and are beyond the 
scope of these guides. Designing for terrorism in transit has not received the same amount of 
attention as emergency management, response, and policing, and it can be difficult for a 
transit security manager to find comprehensive design guidance to suit his or her particular 
situation. It is incumbent on the security manager to seek out further guidance in other bodies 
of literature for these specific strategies, especially in the case of design. The lack of specific 
research and guidance for transit in this area is unfortunate. Security managers want to be 
assured that the design elements of their security strategy are effective and do not leave their 
passengers and personnel unnecessarily at risk. Additionally, as much as threats and acts of 
terrorism can have serious consequences for a transit system, security strategies themselves 
may also interfere with the operations of transit. This caution against unintended 
consequences has been raised numerous times in the general field of antiterrorism physical 
design.32
There are several reasons why design has not been given much attention in the literature of 
transit terrorism security. The first is temporal. While the threat of terrorism is not entirely 
new, the degree of consideration has been minimal compared to other transit issues, such as 
safety and crime prevention. As late as 1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 
today known as the United States Government Accountability Office) reported that among 
the agencies in the seven cities they studied, “transit officials had no direct experience of 
terrorist incidents, perceived the likelihood of incidents to be remote, and had no 
antiterrorism programs.”33 In the 1990s, the first order of business in addressing the emerging 
threat was to put systems into place to deal with the consequences of an attack, and only now 
do agencies have the dubious luxury of an indefinite time horizon that necessitates and 
facilitates design consideration.
Second, the most vulnerable systems are by far the largest; the task of retrofitting security 
design is a daunting one. Jenkins and Gerston were careful to include a security criterion 
category, called “environmental design and construction features,” for each of the eight case 
studies, so that they could compare each system’s efforts. However, Savage of the New York 
City Transit Authority (NYCTA), interviewed in one of the case studies, notes that,“NYC 
Transit suffers from a disadvantage due to the sheer size of the system because its 468 stations 
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were constructed over a span of 120 years. Security was not previously a major consideration in 
design and construction and the cost of systemwide remedial construction would be 
enormous.”34 
Further reading on the NYCTA case does, in fact, show that the agency takes design into 
consideration. For example, a security task force from NYCTA visited England, Italy, France, 
and Japan, to study those systems’ experiences with terrorism.35 The agency implemented the 
task force’s management suggestions, such as the establishment of ventilation procedures, but 
held off on the resulting design recommendations. Changes to station layout were considered 
infeasible, again, due to the scale of the system. Additionally, a recommendation to remove 
trash receptacles from stations was thought to be counterproductive. The heightened risk of 
track fires resulting from trash buildup was considered more dire than the perceived-as-remote 
risk of a bomb being placed in a trash can. Thus, the decision not to implement security 
measures can be as important as the decision to move forward with such measures.
A third reason for the limited attention design has received is that, as one author notes in a 
recent issue of Passenger Transport, “Preparedness is the best defense” against terrorism.36 The 
expense of capital construction for physical security and the potential for such measures to be 
counterproductive in the transit environment may suggest that other alternatives take priority. 
This is coupled with the sense that in an era of suicide bombing, security is illusory and there 
is no defense against a determined terrorist.37 In other words, the best hope for transit is to 
minimize disruption by having a very organized response and recovery strategy.
However, such a pragmatic, fatalist view ignores actual and potential roles that design plays in 
security planning for individual crimes and terrorism. Most terror experts call for “layering” 
protective strategies so that no single strategy is responsible for the entire system, and the 
failure of one layer does not necessarily jeopardize the security of the system overall.38 Physical 
security and design dictate the location of system components and the layers of security 
encompassing them. Further, on a conceptual level, design is itself one of these many layers of 
security strategies, along with policing and response planning. Even if the consensus is that 
good policing is the best defense against terrorism and effective emergency response the best 
way to minimize the effect of terrorism, design serves the important function of ensuring that 
those primary resources are fully utilized.39 In this light, the task of minimizing opportunities 
for crime and terrorism through design becomes critical. 
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Design Strategies
Security design involves two areas of facility design: the spatial layout of transit facilities, and 
the structural design of buildings, track, and rolling stock. Since very little has been written 
that is directly applicable to transit vehicles and stations, the most useful guidance in the area 
of designing for antiterror security comes mainly from the building trades. The GSA, in its 
capacity as the federal government’s landlord, and FEMA provide excellent advice and 
specifications for building antiterror security in the areas of target hardening, fire safety, blast 
resistance, and situational crime prevention strategies (SCP) such as crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED).40 The American Institute of Architects (AIA) offers guidance 
through its 2003 publication, Security Planning and Design: A Guide for Architects and Building 
Design Professionals.41 Additionally, the latest edition of Architectural Graphic Standards
includes a chapter on design criteria for security against terror.42 
Academia has provided a number of case studies and best practice guidelines that list 
strategies employed by selected transit operators.43 At least one state, Florida, through the 
work of the Center for Urban Transportation Research at the University of South Florida in 
2001, has developed a list of recommended design measures in its own antiterror analysis.
Environmental Design
The important role that environmental design plays in reducing or supporting crime in the 
transit environment is well documented.44 According to Felson and LaVigne, the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA or Metro) and the Port Authority Bus 
Terminal are classic examples of success stories of applied security design against crime in rail 
transit environments.45 In each case, environmental design shares the credit for increased 
security with strategic policing, strict maintenance procedures, and “zero tolerance” policies in 
enforcing rules and regulations. However, the applicability of these successes to terrorist threat 
must be viewed cautiously. Effective design against crime will not necessarily provide 
sufficient protection against terrorist threats because there are significant differences between 
criminals’ motivations and the effects of the crimes they seek to commit and those of terrorists.
CPTED and SCP are both aimed at reducing opportunities for specific types of crime, 
particularly in public or semiprivate environments. The goal of CPTED is to influence the 
social and physical use of space through environmental design that discourages antisocial and 
criminal behavior.46 
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The main CPTED principles are natural surveillance, natural access control, and
territorial reinforcement. Natural surveillance refers to the use of building design and 
layout to increase the ability of legitimate users and security personnel to observe activity. 
Clear sight lines have the effect of increasing visibility of users and limiting opportunities for 
hidden activities.47 Natural access control is achieved by using building elements to limit or 
channel access to the facility; for example, allowing for only one entrance into a facility and 
providing an extended “standoff distance” between the building and the street. Territorial 
reinforcement strategies encourage desired users to take “ownership” of certain spaces under 
the theory that people pay more attention to their surroundings if they are invested in that 
space. These strategies concentrate public uses and amenities to increase the likelihood that 
improper use of the space will not be tolerated by the critical mass of legitimate users. 
Situational crime prevention takes CPTED one further step by incorporating design strategies 
with strategic management policy and policing functions.48 
LeVigne, Clarke, and Felson are each very careful to note that the successes recorded in their 
work are evidence of one of CPTED and SCP’s fundamental principles: that management 
procedures and the environment be tailored to highly specific crime problems.49 Balog, Boyd, 
and Caton also make note of this in their work.50 The type of designs prescribed for individual 
crimes relies on well established theories of criminal behavior, motivation, and individual 
perceptions of risk and reward. However, criminals seeking personal gain will necessarily have 
very different motivations than those seeking to cause maximum destruction to further a social 
or political goal. Even on a purely theoretical level, the direct application of measures that 
have been successful in reducing the threat of crime will not necessarily prove successful 
against the terrorist threat. For example, LaVigne (1996) notes that CCTV cameras are 
mounted in very visible locations in the WMATA stations to alert would-be criminals that 
they are being watched. 
The cameras alone appear to be enough to deter offenders, as LaVigne quotes former D.C. 
Metro Transit Police Chief Angus MacLean as saying, “The cameras mainly serve a 
psychological purpose because they read out at the station manager’s kiosk and often no one is 
there.”51 It is easy to see where “dummy” cameras and similar devices might not be as effective 
in deterring a bomber with a different psychological relationship to the risk of being caught. 
For CPTED to work against the threat of terror, its strategies must be tailored to the 
motivations and behaviors of terrorists.
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The applicability of crime prevention design strategies to the threat of terrorism has not been 
adequately addressed in the literature. Many sources simply extrapolate the CPTED approach 
from crime prevention to terrorism prevention. This makes sense where security tactics share 
common goals, such as in access control and surveillance. However, relying only on successful 
crime prevention strategies to address the terrorist threat ignores important distinctions in 
mode, motivation, and magnitude. 
In its recent publications on designing buildings against terrorist attack, FEMA takes a more 
nuanced approach: “In cases where CPTED techniques conflict with security principles, 
designers should seek innovative solutions tailored to the unique situation.”52 The authors 
note that many antiterror design strategies are similar to those prescribed under CPTED 
principles. For example, using the principle of natural surveillance to limit opportunities to 
conceal illicit acts is similar to the common antiterror approach of eliminating spaces where an 
attacker could conceal an explosive. However, they also discuss the possibility that individual 
crime prevention strategies can conflict with the goals of designing for the threat of an 
explosive attack. They offer the example of the location of parking facilities. CPTED 
principles would suggest that a parking lot be located in a place that facilitates casual 
monitoring by the building’s occupants and visitors. However, allowing vehicles too close to 
the building may increase its vulnerability to a car or truck bomb.53 Some design elements 
credited with combating crime can, in fact, become liabilities in the event of an incendiary 
attack. Both LaVigne and Boyd note the role of trash cans on WMATA’s station platforms in 
maintaining a clean environment in which crime is not tolerated.54 This may be a good 
strategy in transit systems with low risk of terrorist attack as trash cans and recycling bins are 
important passenger amenities. However, Jenkins’ chronology reveals trash cans to be a 
favorite delivery device for terrorist bombings in transit stations.55 In response to this threat, 
the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) switched from conventional to 
bomb-resistant trash cans at busy stations during the 1996 Olympics.56 Other high-risk 
systems, especially those with underground stations, have removed or sealed their trash cans 
entirely. Such stations have maintained their standard of cleanliness by adopting a “pack it in/
pack it out” policy similar to many state parks, and increasing maintenance rounds. 
The use of glass as a design element is particularly problematic in the event of a bombing, but 
it is cited in many documents dealing with designing out crime in the transit environment.57
Glass serves an important security function when it enhances formal and informal surveillance 
by bringing in natural light, providing a sense of openness, and enhancing visibility. In 
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Felson’s study of the Port Authority’s efforts to bring crime under control in the mid-1990’s, a 
glass-walled café in the Port Authority Bus terminal affords ample opportunity for casual 
surveillance of a once isolated area.58 Glass is also featured extensively in the security strategies 
of a proposed subway station in Paris.59 In this case, glass skylights bring in natural light and 
glass barriers along the platform prevent accidental falls and pushings. 
However, when ruptured by a bomb blast, glass can be extremely hazardous. In its book, 
Security Planning and Design, the AIA offers this gentle caution: “Glass fragments generated 
during failure are extremely hazardous to building occupants and, if not properly designed, 
can cause mass casualties when propelled at high speeds into occupied spaces.”60 
This is not the end of glass, because there are several ways in which it can be made safer, 
including heat treating and laminating. The AIA book also notes that even if blast resistance 
is the only consideration (leaving aside aesthetics and building performance), decisions about 
glazing depend on many factors, from the level of the bomb threat to the integrity of the 
frame, and the blast load on the facility itself. This caution should serve not as a prohibition 
against the use of glass in transit station design. Rather, it is an illustration of the tensions 
among the design requirements of traditional crime security, antiterror security, and 
aesthetics.
In spite of the hazards inherent in applying crime prevention design strategies directly to the 
threat of terrorism, the many guiding principles and lessons of CPTED can inform antiterror 
security strategies. This is especially true in an environment as public and open as transit, 
where the theories of CPTED can be a valuable countervailing force against traditional target-
hardening measures, which can interfere with an agency’s mandate to provide efficient public 
transportation at minimal cost. A goal of CPTED is to provide security while emphasizing the 
objectives of the organization, rather than focusing solely on target hardening.61 But for 
design to play a role in securing transit against terrorism, security planners and designers must 
first understand the nature of the threats posed by criminals who seek large-scale destruction 
of life and property. Then, they must select among the most effective strategies for each 
specific threat, according to an evaluation of each measure’s tangible and intangible costs and 
benefits. At the very least, the effects of successful anticrime strategies must be decomposed to 
see what elements of these anticrime measures would work against the specific requirements of 
security under the threat of terrorism.
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Understanding the Threat to the Physical Environment
To better understand the nature of the threat of terrorism in terms of modes of attack and 
effects of those attacks on transit’s physical structures, planners can turn to the growing body 
of literature provided by the building trades, the military, and the federal government. 
Fortunately, the effects of manmade disasters, as well as their mitigations, are well 
documented and familiar to the emergency management community. One of the more 
accessible discussions of the current state of the practice is found in FEMA’s 2003 publication, 
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. A second 2003 FEMA 
publication, titled Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, is part of a series of 
“how to” guides for communities and states. 
In Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning, FEMA provides a set of “Event 
Profiles for Terrorism” that planners can use to familiarize themselves with the various modes 
of attack, the extent of their effects, and any mitigating or exacerbating conditions. The list 
includes attack modes relevant to the transit environment such as conventional bombs or 
improvised explosive devices, and chemical, biological, or radiological agents. In addition, the 
guide provides a list of “Terrorism and Technological Hazard Mitigation Actions,” which they 
caution “is by no means exhaustive or definitive; rather, it is intended as a point of departure 
for identifying potential mitigation techniques and strategies in your community or state.” 
With the foregoing caveat, the recommended actions range from “implement crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED)” and “eliminate potential site access 
through utility tunnels, corridors, manholes, etc.” to “create blast-resistant exterior 
envelope.”62 Because the guide is intended for those without specific expertise in antiterrorism 
security, it does not discuss the degree of effectiveness of these measures in mitigating specific 
threats.
Even more specific guidance is provided by FEMA’s Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. Just as security design against terror builds on the detection 
and deterrence functions of anticrime security design measures, FEMA’s reports build on its 
experience in mitigating against natural disasters. As an example of this synthesis, they note 
that their recommendations for hurricane window design also apply to bomb blasts. However, 
they are careful to note where a natural hazards approach may be deficient.63 For example, 
mitigating natural hazards does not require the same attention to access control and 
surveillance. 
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The reference manual begins with a threat and hazard analysis methodology similar to those 
recently developed for transit. Part of this methodology includes an extensive “Building 
Vulnerability Assessment Checklist” borrowed from the Veterans Administration. The 
checklist is composed of questions designed to determine the vulnerability of specific elements 
of the building’s design and operation. The questions relate to thirteen categories of building 
design and operations, many of which are applicable to the transit environment: site, 
architecture, structural systems, building envelope, utility systems, mechanical systems 
(heating, ventilation, and air conditioning), plumbing and gas systems, electrical systems, fire 
alarm systems, communications and information technology (IT) systems, equipment 
operations and maintenance, security systems, and security master plan. Similar assessment 
checklists are widely available, including one recently developed specifically for transit 
systems on behalf of the FTA.64 FEMA’s checklist is unique, however, in that each question is 
associated with specific guidance and a reference to another guide. For example, question 1.3 
asks, “In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park 
unacceptably close to a building in public rights-of-way?” In response, the guidance offers: 
Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient setback, 
restrict parking in the curb lane. For typical city streets, this may require 
negotiating to close the curb lane. Setback is common terminology for the distance 
between a building and its associated roadway or parking. It is analogous to stand-
off between a vehicle bomb and the building. The benefit per foot of increased 
stand-off between a potential vehicle bomb and a building is very high when close 
to a building and decreases rapidly as the distance increases.65
This is followed by a reference to a publication providing more detailed guidance: General 
Services Administration’s Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service, published in 
2003.66 
Security is traditionally addressed from the outside in, from the building’s site perimeter to 
the building envelope and, finally, the interior. FEMA’s guide devotes a great deal of its report 
to site selection and site design criteria, which, they note, have limited applicability to dense 
urban settings. Nonetheless, FEMA does present the potential of urban design to negotiate the 
tensions among security, aesthetics, and primary use of space around the building’s perimeter. 
Where similar guides have recommended against the use of bus shelters because they can hide 
illicit activity from view, FEMA simply suggests that they be designed to enhance 
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surveillance. Also unique to this report is its explicit caution against the interference of 
security measures with pedestrian traffic flow and a reminder that “the design of bollards, 
fences, light posts, and other streetscape and landscape elements should form an urban 
ensemble that helps to create a sense of unity and character.”67 The guide’s extensive 
discussion of considerations in the use and placement of bollards and planters is particularly 
useful to designing secure perimeters for urban rail transit stations. Parking presents a 
particular challenge to urban rail transit security because the danger of vehicle bombs 
demands more stand-off distance between parking and the station than is generally feasible. 
FEMA suggests that planners be creative and offers a sampling of design, operations, and 
engineering measures for parking near high-risk facilities.68 Finally, the individual measures 
discussed throughout the site design chapter are listed and ranked according to their level of 
cost, effort, and protection. Those same measures are then correlated in a table with specific 
threats from vehicular bombs to airborne contamination.
Although bombs and other incendiary devices appear to pose the most likely threat to transit 
systems, there is no specific guidance for the design of rolling stock in relation to the terrorist 
threat.69 However, there are two guides available that address fire safety: 1992’s Fire Safety 
Countermeasures for Urban Rail Vehicles by Hathaway, Baker, and Moussa, and Recommended Fire 
Safety Practices for Rail Transit Materials Selection, from the Urban Mass Transportation 
Administration, 1984. Both reports assume only accidental ignition. The goal of the fire safety 
countermeasures prescribed in the reports is to prevent fires from starting, slow down or 
contain fires if they do start, and evacuate passengers as quickly as possible. The 1992 
document focuses on all aspects of fire safety: fire prevention, early detection, fire hardening, 
and passenger evacuation. The shorter 1984 document recommends fire safety tests for 
materials used in rail transit—from undercarriage components to seat cushions. Similarly, Fire 
Safety Countermeasures for Urban Rail Vehicles focuses on replacement components and 
construction materials of rail cars, rather than the fundamental components such as motors 
and switches.70 The 1992 report details the major characteristics of rail transit vehicle 
equipment, the types of fire problems that are likely to occur, and selected countermeasures 
against fire. In addition, potential research and development opportunities are highlighted. 
While certainly this is useful in suppressing the devastating secondary effects of fire from a 
blast, the guide provides no information on the specific effects and countermeasures for blast 
hazards on rail cars.
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Bombs are not the only threat to transit, and terrorists have not historically limited themselves 
to one mode of attack. The sarin attack in Tokyo in 1995 alerted security managers to the 
threat of chemical and biological agents. There is a considerable body of research and literature 
on the behavior of chemical and biological agents in buildings, and mitigations including 
those by FEMA and Mead and Gressel. However, chemical and biological agents released in 
moving trains have a different impact from those released in buildings. Therefore, this 
literature may be of limited use in the transit environment. Fortunately, the potential of a 
chemical or biological attack on subways has been given serious attention since the Tokyo gas 
attacks.
Much of the guidance that arose out of that event relates to the emergency response and 
management functions necessary to reduce the harm done in the event of the release of a 
chemical or biological agent.71 Policastro and Gordon have documented prospective 
technologies appropriate for the subway environment. Given the limitations of current 
automated detection technologies, they note that rapid containment and response are the keys 
to limiting casualties in the event of a chemical or biological release in a subway system. The 
need to contain or vent a released chemical or biological agent is determined by the properties 
of a specific agent. But without highly sensitive detection technologies, subway operators will 
not likely know the nature of the release in order to make the critical containment/vent 
decision. Therefore, Poliocastro and Gordon recommend a default policy of immediate 
containment of the “plume” by stopping the movement of the trains and delaying the 
activation of emergency fire and smoke fans.72 
They also discuss the system design factors that act to spread or contain a release, noting that 
moving trains push contaminated air throughout the station, into adjacent stations, and out 
through any street level vents in a piston effect. Because subway system design factors are 
assumed to be fixed, they recommend that response strategies be tailored to the design of each 
track section (for example, single versus multiple tracks). Technologies that detect chemical or 
biological releases and automate part of the response are receiving an increasing amount of 
research and testing support because response time is so critical in reducing casualties from an 
attack. WMATA has plans to pilot test chemical detection equipment in twelve stations as 
part of the Department of Energy’s PROTECTS (Program for Response Options and 
Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism in Subways) program.73
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Challenges to the Security Paradigm
As noted in the introduction, transit presents several unique challenges to the security 
paradigm as it has historically been applied in other theaters such as aviation and federal 
buildings. In this section, three major challenges as they are presented throughout the 
literature of transit terrorism will be discussed. 
Dual-Use
Given the existing demands placed on transit systems, and the limited resources with which 
transit operators execute their most basic functions, efficiency and effectiveness must play a 
large role in any comprehensive approach to security against terrorism. Several articles 
advocate for a dual-use approach to transportation security that would protect transportation 
systems against terrorism, while at the same time helping agencies meet their other 
transportation goals, that is, safety and efficiency.74 In fact, this dual-use approach has been 
consistent throughout the literature. Transit security for terrorism is considered at once a new 
problem and an extrapolation of the general problem of transit crime and system safety.75
Some, but not all, of the approaches for securing the system against terrorism will necessarily 
secure it against general crime and safety. Another reason for approaching transit security from 
this angle is that it has been historically difficult to justify the expenditures needed for 
securing a system against terrorism, given the low real incidence of terrorism and the 
variability of threat levels. Complementary strategies that address other transit goals, in 
addition to security against terrorist attack, are more likely to receive funding and support.76
The case studies have suggested that while preparation and planning for terrorism are key, it 
does not need to be all encompassing to be effective in the event of an attack. More limited 
efforts that focus on mundane crimes and smaller-scale emergencies such as power outages, 
technical failures, or natural occurrences have been shown to be as effective in the event of a 
major catastrophe:
Advance emergency preparations were the backbone of New York City’s response 
on September 11. Representatives of several transportation agencies noted that 
documented and practiced emergency response procedures could never have 
accommodated a catastrophic event with such widespread impacts. But it is clear 
that practicing and preparing for less-significant emergencies did, in fact, help 
transportation agencies manage and adapt on September 11.77 
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In other words, marathoners do not prepare for running a marathon by running 26.2 miles 
regularly. Doing so would be too taxing and leave them without the resources to perform 
effectively in daily life and in competition. On the day of the marathon, however, the months 
of shorter workouts carry them to the finish line. 
The promise of dual-use strategies can easily be overstated. However, the consequences of an 
actual attack, rare as it is, may be too dire to risk ill-conceived measures. The fact that a 
strategy has a secondary benefit does not eliminate the need to question the assumptions about 
the applicability of nonterror strategies to the transit terror arena. Similarly, transit agencies 
must be aware of the danger of being swept up in the search for security so they do not waste 
resources on what some might call a solution looking for a problem.78
Evaluating Costs
The Federal Transit Administration asserts, “Security and emergency preparedness must be 
accountable for their return on their investment”.79 This is, however, easier said than done. 
Transit agencies have figured out how to quantify the economic impact of crime on their 
systems, both in terms of loss of life and property as well as revenue lost from passengers 
choosing other modes.
Transit crime has both financial and social costs. The financial costs, directly borne by the 
systems themselves, but indirectly passed on to patrons and taxpayers through higher fares and 
higher taxes, reductions in the frequency and quality of service, and higher government 
subsidies, can be divided into two categories: the increased financial burden of operating the 
system and the reduction of revenues collected. The social costs are borne by both patrons who 
suffer from reduced security in the system and nonpatrons who contend with congestion 
outside the system as potential passengers concerned about a lack of security turn to other 
forms of transportation.80 There is no such economic measurement for the threat of rail transit 
terrorism. However, establishing such measurements will be a key task for the security and 
transit communities.
There is now a need to address the threat more critically and comprehensively so that transit 
security strategies themselves do not, in the long term, cripple transit agencies’ ability to 
fulfill their critical role of providing mobility in urban centers. This alarm has been raised in 
terms of the mismatch between the level of preparedness that the Department of Homeland 
Security calls for and the funding available to local governments and transit agencies to meet 
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these calls.81 Peter Guerrero, director of physical infrastructure issues at the Government 
Accountability Office, notes, “Every time the administration raises the security threat level, 
the private sector and local governments are forced to divert resources from such things as 
maintenance and safety.”82 
The diversion of funds from maintenance and safety is not the only concern transit agencies 
have in balancing the need for antiterrorism security with other transit goals. As transit 
security becomes more comprehensive and layered, there arises the potential that these 
security strategies conflict with agencies’ primary purpose: to provide accessible, convenient, 
and affordable transportation for daily users.83 For example, one countermeasure for arson is 
the removal of shelters and benches.84 Indeed, many transit operators have done just that. 
However, there is no analysis of the cost of such measures to riders and system ridership. 
The effect of these dangers in approaching security extends beyond the transit system to our 
environment and the functioning of our economy. Transit agencies struggle to compete with 
the private automobile to alleviate the consequences of worsening congestion and air 
pollution. To meet these demands, they must provide convenience, attractiveness, and 
affordability above and beyond what is offered by private transport. If security measures add 
too much delay or cost, or make the trip unpleasant, the cost is borne by the transit operator, 
the economy, and the environment in the form of increased dependence on private vehicles. 
FEMA’s recent guidance on mitigating manmade disasters provides this cautionary note:
While many benefits can be achieved through implementing mitigation actions, 
planners should be sensitive to potential negative impacts as well. For example, 
altering traffic patterns may increase commute times and distances, and reducing 
on-street parking may impact retail activity. Such considerations can be pivotal in 
determining the feasibility, viability, and potential for success of mitigation 
planning initiatives.85 
In the past, transit agencies have addressed this challenge implicitly by showing a preference 
for dealing with transit terror in ways that do not affect operations, such as response planning 
and policing. However, in the post-9/11 era, the need to assure the public that more is being 
done has generated calls for a comprehensive approach, which ensures security but also 
preserves transit’s goals for ridership.
The goals of safety, security, and efficiency in transit operation are not fully compatible. Two 
documents discuss the impact of security measures on the functioning of transit. The first is 
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transit specific, but does not consider terrorism, while the second deals with antiterror 
measures on urban design. In “Target Hardening at a New York City Subway Station: 
Decreased Fare Evasion—At What Price?” Weidner questions New York City Transit’s 
(NYCTA) efforts to thwart fare evaders with high wheel turnstiles. He raises the issue of 
whether the benefits of reduced fare evasion outweighed the creation of a “prison-like” 
environment.86 The NYCTA has since installed these turnstiles in hundreds of stations, with 
no negative effect on ridership or change in the rate of crime.87 However, Weidner raises an 
important question about the nature of the costs security can impose on transit systems. 
Similarly, the National Capital Planning Commission’s (NCPC) 2001 publication, Designing 
for Security in the Nation’s Capital, considers the effects of public security measures on the urban 
design goals of Washington’s Monumental Core. “Even before the 1995 bombing in 
Oklahoma City, Washington’s streets and public spaces had become an unsightly jumble of 
fences and barriers… The National Capital reflects the spirit of America, but today in 
Washington we look like a nation in fear.”88 
While urban design in this case has a much different function than the more workaday goal of 
transit to move people to their destinations, the NCPC report, like the Weidner article, can 
help practitioners frame some of the nonquantitative concerns and costs and compromises that 
arise when planning for security. The General Services Administration’s symposium on 
security and the design of public buildings, “Balancing Security and Openness,” carries these 
questions further by examining the effects of designing for security on the character of 
America’s public buildings. The report provides insight into the tensions between the need of 
U.S. federal buildings for security and the need of the public for openness in government.89
“Balancing Security and Openness” might as well be the title of a transit security symposium. 
However, in the case of transit, openness is a fixed condition of the system and not subject to 
questions of balance.
Evaluating Effectiveness
The available frameworks help systems assess their relative risk and vulnerability to terrorism 
in an effort to ensure that their security efforts match their financial and institutional 
capabilities. However, there has been no formal evaluation of the effectiveness or cost of 
individual security strategies in the transit environment. Much of what has been presented in 
the guidelines is extrapolated from best practices for dealing with nonterrorist threats. In part, 
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this is due to the fact that concrete measures of effectiveness against incidents as rare as 
terrorist attacks are elusive, if not impossible. Jenkins notes:
Because terrorist threats are not easily quantifiable, it is difficult to determine the 
“right” level of security. Using cost-benefit analysis as the sole criterion to 
determine the level of security is not very helpful. The risk of death to any 
individual citizen from terrorism is minuscule, making it difficult to argue for any 
security measure on the grounds that it will save lives. Since the threat of terrorism 
is murky and security measures are costly, it is hard to justify the expenditures 
before an attack.90 
The fields of building science and disaster response have extensive experience in quantifying 
the physical effects of individual natural and manmade hazards on buildings, and designing to 
prevent catastrophic failure. In the case of natural hazards, researchers can draw on extensive 
historical data to quantify the economic risk and mitigate accordingly.91 Likewise, crime 
prevention efforts have begun to rely extensively on historical data to target resources 
efficiently and analyze the effectiveness of their efforts. Thankfully, attacks on U.S. urban rail 
systems are rare enough that no equivalent databases are available for such analysis. Evaluation 
of the effectiveness of specific security measures in deterring terrorists must be more 
qualitative and theoretical.
At least one researcher has taken the time to ask the question, “Is there a difference between 
designing for crime and designing for terrorism?” Atlas contends that “attack from criminal 
behavior or attack from terrorist activity only reflect a change in the level and types of threats. 
The process and challenges are the same.”92 He provides a very thorough and informative list 
of established CPTED strategies that may address terrorist threats. A comparison of the 
current practices against crime with those of London’s successful antiterror security strategies 
should give some confidence to security managers of the applicability of current crime control 
measures to the emerging terror threat. The integrated approach of London’s antiterror 
strategy, “Control of Public Space,” is very similar to the “systems approach” to traditional 
transit crime advocated by the FTA. Boyd, Maier, and Kenny present crime data and security 
practices of nine transit agencies around the country. They find that most agencies employ a 
combination of personnel deployment, system design and technology, data collection, and 
training, operating, and management practices. The study lists security measures used by 
these agencies in addressing twenty-eight different types of crime, including terrorism. 
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However, it was beyond the scope of the study to provide fine-grained analysis of the cost, 
consequences, and efficacy of the individual measures.
While a level of compatibility between strategies against crime and terrorism may exist, 
CPTED relies heavily on a thorough understanding of criminal motivation and behavior. 
Therefore, a change in the level and type of threat is a very significant alteration of practice for 
which some established CPTED strategies may not be entirely suited. Balog warns, “Solution 
for a particular crime in a particular situation, will not necessarily work for all types of 
crime.”93 It certainly seems logical that many design strategies that reduce the opportunity for 
crime may also reduce the opportunity for terrorist activities. Still, the application of such 
strategies to terrorism in the transit environment deserves more critical analysis of the mode, 
motivation, and effect of terrorist actions against transit. It would be especially useful to think 
through the differences in motivation, evaluation of risk, and tactics between “ordinary” 
criminals who are out for their personal gain and terrorists whose goals are political.
Despite the lack of definitive evaluative research, an outline of best practices has emerged from 
the collective recent experience of rail transit terrorism, which suggests that coordination and 
response planning, assisted by technologies such as CCTV, are the best tools transit agencies 
have. Training police, transit employees, contractors, and the public to watch for suspicious 
activity supports a thorough response capability. Environmental design ensures that policing 
resources are used efficiently by making surveillance easier and reducing opportunities for 
terrorism (for example, eliminating places where bombs can be hidden, or erecting antiram 
bollards). Engineering blast resistance into existing transit facilities may be too costly for the 
level of threat faced by even the most vulnerable transit systems, but more modest structural 
improvements to glazing or light fixtures could be part of a system’s strategy. The threat of 
terrorism is no longer a political anomaly, but one of the challenges facing urban rail transit 
systems and public infrastructure as a whole. It is too grave a threat to pass up the possible 
protection that these strategies afford urban rail transit. 
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SECURING TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN THE POST-9/11 ERA: A SURVEY 
OF U.S. TRANSIT OPERATORS
Overview
When the September 11, 2001, attacks destroyed parts of the New York City transit system 
and the March 11, 2004, commuter rail bombings did the same in Madrid, Spain, the 
vulnerability of open, accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts 
was cast in sharp relief. Well prior to these attacks, research on terrorism and public transit 
had shown public transit systems worldwide to be a principal venue for terrorist acts.
Most previous research on transit terrorism has consisted of single or groups of case studies of 
major terrorist acts and responses to them by police and transit managers. Case studies are 
especially useful when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has 
little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context.94 Despite these advantages, case studies are limited, in that they are not 
necessarily representative and thus may not reflect the conditions or trends facing the transit 
industry more broadly. Thus, one cannot generalize from the findings of case studies (though 
in practice, researchers often do). This is an especially relevant issue in the study of U.S. transit 
systems, because they vary so dramatically in size—from thousands of vehicles and millions of 
daily passengers, to just a handful of vehicles carrying dozens of daily passengers. As potential 
targets of terrorist acts, these systems, and their stations and vehicles, are likewise dissimilar.
In contrast to case studies, aggregated analyses of data drawn from a representative sample of 
the population (in this case, larger U.S. transit operators) are generalizable and allow 
researchers to draw conclusions about the population under study.95 However, more 
generalized, aggregated studies of the security experiences and practices of transit systems 
have been much less common. In the United States, just two such aggregate studies of transit 
system security have been published in recent years.
In a 1997 Transit Cooperative Research Program report, Boyd and Sullivan reported on a 
survey of forty-two transit managers regarding experiences with terrorist acts, perceptions of 
risks, and interagency coordination in planning for transit security. They found that terrorist 
acts against transit systems were on the rise in the United States and worldwide, that transit 
agencies—particularly those operating rail service—were perceived by respondents to be at 
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great risk for attack, and that coordinated efforts to both deter and respond to terrorist acts 
were on the rise but not yet commonplace.
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Congress asked the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to consider what role the federal government should play in helping public 
transit operators reduce both the likelihood and impacts of terrorist attacks on transit systems 
in the United States.96 Part of this research included a mid-2002 survey of officials at 155 
transit systems in the United States. The survey focused on security planning and preparation 
efforts, interagency and intergovernmental transit security coordination efforts, and 
perceptions of obstacles to more effective security planning. Perhaps not surprisingly, a 
principal finding of the 2002 GAO report was that transit system managers surveyed cited 
increased funding as the most important role the federal government could play in assisting 
transit systems with security planning.
The findings of these two surveys, which are discussed in more detail in the pages that follow, 
contributed significantly to our understanding of the experiences with, perceptions about, and 
preparation for terrorist threats to U.S. transit systems. While the 1997 Boyd and Sullivan 
survey was of a relatively small sample of transit systems (60 systems surveyed, 42 responded), 
it provides a snapshot of transit systems when concerns over terrorist threats were just 
beginning to wax for many transit managers. The 2002 GAO report surveyed many more 
transit systems (200 surveyed, 155 responded) about six months after the September 11, 2001, 
attacks, a time when transit managers (and, of course, their passengers) had a heightened 
awareness of terrorist threats, but before many new plans, programs, and procedures could be 
put into place. While both surveys devote considerable attention to bureaucratic, policing, 
and emergency response issues, they largely ignore the role of system design for transit 
security.
The survey reported on here complements and extends the findings of these two surveys in 
several ways. First, by surveying transit managers in the late spring and early summer of 2004, 
the survey findings provide a profile of experiences, perceptions, and actions nearly three years 
after the September 11, 2001, attacks that made security a top priority among U.S. transit 
operators, and just after the largest single terrorist attack directed toward transit (in Madrid, 
Spain), which further heightened concerns over transit security. This allows us to examine the 
degree to which post-9/11 attention, initiatives, and mandates have been integrated into 
transit planning practice.
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Second, this research expands on these earlier studies by surveying respondents’ attitudes 
toward, and efforts in, four distinct areas of transit security planning: (1) policing, (2) security 
hardware/technology, (3) public education/user outreach, and (4) environmental design 
strategies. The latter two of these approaches have received considerable attention in research 
on personal and property crime on transit systems, but far less in transit security research.
Finally, while previous research on transit system vulnerability has focused on transit systems 
operating one or more rail modes, less attention has been paid to systems that use or manage 
indoor bus and ferry terminals. Like rail transit stations, terminals—such as the Port 
Authority Bus Terminal in Manhattan, or the TransBay Bus Terminal in downtown San 
Francisco—host tens of thousands of weekday passengers in enclosed spaces vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks. While we separately evaluate rail and nonrail transit systems, we include data 
on the experiences and perceptions of transit system managers responsible for enclosed bus and 
ferry terminals as well.
Description of Survey
During the spring of 2004, hard copy and electronic letters describing our research and 
soliciting participation in a survey were sent to the general managers of all 259 U.S. transit 
agencies that, according to the National Transit Database maintained by the Federal Transit 
Administration, operate at least 50 vehicles in peak period service. This ranged from a high of 
9,136 vehicles at MTA-New York City Transit, to a low of 50 vehicles at South Bend Public 
Transportation Corporation in South Bend, Indiana; Bay Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority in Bay City, Michigan; and Escambia County Area Transit in Pensacola, Florida. 
The letter asked each general manager to designate the appropriate person or persons to 
complete an on-line survey. In the case of smaller systems, this was often the general manager 
himself or herself, and in larger systems this was most often (but not always) the director of 
policing or security. We assume in this analysis that the general manager was in the best 
position to determine who should complete the survey, so we do not parse our analysis to 
analyze responses by different types of respondents. The survey instrument was designed to 
allow respondents the flexibility to complete the survey over the course of several interactive 
sessions before submitting a completed survey. Respondents from 113 transit agencies 
completed some or all of the survey questions (44 percent of the 259 agencies contacted).97
Figure 1 on page 56 compares the resulting sample to the population with respect to the 
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number of vehicles operated during peak period service. The sample is somewhat 
underrepresented with respect to smaller systems.
Figure 1  System Size Comparison
Transportation systems from 108 cities in 40 different states are represented in the sample. 
California has the highest number of responses with 22, followed by Florida (8), and 
Washington (7). Almost half (45 percent) of the respondents identified their title as 
something associated with security; 28 percent had titles associated with management; 13 
percent were associated with operations or maintenance; and 14 percent reported various other 
titles (a complete categorization of titles is presented in Appendix B).
Most (80 percent) of the systems analyzed here operate more than one transit mode. Fifty-nine 
systems (or about half—52 percent—of the entire sample) operate bus and paratransit only. 
One-fourth (twenty-eight) of the systems operate rail service;98 twenty-three of these systems 
are multimodal operations, while five systems operate rail service only. Fifty-two of the fifty-
nine nonrail systems (which were drawn from the largest such systems in the country) report 
that they operate service out of at least one enclosed bus terminal or multimodal transfer 
facility; these fifty-two systems represent 46 percent of all respondents. Systems operating rail 
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service or that operate out of an enclosed bus terminal or multimodal facility (n = 80) 
responded to a more extensive set of questions than did the nonrail, nonenclosed terminal 
systems. Table 1 shows the percent of systems analyzed operating each of the specified transit 
modes.
The range of responding agencies’ services is broad. For example, the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority reported operating all modes of transit listed in Table 1, while the 
Dallas Area Rapid Transit, New Jersey Transit, and the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority operate commuter and light rail as well as bus and paratransit 
service. The Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) system in Cleveland 
operates heavy and light rail plus bus and paratransit, while the King County Metro Transit 
system offers light rail, bus, ferry, and paratransit.
Three-fourths of the twenty-eight systems with rail service modes operate out of multiple 
types of stations. All but two systems have some or all at-grade stations, and about 60 percent 
have elevated and/or below-ground/subway type stations (see Table 2 on page 58). 
Respondents were asked to identify the busiest station in the system and the year it was built. 
The oldest station in the sample is South Station Rapid in Boston, which was built in 1899. 
Most of the stations for which year-of-construction data were provided were built since 1970. 
Table 3 on page 58 lists the twenty rail transit systems that provided information on the age of 
their busiest station.
Table 1  System Travel Modes
 Mode # of Systems % of Systems
 Commuter Rail 9 8%
 Heavy Rail 7 6%
 Light Rail 18 16%
 Bus 104 92%
 Ferry 10 9%
 Paratransit 91 80%
 Othera
a. Includes vanpool, carpool, cable car, trolley, 
streetcar, incline, automated guideway, airports
13 11%
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Table 2  Rail Station Types
 Type # of Systems % of Systems
 Elevated 16 57%
 Below-ground/subway 16 57%
 At grade 26 93%
 Don’t know 1 4%
 More than one type 21 75%
Table 3  Busiest U.S. Rail Systems 
Agency Headquarters Station Year Built
Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority
Boston South Station Rapid 1899
Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority
Philadelphia Suburban Station 1920
Metrolink Los Angeles Union Station 1939
New Jersey Transit Newark Penn Station, New York 1965
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid 
Transit District
Oakland Embarcadero 1971
Washington Metropolitan Area 
Transit Authority
Washington, D.C. Metro Center 1976
San Diego Trolley Inc. San Diego San Ysidro 1980
Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit 
Authority
Atlanta Five Points 1980
Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority
Buffalo University Station 1984
Tri-County Metropolitan Transit 
District
Portland Rose Quarter 1985
Sacramento Regional Transit Sacramento St. Rose of Lima Station 1987
Santa Clara Valley 
Transportation Authority
San Jose Tamien 1987
GCRTA Cleveland Tower City 1987
Virginia Railway Express Alexandria L’Enfant 1991
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Incidents and Perceived Threats
Substantive security incidents on United States transit systems are rare, but not 
unprecedented. Respondents were asked about the occurrence of various types of security 
incidents and the frequency of such incidents over the past decade. The results of this query 
track very closely with those reported in 2002 by the United States Government 
Accountability Office (2002), suggesting some reliability in the results. Agencies with rail 
systems (n = 28, or 25 percent of respondents) or that operate out of an enclosed bus terminal 
or multimodal transfer station (n = 52, or 46 percent of respondents) were asked about 
possible terrorist incidents experienced on their systems. Of these eighty systems queried, 
there were sixty-eight valid responses. A total of twenty-eight agencies reported experiencing 
some sort of incident; twelve of these were rail transit systems, and sixteen were nonrail 
operators. Counts of different types of incidents experienced are shown in Figure 2 on page 60. 
Use of arson/incendiary devices on a system was the most common type of incident recorded. 
The “Other” category included reports by two systems of suspicious packages that were 
identified but turned out to be false alarms, a bomb threat, two knife attacks, a shooting with 
no victims, theft of a radio system, hazardous materials contamination on a bus, and a case of 
rail-track tampering. Details on these incidents are summarized in Table 4 on page 61 and 
Table 5 on page 64.
Regional Transportation District Denver I-25/Broadway 1994
Dallas Area Rapid Transit Dallas West End 1996
Montebello Bus Lines Montebello, CA Montebello/Commerce 1998
Memphis Area Transit Authority Memphis North End Terminal 1998
Utah Transit Authority Salt Lake Sandy Civic 1999
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Jersey City World Trade Center 
Station
Reopened 
2003
Table 3  Busiest U.S. Rail Systems (Continued)
Agency Headquarters Station Year Built
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Figure 2  Incidents Experienced by Systems
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Detonation of explosive device
Identification of chemical or biological contaminants
Breach of essential computer/software systems
Vehicle hijacking
Identification of explosive device
Hostage/barricade situation
Employee sabotage
Shooting incident with multiple victims
Use of arson/incendiary devices
Other
# of Incidents
No Rail Rail
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Table 4  Description of Security Incidents 
Type of Incident
System 
Has 
Rail
 No. of 
Incidents 
in Last 
Decade
Year of 
Most 
Recent 
Incident
Location of 
Incident Description of Incident
Identification of 
explosive device on 
system
No 1 2002 Bus Stop Pipe bomb placed in trash can was located and 
destroyed.
Yes 1 2002 Vehicle Suspicious package on bus removed from vehicle.
Yes < 12 Station Pipe bomb found on rail transit platform.
Detonation of explosive 
device on system
No 1 2003 Vehicle Explosive device detonated by juveniles on a bus.
No 1 2004 Station Soda bottle bomb was detonated on a bus at 
main transfer point injuring one passenger.
Use of arson/incendiary 
devices on system
No 3-4 2003 Vehicle Juveniles playing with matches ignited various 
things.
No Several Yearly Vehicle/Bus 
Stop
Arson vandalism by juveniles.
No 2003 Bus Stop 
Shelter
Juvenile lit a bus stop shelter on fire.
No 1-2 Station Fire started in restroom trash container.
Yes 120 2004 Station/
Vehicle
Intentional lighting of newspapers to make a fire.
Yes 3 2002 Bus/Train Five buses destroyed by fire and three more 
damaged. 
Rail car seat set on fire.
Yes 1 2002 Vehicle Fire intentionally started on floor of vehicle.
Chemical or biological 
contaminant
No 1 2003 Vehicle Suspect sprayed pepper or mace on board.
Yes 20 2002-03 Vehicle White powder anthrax scare.
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Vehicle hijacking
No 2002 Vehicle Intoxicated male assaulted driver and attempted 
to leave using vehicle.
No 1 1988 Vehicle Passenger wanted to go to a city where the bus 
did not go. No other passengers were on board.
No 1 1994 Vehicle Passenger who said he had a gun demanded to 
be taken to the airport. He was arrested there.
Yes 1 2004 Vehicle Passenger took control of bus when it started 
back to the location where he boarded.
Hostage/barricade 
situation
No 1 2003 Vehicle Armed suspect boarded a bus. Shots were 
exchanged with no injuries and suspect captured.
No 1-2 2004 Vehicle Passenger told driver he had a bomb strapped to 
his chest. Police were notified by silent alarm. 
There was no bomb.
Yes Station Incident at rail station handled by local law 
enforcement.
Yes 2 1999 Vehicle Mentally disturbed persons threatening to harm 
others.
Yes 1 Bus Terminal Man barricaded in coffee shop threatening to kill 
himself. Surrendered after negotiations with 
police.
Table 4  Description of Security Incidents (Continued)
Type of Incident
System 
Has 
Rail
 No. of 
Incidents 
in Last 
Decade
Year of 
Most 
Recent 
Incident
Location of 
Incident 
Description of Incident
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Employee Sabotage
No several 2004 Vehicle/Bus 
Garage
Miscellaneous instances.
No 2003 Maintenance 
Facility
Sabotaged oil on several revenue and support 
vehicles.
No 2003 Vehicle/Bus 
Garage
Removal of microphones; damage to cameras.
No Station Disabled buses.
Yes 1 1985 Building Employee drove stolen vehicle into administration 
building.
Breach of computer/
software systems
No several 
dozen
2004 Vehicle Sabotaging digital cameras and/or audio devices.
No 2004 Other Systems infected with computer viruses.
Yes 1 2003 Computer Accidental hacking caused brief shutdown of 
operations.
Shooting incident with 
multiple victims
No 1 2002 Vehicle Male passenger boarded bus with shotgun and 
shot another passenger and himself.
No 1 Other North Hollywood shoot out.
Yes 1 1996 Station Gang members shot other gang members in 
stairwell at entrance to the station.
Yes 1 1994 Station Subject shot two or three passengers at station.
Yes Maintenance 
Facility
Disgruntled employee went to work and started 
shooting.
Table 4  Description of Security Incidents (Continued)
Type of Incident
System 
Has 
Rail
 No. of 
Incidents 
in Last 
Decade
Year of 
Most 
Recent 
Incident
Location of 
Incident 
Description of Incident
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Table 5  Description of Other Security Incidents
Type of 
Incident
System 
Has 
Rail
No. of 
Incidents 
in Last 
Decade
Year of 
Most 
Recent 
Incident
Location of 
Incident Description of Incident
Other
No 2-3 2002 Vehicle Passenger told bus driver he had left a bomb on rear seat 
and ran away. 
No 2 2004 Outside 
Vehicle
Vehicle windows shot out while traveling on road.
No 3 2004 Multi-Modal 
Transfer 
Center
Suspicious bag left on bench. Terminal evacuated until bomb 
squad determined it was not a bomb.
No 2 2000 Vehicle Chemicals for methamphetamine production released 
accidentally.
No 1 2004 Vehicle Radio stolen from service vehicle and vehicle set on fire.
No 1 2004 Vehicle One passenger stabbed another after verbal altercation.
Yes 1 2003 Tracks Track jacked up and boulder placed under track.
Yes 2004 Vehicle Operator shot by estranged husband.
Yes 2 2001 Station Two planes hit the WTC Towers causing a collapse onto 
station.
Yes < 10 2004 Vehicle Male climbed through bus window and robbed driver.
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Sixteen agencies indicated that they had received one or more of what respondents believed to 
be credible threats (for example, bomb, chemical, biological, fire attacks) in the last year. Most 
of these (fourteen of the sixteen) had received from one to four threats. Two other very large 
rail operators reported large numbers of threats; one cited thirty-one credible threats in the 
past year, and the other twelve.
In addition to providing information on actual threats and attacks, respondents were also 
asked about their perceptions of vulnerabilities. While one could argue that these survey 
respondents (who were designated by each system’s general manager as the person at that 
agency who is most knowledgeable about transit security issues) are in perhaps the best 
position of anyone to offer vulnerability assessments, such perceptions should probably be 
treated more as informed speculation than concrete assessments of vulnerability. What is most 
clear from responses to these questions, however, is that transit systems are, by their very 
nature, perceived by system managers as very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Of respondents 
who expressed opinions on vulnerability, only in the case of paratransit did fewer than 60 
percent of the respondents rank a transit mode or system component as somewhat or very 
vulnerable. Overall, rail modes were perceived by respondents to be the most vulnerable (see 
Table 6), though these findings are based on relatively few responses.99 Finally, respondents 
collectively did not assign much difference in vulnerability ratings of various system 
components (Table 7 on page 66).
Table 6  Vulnerability of System Modes to Attack
Mode
Don’t 
Know
Not 
Vulnerable
Somewhat 
Vulnerable
Very 
Vulnerable n
 Heavy rail - - 20% 80% 5
 Commuter rail 12% - 25% 63% 8
 Light rail 13% - 27% 60% 15
 Bus 6% 19% 29% 45% 97
 Other 18% 18% 27% 36% 11
 Paratransit 7% 41% 27% 26% 83
 Ferry 22% 19% 44% 22% 9
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Given this overview of actual and perceived security threats on our sample of U.S. transit 
systems, our analysis now looks at the security planning efforts of these same systems.
Threat and Vulnerability Assessments
Of the 113 agencies represented in the sample, 85 percent indicated that they have conducted 
some level of threat and vulnerability assessment of key system infrastructure. Agencies with 
rail were much more likely to conduct a comprehensive assessment than other agencies. This is 
a significant increase over the 54 percent reported by respondents to the 2002 GAO survey. 
Almost half (46 percent) of the agencies with rail have conducted a comprehensive security 
assessment, compared to only about 13 percent of agencies without rail (see Table 8 on 
page 67).100 Most transit agencies without rail have conducted security assessments, but they 
are more likely to be described by respondents as moderate or partial assessments, rather than 
comprehensive. Considering only transportation systems without rail, we find little difference 
with respect to assessment practices between those with a multimodal transfer or enclosed bus 
terminal and those without.
Table 7  Vulnerability of System Components
Component
Don’t 
Know
Not 
Vulnerable
Somewhat 
Vulnerable
Very 
Vulnerable
n
Tracks and rail lines 8% 15% 11% 66% 26
Rail stations 12% 14% 11% 63% 27
Bridges/tunnels 4% 8% 26% 62% 38
Multimodal terminals  
(bus and rail)
11% 10% 23% 56% 50
Vehicles 6% 10% 32% 52% 67
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Table 8  Conducted Threat and Vulnerability Assessments 
Level of Assessment # of Systems
% of 
Systems
Cumulative%
ALL Systems
YES, Comprehensive 24 21% 21%
YES, Moderate 38 34% 55%
YES, Partial 34 30% 85%
NO 11 10% 95%
Don’t Know 6 5% 100%
TOTAL 113 100%
Systems with Rail
YES, Comprehensive 13 46% 46%
YES, Moderate 11 39% 86%
YES, Partial 1 4% 89%
NO 2 7% 96%
Don’t Know 1 4% 100%
TOTAL 28 100%
Systems without Rail
Systems with Multimodal Transfer or 
Enclosed Bus Terminal
YES, Comprehensive 7 13% 13%
YES, Moderate 15 29% 42%
YES, Partial 19 37% 79%
NO 7 13% 92%
Don’t Know 4 8% 100%
TOTAL 52 100%
Other Systems
YES, Comprehensive 4 12% 12%
YES, Moderate 12 36% 48%
YES, Partial 14 42% 91%
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Among those systems that have not conducted security assessments, the primary reasons given 
for not doing so were lack of resources (n = 5) or the fact that services were contracted to an 
outside agency (n = 3). Four agencies indicated that they were in the process of planning an 
assessment at the time of the survey, while one respondent stated simply that his/her agency 
was not a “high-value target.”
Thirty-five agencies report conducting assessments at least once a year, while twenty-eight 
agencies report conducting assessments every two or three years (see Table 9 on page 69). The 
remaining agencies report no regular policy regarding frequency, but rather conduct 
assessments as deemed necessary. Seventy percent of agencies conducting assessments had done 
so in the last two years (see Table 10 on page 69). In general, the reported frequency of such 
assessments is substantially higher than was reported in the GAO survey just two years earlier. 
There was not a significant difference in the timing of assessments between agencies that 
operate rail and those that do not.
NO 2 6% 97%
Don’t Know 1 3% 100%
TOTAL 33 100%
Table 8  Conducted Threat and Vulnerability Assessments (Continued)
Level of Assessment # of Systems
% of 
Systems
Cumulative%
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The most common purposes reported for the most recent threat and vulnerability assessment 
conducted were to assess terrorism-related vulnerabilities (80 percent of systems) and crime-
related vulnerabilities (70 percent of systems). Only 38 percent of the systems used the process 
to assess natural disaster-related vulnerabilities (see Table 11 on page 70), which contrasts 
significantly from the 85 percent reported in the 2002 GAO survey. Other purposes 
mentioned were to assist in developing a security plan and to help prioritize security 
enhancements for implementation. All but one of the systems with rail (96 percent) 
mentioned terrorism as a purpose of the assessment as compared to three-fourths of systems 
without rail.101 Systems without rail were somewhat more likely to have conducted a crime or 
Table 9  Frequency of Assessment
Frequency # of Systems % of Systems Cumulative%
More than once a year 8 8% 8%
Once a year 27 28% 36%
Once every 2 years 19 20% 56%
Once every 3 years 9 9% 66%
Other 23 24% 90%
Don’t Know 10 10% 100%
TOTAL 96 100%
Table 10  Year of Most Recent Assessment
Year # of Systems % of Systems Cumulative%
1999 2 2% 2%
2001 7 7% 9%
2002 16 17% 26%
2003 36 38% 64%
2004 32 33% 97%
Don’t Know 3 3% 100%
TOTAL 96 100%
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natural disaster assessment than systems with rail (though the observed differences were not 
statistically significant). Further, among systems without rail there were essentially no 
differences in the stated purposes of the assessments between systems that operated a 
multimodal transfer or enclosed bus terminal and those that did not.
Identifying effective security and technology procedures and supporting decision making at 
the executive level were the most prevalent uses of the threat and vulnerability assessment 
results reported (see Table 12 on page 71). Almost all systems with rail have multiple uses for 
the assessment results, and are much more likely to use the assessment for the specific uses 
listed in the survey than are systems without rail. For example, 58 percent of systems with rail 
use the assessment results to apply for Urban Area Security Initiative grants as compared to 
only 6 percent of systems without rail. In Figure 3 on page 72, we do see that there are some 
differences in use of assessment between systems operating an enclosed bus terminal/
multimodal transfer and those without.
Table 11  Purpose of Assessment
Purpose All Systems Systems with Rail
Systems 
without Rail
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
Assess terrorism-related 
vulnerabilities
78 80% 24 92% 54 76%
Assess crime-related 
vulnerabilities
68 70% 16 62% 52 73%
Assess natural disaster-
related vulnerabilities
37 38% 8 31% 29 41%
Other 4 4% 1 4% 3 4%
Don’t Know 2 2% 0 0% 2 3%
More than one purpose 67 69% 17 65% 50 70%
Total systems conducting 
assessment
96 25 71
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Table 12  Use of Assessment
Use of Results All Systems Systems with Rail
Systems without 
Rail
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
Identify effective security 
technology & procedures
79 81% 23 88% 56 79%
Support decision making 
at the executive level
67 69% 22 85% 45 63%
Support preparation of 
budgets
56 58% 17 65% 39 55%
Fulfill requirements of 
System Security Program 
Plan and/or State Safety 
Oversight Program
55 57% 18 69% 37 52%
Support FTA’s security 
outreach & technical 
assistance program
37 38% 18 69% 19 27%
Apply for Urban Area 
Security Initiative grants
19 20% 15 58% 4 6%
Other 3 3% 2 8% 1 1%
Have not used results yet 4 4% 0 0% 4 6%
Don’t know 1 1% 0 0% 1 1%
More than one use 82 85% 24 92% 58 82%
Total systems conducting 
assessment
96 25 71
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Figure 3  Use of Assessment
About one-third of the agencies without rail reported using an in-house team to conduct their 
threat and vulnerability assessments, while only 12 percent of systems with rail conducted 
such assessments in-house. Systems with rail were more likely to use a combination of groups 
to conduct the assessment, primarily made up of an in-house team along with contracted 
security consultants (see Table 13 on page 73). Systems without rail were twice as likely to use 
the sheriff’s or police department (about one-third) than systems with rail (16 percent). The 
most common “other” group mentioned was assistance from the FTA (listed by nine agencies).
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Security Strategies
Respondents were asked about their views on the importance of each of four distinct security 
strategies, and whether these views had changed since September 11, 2001. The four strategies 
are:
• policing.
• security hardware/technology.
• public education/user outreach.
• environmental design strategies.
Table 13  Who Conducted Assessment?
Who Conducted 
Assessment?
All Systems
Systems with 
Rail
Systems with 
Multimodal 
Transfer or 
Enclosed 
Station
Systems with 
Neither
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
In-house team 64 67% 15 60% 29 71% 20 67%
Contracted security 
consultants
28 29% 14 56% 7 17% 7 23%
Sheriff’s or police 
department
26 27% 4 16% 13 32% 9 30%
Other 26 27% 8 32% 10 24% 8 27%
Contracted other 
consultants
5 5% 2 8% 2 5% 1 3%
Don’t know
More than one 
group
41 43% 13 52% 18 44% 10 33%
Total systems 
conducting 
assessment
96 25 41 30
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The percentage of respondents who believe that all four of these strategies are central to 
security planning more than doubled after 9/11 (see Figure 4 on page 74 through Figure 7 on 
page 76). Both before and after 9/11, however, policing was considered the most central 
strategy, followed by security hardware and technology. Neither public education and user 
outreach, nor environmental design strategies, were given much importance by respondents 
before 9/11. Following 9/11, however, respondents from over half of the agencies said that 
these factors had become significant and even central parts of security planning. While 
attention to security increased for all types of transit agencies following 9/11, all four of the 
strategies analyzed here (policing, technology, outreach, and design) were considered more 
significant or central to security planning for agencies with rail than for agencies without.
Figure 4  Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Policing
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Figure 5  Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Education & User Outreach
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Figure 6  Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Security Hardware/Technology
Figure 7  Importance of Strategies in Security Planning: Environmental Design
Before 9/11, respondents from agencies with rail were much more likely to have considered 
policing significant or central to security planning than were those from agencies without rail 
(see Figure 8 on page 77). Following 9/11, however, respondents from all types of agencies 
thought policing to be a significant or central strategy. Environmental design strategies were 
also considered by respondents from agencies with rail to be a more significant part of security 
planning, both before and after 9/11. Given that operators of rail systems are likely to be 
responsible for securing many rail stations and miles of rail rights-of-way, this result is not 
surprising. By contrast, nonrail operators of enclosed stations or terminals typically operate 
just one or few such stations and are not responsible for securing the streets and sea lanes on 
which their vehicles operate.
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Figure 8  Strategies Considered Central or Significant in Security Planning
When asked about specific changes in security strategies after 9/11, many respondents 
reported that increased resources (for example, funding) were now devoted to policing 
strategies. For some agencies this entailed the development of a new in-house police or 
security force; in other cases, where police forces were already in place, the number of police or 
security officers increased. Specifically, many respondents reported having a greater public 
police presence with greater attention paid to increased public visibility of police officers and 
security guards. In addition, many respondents reported increased coordination with local law 
enforcement, as well as increased employee awareness training regarding the vulnerabilities of 
systems to terrorism. 
Following 9/11, agencies have tended to look for new ways to engage passengers on security 
issues. A number of agencies have implemented a Transit Watch program, which engages the 
public as additional security “eyes” and “ears.” Others have sought to increase public 
awareness of security issues through posters, pamphlets, Web pages, and regular newsletters. 
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The most common change in security hardware/technology strategies reported after 9/11 is the 
increased use of surveillance cameras both on vehicles and at stations. Also, more electronically 
controlled access points have been implemented. 
Finally, respondents reported greater awareness of, and attention to, crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED) strategies after 9/11. While awareness of CPTED strategies 
was high, fewer agencies reported actually implementing CPTED strategies after 9/11. Such a 
result is not surprising, however, because while strategies like policing and public outreach are 
operational and amenable to short-term adjustments, changes in the design or rehabilitation of 
capital facilities to reflect security concerns is a longer-term and more incremental enterprise. 
Accordingly, most respondents report that their agencies intend to incorporate CPTED 
strategies into future facility designs.
Prior to 9/11, transit system security planning focused far more on personal and property 
crime than on acts of terrorism. While efforts to address crime and terrorism are frequently 
complementary, they are not always one and the same. When asked how they tend to consider 
antiterrorism and anticrime strategies, most respondents reported viewing the strategies as 
either hand in hand (46 percent) or partly overlapping (41 percent). Across all agency types, 
only a few respondents, however, reported that anticrime and antiterrorism strategies were 
largely separate from one another (see Table 14).
Table 14  Antiterrorism Versus Anticrime Strategies
Agency Opinion All Systems Systems with 
Rail
Systems with 
Multimodal 
Transfer or 
Enclosed 
Station
Systems with 
Neither
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
Completely 
separate from  
one another
8 7% 1 4% 6 12% 1 3%
Partly overlap one 
another
44 41% 13 46% 20 41% 11 35%
Considered  
hand in hand
50 46% 13 46% 19 39% 18 58%
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Policing Strategies
Respondents were asked how policing is provided at their transit system. The survey 
instrument offered five possibilities, plus an “other” category:
• sworn transit law enforcement. 
• nonsworn transit police (private security).
• contracted local police.
• dedicated bureau of local law enforcement.
• no formal security; rely exclusively on local law enforcement.
About half (47 percent) of the agencies use just one policing strategy; this total includes 19 
percent that have no formal security and rely exclusively on local law enforcement (see 
Table 15). The remaining agencies use a combination of policing options, with nonsworn 
transit police the most common. Over half of the agencies use nonsworn police for all (10 
percent) or part (43 percent) of their policing activities. The least-used policing option is a 
dedicated bureau of local law enforcement—only 7 percent of agencies rely completely or 
partially on this strategy.
Don’t know 6 6% 1 4% 4 8% 1 3%
Total systems 108 100% 28 100% 49 100% 31 100%
Table 15  Agencies’ Reliance on Policing Strategies
Policing Strategy % of Agencies
Use 
Exclusively
Use as Part of 
Overall Strategy
Total
Sworn transit law enforcement 10% 19% 29%
Nonsworn transit police 10% 43% 53%
Table 14  Antiterrorism Versus Anticrime Strategies
Agency Opinion All Systems
Systems with 
Rail
Systems with 
Multimodal 
Transfer or 
Enclosed 
Station
Systems with 
Neither
(Cont.)
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When comparing 2002 GAO survey results to our 2004 survey, we find the percentage of 
systems relying on regular local law enforcement (33 percent in 2002 and 33 percent in 2004) 
or with a contract or dedicated arrangement with local law enforcement (34 percent in 2002 
and 35 percent in 2004) was essentially the same. However, our 2004 survey found 
significantly higher shares of transit operators with an in-house transit police department of 
sworn officers (8 percent in the 2002 GAO survey and 29 percent in our 2004 survey) and 
using contracted nonsworn transit security (35 percent in 2002 and 53 percent in 2004). 
While these differences might reflect random variation or bias in one or both of the two 
samples, the questions posed in these two surveys were similar enough to suggest that, in the 
three years since 9/11, the proportion of transit agencies with in-house police/security services 
has increased significantly.102
Systems with rail were more likely to rely on sworn transit police than systems without; 64 
percent of agencies with rail used sworn transit police for at least half of policing, compared to 
only 10 percent of agencies without rail. In contrast, systems without rail service were twice as 
likely to rely heavily on nonsworn police than systems with rail; 37 percent of systems without 
rail use nonsworn police for over half of their policing, compared to 18 percent of systems with 
rail. These differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Eighty-one percent of the respondents provided us with information on the number of full-
time equivalent security/police personnel contracted for or employed by the agency. The 
numbers ranged from zero to 1,500 (at the Port Authority Trans-Hudson headquartered in 
Jersey City, and with responsibilities for three airports and the New York seaports in addition 
to the PATH trains and stations). Just over one-fourth (27 percent) of the respondents were 
Contracted local police 4% 24% 28%
Dedicated bureau of local law 
enforcement
4% 3% 7%
Rely exclusively on local law 
enforcement
19% 14% 33%
Other strategy 0% 19% 19%
Total 47%
Table 15  Agencies’ Reliance on Policing Strategies
Policing Strategy % of Agencies
(Cont.)
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from agencies with no in-house or contract security personnel. Sixteen agencies—all of which 
have rail—employ or contract for over fifty security personnel, and seven of these agencies 
have over one hundred. Thirty-four percent of the agencies have between one and ten security 
personnel and 20 percent between ten and fifty (see Figure 9).
Figure 9  Full-Time Equivalent Security/Police Personnel
Regarding perceptions of effectiveness in addressing terrorist threats, policing strategies were 
ranked high by respondents. Policing was ranked by 84 percent of respondents as “very” or 
“somewhat” effective in preparing for terrorist attacks. This percentage is even higher (93 
percent) for agencies with rail; 39 percent of respondents from agencies with rail consider 
policing strategies to be very effective, while 54 percent consider them to be somewhat 
effective. By comparison, only 24 percent of agencies without rail find policing strategies very 
effective and 57 percent find them somewhat effective—a total of 81 percent.
Security and Hardware Technology Strategies
In this era of rapidly evolving and extensively deploying information and communication 
technologies both inside and outside of the transit industry, it should come as no surprise that 
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transit agencies are turning to technology to support increased security efforts. The most 
extensively used security hardware technologies in our sample were personnel radio 
communications systems, used extensively by over 90 percent of all agencies—both with rail 
and without. The only other technology hardware used extensively by over half the agencies is 
emergency alert/notification systems on transit vehicles, which are used extensively by almost 
70 percent of agencies. Public address systems and closed-circuit cameras are used to some 
degree by most agencies (see Figure 10), while electronic access control, emergency 
telephones, and GPS locators are used to some degree by about half the agencies. There was 
little use of the other security-related hardware and technologies asked about in our survey, 
such as tunnel intruder detection systems, explosives detection equipment, and chemical/
biological sensors.
Figure 10  Security Hardware Technologies/Strategies Employed by Agencies
Systems with rail are more than twice as likely to make extensive use of electronic access 
control and emergency telephones than systems without rail, and are somewhat more likely to 
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make extensive use of public address systems, closed-circuit cameras, and GPS locators than 
systems without rail (see Figure 11).
Figure 11  Extensive Use of Security Hardware and Technology Strategies
Just over one-fourth of the respondents consider security hardware strategies very effective in 
preparing for terrorist attacks and an additional 55 percent think these strategies are 
somewhat effective, for a total of 81 percent. There is little difference of opinion on this type of 
strategy between respondents from systems with rail and those without rail.
Information and Outreach Strategies
A stream of crime and public safety literature has for years suggested that public awareness of 
and involvement in crime reporting and prevention can greatly increase the watchful “eyes on 
the street” and help to reduce the acceptability of both petty and felonious criminal 
behavior.103 Many transit systems abroad—such as the London Underground—have actively 
sought to enlist the help of patrons in watching for and reporting suspicious activity. When 
asked about information and outreach strategies to educate transit riders about general 
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emergency and safety issues, three-quarters of those from rail systems report having such 
programs in place, and 86 percent of these include specific strategies to educate transit riders 
about dealing with terrorist attacks (see Table 16).
Efforts by transit agencies to educate passengers on safety and security issues appear to have 
increased dramatically since 9/11. In its 2002 survey, the GAO report found that just 18 
percent of agencies surveyed had conducted transit safety/security campaigns prior to 9/11, 
while 23 percent had done so in the six months after 9/11. Two years later, our survey found a 
very different picture: 59 percent of agencies reported having a general safety/security public 
education program in place, and 32 percent reported having programs specifically devoted to 
educating passengers about terrorism.
The proportion of surveyed agencies without rail that have information and outreach strategies 
is (statistically at the 0.005 level) significantly lower than those with rail. Only 6 percent of 
the surveyed agencies without rail have “extensive” strategies in place to educate passengers on 
Table 16  Information and Outreach Strategies
Agency Has 
Transit-Rider 
Education 
Strategies
All Systems Systems with Rail Systems without Rail
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
General Emergency and Safety Issues
Yes, Extensive 16 15% 11 41% 5 6%
Yes, Modest 47 44% 10 37% 37 46%
No 36 34% 6 22% 30 38%
Don’t Know 8 7% 0 0% 8 10%
TOTAL 107 100% 27 100% 80 100%
Dealing with Terrorist Attacks 
Yes, Extensive 8 7% 8 30% 0 0%
Yes, Modest 26 24% 10 37% 16 20%
No 64 60% 8 30% 56 70%
Don’t Know 9 8% 1 4% 8 10%
TOTAL 107 100% 27 100% 80 100%
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general emergency and safety issues, compared to 41 percent of agencies with rail. While 
nearly a third of respondents (30 percent) from agencies with rail report having extensive 
programs in place to educate passengers on what to do in case of a terrorist attack, none of the 
respondents from nonrail systems reported having an extensive education program in place.
We found no differences between rail and nonrail agencies in the specific information and 
outreach strategies employed to educate transit riders about general emergency and safety 
issues and strategies to educate riders about dealing with terrorist attacks. Transit Watch 
programs are popular, as well as posters and pamphlets that emphasize the message that 
security is everyone’s responsibility. Respondents also report using passenger newsletters, Web 
pages, public forums on transportation issues, and neighborhood outreach to keep riders 
informed.   
Information and outreach strategies are considered by over half the respondents to be very 
effective or effective in preparing for terrorist attacks. This percentage is even higher for 
agencies with rail. Twenty-one percent of respondents from agencies with rail consider 
information and outreach strategies to be very effective and 50 percent believe that they are 
somewhat effective—a total of 71 percent. In comparison, only 11 percent of respondents from 
agencies without rail find public education and outreach strategies to be very effective and 43 
percent find them somewhat effective—a total of 54 percent.
Environmental Design Strategies
While system design for transit security received little attention in the two previous security 
surveys of U.S. transit systems,104 this strategy was familiar to most respondents in our survey. 
More than two-thirds (69 percent) of the respondents in our survey reported that they were 
familiar with crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and could define the 
concept. Well over half (58 percent) of the respondents said that their systems employ CPTED 
strategies.
Given that rail transit systems tend to have many enclosed stations and miles of exclusive 
rights-of-way, it is not surprising that familiarity with, and employment of, CPTED strategies 
is higher at agencies operating rail transit service (see Table 17 on page 86). Almost all the 
respondents from agencies with rail (twenty-two out of twenty-five, or 88 percent) indicated 
that they are familiar with CPTED and could define the concept. Seven of these twenty-two 
respondents from rail systems are associated with agencies that make extensive use of CPTED 
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strategies, and another fifteen agencies report having a moderate CPTED strategy program, for 
a total of 88 percent of rail transit agencies reporting use of CPTED. By contrast, about half 
(49 percent) of agencies without rail report making use of CPTED strategies, and about two-
thirds (63 percent) of respondents from these agencies could define the term. 
Definitions of CPTED were reasonably consistent across respondents. Some of the definitions 
were rather broad, such as:
• “The proper design and effective use of the built environment that leads to a reduction in 
the fear and incidence of crime, and an improvement in a community’s quality of life” 
(Manager, Special Projects, system with bus and paratransit only).
Table 17  Use of CPTED Strategies
CPTED Crime Prevention 
through Environmental Design
All Systems
Systems with 
Rail
Systems without 
Rail
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
# of 
Systems
% of 
Systems
Can you define CPTED?
Yes, familiar with term 72 69% 22 88% 50 63%
 Uncertain about meaning 18 17% 2 8% 16 20%
 Don't Know/Not Sure 15 14% 1 4% 14 18%
 TOTAL 105 100% 25 100% 80 100%
Agency makes use of CPTED?
Yes, extensive use 14 13% 7 28% 7 9%
Yes, moderate use 47 45% 15 60% 32 40%
 No 32 30% 2 8% 30 38%
 Don't Know/Not Sure 12 11% 1 4% 11 14%
 TOTAL 105 100% 25 100% 80 100%
 Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators
Mineta Transportation Institute
87
• “Design that eliminates or reduces criminal behavior and at the same time encourages 
people to be aware of each other and their environment” (Manager, Protective Services, 
system with bus only).
• “CPTED is a proactive strategy that builds security into the design with a focus on 
prevention through solid security design, e.g., adequate lighting, ease of patrol, perimeter 
protection and access control, minimizing landscaping and hiding places, etc.” (Manager, 
Public Safety, regional system with light rail and bus).
Other definitions were quite specific, and often included specific design ideas:
• “Designing system and facilities with the intention of reducing potential criminal 
breaches, e.g.: lighting, open architecture limiting and/or eliminating alleyways and blind 
spots, reducing and/or eliminating use of or access to equipment and containers (such as 
enclosed trash cans) where IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or other potentially 
hazardous items can be left, etc.” (Safety, Training Coordinator, system with bus only).
• “CPTED refers to the incorporation of anticrime design initiatives directly into the 
planning and construction of facilities and structures. This includes, but is not limited to, 
the reduction or elimination of ‘blind’ areas from the ‘blueprint’ phase through to aesthetic 
considerations (for example, landscaping, lighting). Both visual and psychological impacts 
are considered.” (Government Relations Officer for Homeland Security, metropolitan 
transit authority with commuter, heavy, and light rail).
Two-thirds of the respondents from the sixty-one agencies that make use of CPTED strategies 
think that these strategies are very important in overall security planning, while the 
remaining third consider CPTED strategies to be somewhat important to transit security 
efforts. No respondents considered the strategies to be unimportant. These perceptions were 
similar among systems with and without rail.
Figure 12 on page 88 shows that agencies that use CPTED strategies are most likely to apply 
them to entrances and exits (82 percent), parking lots (75 percent), or gates (61 percent). By 
contrast, CPTED strategies are least likely to be applied to elevators, escalators, and vending 
machines. Comments listed under the “Other” category included landscaping and physical 
barriers around facilities. CPTED strategies employed for each component mentioned are 
summarized in Table 18 on page 89. When asked to rank CPTED strategies for cost-
effectiveness (most “bang for the buck”), improved lighting and the addition of security 
cameras and/or closed circuit TV were the most commonly mentioned. Other strategies 
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mentioned by multiple respondents were access control, open facility design with clear lines of 
sight, and landscaping.
Figure 12  Components with CPTED Strategies
When asked specifically about application of CPTED concepts to rail systems, about half the 
agencies with rail use CPTED in the design of maintenance facilities and station tunnels (see 
Figure 13 on page 90). The other components listed—control centers, traction power stations 
and distribution, and tracks—were mentioned by between 20 percent and 40 percent of rail 
agency respondents.
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Table 18  CPTED Strategies for System Components
TABLE 18:  CPTED STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEM COMPONENTS
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  Lighting 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
  Visibility (clear lines of sight) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
  Use of Glass & Natural Light 9 9
  Keep Clear of Obstacles 9 9
  No Hidden Corners/Dead Areas 9 9
  Limit Access Paths/Points 9 9 9 9
  Electronic Access Control 9 9
  Security Cameras 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
  Emergency Telephones 9 9 9
  Emergency Alarms 9 9
  Monitoring by Staff/Security 9 9 9 9
  Curved Entrance Wall without Doors 9
  Explosive Resistant 9
  See-through Containers 9
  Location* 9 9 9
  Minimal/Low Landscaping 9 9
  Fencing 9
  Public Information Signage 9 9
  Large Windows 9
  Secure Parking 9
  Vandal- and Graffiti-Proof 9
* Configure location of gates to be able to close off sections of station. Locate vending machines
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System Component
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Figure 13  Rail System Components with CPTED Strategies
Respondents from just twenty-three agencies (22 percent) reported having CPTED guidelines 
in place (ten with rail and thirteen without).105 Most (61 percent) of these guidelines were 
developed by an in-house team (fourteen of the twenty-three agencies with guidelines). Five 
contracted with consultants to prepare their CPTED guidelines, two used the sheriff’s or 
police department, one adopted FTA guidelines, and one developed guidelines through 
CPTED training at a local technical college. The lead department for developing guidelines 
was most often associated with safety and security or operations. One respondent specified the 
district architect and another, capital development.
Conclusion
The findings of this survey in many ways reflect the asymmetry inherent in public transit in 
the United States. While hundreds of transit systems operate in dozens of cities, most of the 
stations, vehicles, and passengers are concentrated on a few, very large, high-profile systems—
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systems that are the mostly likely targets for terrorist attacks. The ten largest U.S. transit 
systems (operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to 
the Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the remaining transit systems carry the 
remaining 35 percent. Thirty-nine percent of all 2002 transit trips in the United States 
occurred in one metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all United States transit trips 
were carried by just one system, the New York MTA.106
While significant attacks against U.S. transit systems remain rare, they are likewise 
asymmetric. Just sixteen of the eighty systems with rail service and/or enclosed bus/ferry 
terminals queried for this research reported receiving a credible threat (for example, bomb, 
chemical, biological, fire attacks) in the past year. While fourteen of these sixteen systems had 
received fewer than five threats, one agency reported receiving twelve credible threats, and 
another reported receiving thirty-one. These threats and incidents, combined with the tragic 
events of 9/11 and the recent, deadly transit attacks in London, have pushed security to the 
forefront of transit policy debates.     
This survey of 113 U.S. transit systems finds that attention to transit system security increased 
significantly after 9/11, and this attention has been translated in the three years since into 
increased policing, use of security technologies, public information and outreach, and CPTED 
strategies. In its 2002 survey of U.S. transit systems, the GAO found that just over half (54 
percent) of transit systems had conducted security threat assessments. Just two years later, we 
found in this survey that the proportion of large U.S. transit agencies that had conducted such 
assessments had increased to 85 percent.
Our survey asked in detail about four types of security strategies—policing, technology, 
education and outreach, and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED). We 
found that attention to all these strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half the 
respondents now view all four strategies as central or significant parts of security planning 
efforts. Prior to 9/11, CPTED and, especially, information and outreach, were given much less 
weight in security planning by the respondents to our survey. Because they manage and 
operate large numbers of stations and rail rights-of-way, respondents from rail transit systems 
tended to exhibit higher levels of concern over, and attention to, security issues than did 
respondents from systems with no rail service.
With respect to system design, over 80 percent of the respondents to this portion of our survey 
now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very effective strategy in preventing terrorist 
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attacks (see Table 19). This ranking of effectiveness is similar to policing and security 
hardware and technology strategies (though we should note that half again as many 
respondents answered questions about policing and technology as those who answered 
questions about CPTED strategies). Among the four types of security strategies analyzed here, 
public education/user outreach strategies were generally viewed as less effective than the other 
three types of strategies; nonetheless, 58 percent of respondents rated these strategies as 
somewhat or very effective. In general, systems with rail were more likely to view most 
strategies as very effective compared to systems without rail.
Collectively, the findings of this survey reflect the fundamental dilemmas of transit security 
planning. Because transit systems are open, dynamic systems that congregate hundreds, and 
even thousands, of people together in stations and onto vehicles, most transit managers and 
security officials responding to our survey view transit systems (with the exception of 
paratransit services) as very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the time, 
energy, and resources devoted to transit system security have increased dramatically over the 
past decade, particularly since 9/11, and a majority of respondents to this survey view four 
Table 19  Perceived Effectiveness of Security Planning Strategies
Strategy
Agency 
Type
Very 
Effective
Somewhat 
Effective
Not 
Effective
Don’t 
Know
n
Policing
Rail 40% 53% 7% 0% 27
No Rail 24% 57% 9% 10% 79
TOTAL 28% 56% 8% 8% 106
 
Security hardware/ 
technology
Rail 27% 62% 4% 7% 26
No Rail 26% 53% 13% 9% 80
TOTAL 26% 55% 10% 8% 106
CPTED
Rail 32% 50% 9% 9% 21
No Rail 19% 62% 11% 8% 37
TOTAL 24% 58% 10% 9% 58
 
Public education/user 
outreach
Rail 22% 49% 18% 11% 27
No Rail 11% 43% 20% 26% 80
TOTAL 14% 44% 19% 22% 107
 Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators
Mineta Transportation Institute
93
distinct security strategies as either somewhat or very effective in increasing the safety and 
security of these inherently open and vulnerable systems: policing (84 percent), technology (81 
percent), public education (58 percent), and system design (82 percent).
 Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators
Mineta Transportation Institute
94
 Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders
Mineta Transportation Institute
95
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO INCREASING TRANSIT SECURITY 
THREATS: INTERVIEWS WITH KEY U.S. STAKEHOLDERS
Public transportation in the United States is traditionally a local responsibility, although 
assistance from the national government in the form of funding and technical expertise is a 
long-established practice. Much of that assistance historically has flowed from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT)—at one time from the Urban Mass Transit 
Administration and more recently from its descendent, the Federal Transit Administration 
(FTA). With the sudden apparent need for enhanced security of local transit systems, the 
events of 9/11 created the impetus for a significant reconstitution of national government 
security responsibilities. At the same time, local transit systems faced the challenges and 
burdens of enhancing the security of their systems while balancing security mandates and 
demands with operational and managerial concerns.
This section provides an overview and analysis of the initiatives taken by the various agencies 
and organizations involved in the transit security in the United States, including federal 
agencies, a national industry organization, and local operators. It necessarily omits any 
information about any classified or otherwise sensitive activities in which these agencies and 
organizations may be engaged. The information presented is based primarily on face-to-face 
and telephone interviews with representatives from these agencies and the nongovernmental 
organizations that work with them, along with publicly available documents and agency 
Websites.
The Role of Federal Agencies and Industry Interest Groups
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the concomitant 
placement of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) therein, newly formed entities 
assumed the primary federal responsibility for domestic transportation security, including 
local rail transit. Other federal agencies play a significant collaborative role in what appears to 
be an evolving constellation of specific assignments in a rapidly developing component of 
transportation policy. 
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• The FTA, more specifically, the Office of Safety and Security (OSS), plays an “oversight role 
and an asset management role.” Other offices within FTA, such as the Office of Research 
Management, also play significant roles.
• The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) shares this oversight role with FTA with 
respect to local commuter rail systems only and also assists with the dissemination of 
security-related information to such systems.
Additionally, at least two nongovernmental public interest groups are active partners in the 
ongoing efforts to enhance the security of local transit systems:
• The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) serves as a liaison between federal 
security agencies and the local transit industry through several committees that focus on 
transit security issues. APTA interfaces with the various federal agencies listed earlier, as 
well as the General Accountability Office (GAO), and has helped create safety and security-
related standards for the rail-transit industry.
• The Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA) similarly helps federal 
agencies validate their various policy initiatives, and relays technical assistance on security 
matters to its local transit agency membership.
In considering the present state of federal government efforts to enhance the security of local 
transit facility environments, perhaps the most noticeable consideration is their unsettled 
character. Clearly, the attacks of 9/11, coupled with the more recent spate of terrorist attacks 
on transit systems around the globe, have necessitated an almost improvisational response 
among the agencies charged with responsibility in this arena. The more conventional, carefully 
considered, and incremental approach to policy making has generally been supplanted by 
more direct responses. Therefore, three themes were particularly recurrent among those 
interviewed from these agencies: (1) a sense of urgency about the need to effect improvements 
in transit security from terrorist attacks, (2) the rapidly evolving set of roles and 
responsibilities of different entities, and (3) the significant amount of uncertainty that is 
attendant to these efforts. With these factors in mind, the following sections explore the roles 
and initiatives currently being pursued by the major institutions involved in these efforts.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security has the lead responsibility for federal efforts to 
maintain and enhance the security of public rail transit systems. More specifically, the 
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Passenger Safety division of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has 
responsibility for all nonaviation transit modes, including buses, school buses, passenger and 
commuter rail (including Amtrak), mass transit, and maritime transit. This responsibility 
overlaps to an extent with modal counterparts in the DOT, although DOT’s responsibility is 
primarily transit safety, in contrast to TSA’s charge to maintain security. The result, according 
to Brian O’Malley, Branch Chief, Mass Transit Infrastructure Security, is that responsibility for 
transit security-related functions is currently “oddly divided up.”
According to Don Thompson, TSA Director of Passenger Safety, TSA’s responsibilities are 
outlined in the Aviation Security Act, which tasks the agency with broad authority to 
maintain security of both aviation and “all other modes.” TSA has used this broad legislative 
mandate to become active in the security of local rail transit. The extent of TSA’s role in transit 
security has evolved rapidly with the creation of the agency in 2002 to build upon what the 
FTA, FRA, APTA, and other organizations have been doing from the standpoint of security. In 
the aftermath of 9/11, a great deal of “good work done in haste” was accomplished by these 
entities, according to Thompson. Meanwhile, some additional clarification of roles and 
responsibilities has developed, due in part to legislative mandates that have served to help 
define expectations for TSA.
The primary means by which TSA acts to enhance the security of local transit systems is to 
concentrate on the intermodal and interactive aspects of such systems, with the underlying 
principle being to avoid “hardening” one potential target at the expense of another by 
diverting potential threats to other target and modes. A key underlying principle in this 
endeavor is to balance the need for security with the viability of transit systems. The potential 
fiscal fragility of these systems is acknowledged in TSA’s efforts to enhance security, therefore 
making it unlikely that costly security requirements will be foisted upon local systems absent 
the funding necessary to implement them. To date, despite its legislative authority to do so, 
TSA has eschewed the promulgation of transit-security regulations, but some may be 
forthcoming if it is apparent that the security of local agencies will benefit from them. TSA 
did recently issue a set of extremely generic regulations regarding local transit security 
directives. In fact, the FTA has been more active in this realm, as will be discussed below.
Although specific budgetary and manpower allocations were not available for this report, 
interviews with TSA officials strongly suggest that the vast majority of the agency’s current 
efforts are on airline passenger safety. With respect to public transit, the TSA focus is on 
operational security initiatives rather than on facility design and environment. The DHS grant 
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program for improving rail and transit security in urban areas has awarded or allocated over 
$115 million since May 2003, some of which may have been devoted to a transit environment 
focus. TSA has facilitated an analysis of the threats and vulnerabilities of transit systems, and 
has provided grant funds for sharing the costs of enhancing local transit security systems; these 
efforts might be construed as potentially useful in the area of transit design. Thompson 
suggested that the TSA-hosted “transit security roundtables” conducted at various regional 
settings across the nation might also provide a contribution.
The gradual historic shift from the old “pillar” style of transit station (for example, the New 
York subway system) to the more contemporary open style (for example, BART in the San 
Francisco Bay Area) is clearly superior from a safety standpoint, and perhaps from a security 
standpoint as well. According to Brian O’Malley, the 2004 Madrid attacks would have been 
much more deadly had they occurred within the confines of a more closed station. In this 
respect, the newer light rail transit stops (which tend to be above ground and open) may prove 
to be safer in the event of such an attack. The issue of design for security is new territory for 
the TSA and others endeavoring to envision a more secure transit environment.
More generally, TSA is struggling with the “entire panoply” of the terrorist threat to 
transportation, said O’Malley. Many aspects of transit design that were once taken for granted 
must now be reconsidered. For example, redundancies in transit systems were traditionally 
thought by many to be inefficient. Now they are being reconsidered as possibly useful for 
helping to maintain system operations in the wake of an attack. 
Yet answers to the questions posed by the threat of terror attacks on transit systems are not 
readily quantified. If a system is to be redesigned, or a design improvement to be effected at 
significant cost, how can the costs and benefits be reconciled against the unknown likelihood 
and impact of a terror attack? The uncertainty inherent in the problems posed by such threats 
has forced TSA to take a relatively measured approach to policy making in this area. By 
contrast, enhancements to the security of transit system operations can be made relatively 
simply (although not necessarily cheaply).
Perhaps the activity most relevant to enhancement of transit security design is currently 
underway at TSA’s Mass Transit Infrastructure Security office, and entails the study of the 
possible implementation of countermeasures to terrorist actions. Considerable efforts have 
been made with respect to planning and studying such measures, which would actually 
discourage the instigation and/or enhance the mitigation of terror attacks. However, according 
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to O’Malley, sufficient resources have not yet been committed to implementing these 
measures. Evidently a critical mass of commitment to the idea of countermeasures does not yet 
exist at the policy making level. So, most of the effort is currently aimed at doing vulnerability 
assessments with relatively little being done to actively counteract the threats or weaknesses 
that are identified. More resources, therefore, are needed for mitigation measures to become a 
reality.
The countermeasures under consideration at TSA include a range of technologies that could 
mitigate and/or discourage terrorist attacks. According to TSA officials, it may be entirely 
possible to render bombs and chemical/biological attacks harmless. However, these measures 
need to be integrated into the design of transit facilities and cannot be readily retrofitted into 
them. Such measures, however, would likely be more effective in the context of smaller, 
Madrid-style attacks than massive “doomsday” attacks. At least until recently, according to 
O’Malley, TSA’s efforts have been more focused on the latter.
In sum, although the Madrid attacks appear to have spurred significant response in the local 
transit realm generally at TSA/DHS, interviews with TSA officials suggest that to date most 
of that activity has been directed at the security of local rail transit operations and 
consequently, relatively few concrete results have been achieved in the area of transit system 
design.
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
Although it lacks the regulatory authority of the TSA, the FTA’s role in transit security—and 
specifically the safety and security environment of public transit—is in some ways deeper and 
more direct. Perhaps due to its institutional focus on and experience with transit, the FTA is 
active in pursuing research into the design of transit facilities, promulgating possible 
regulations for the design of such facilities, providing local transit agencies with technical 
assistance, and interacting with TSA and other federal agencies in these efforts.
With respect to research, FTA’s Office of Research Management is engaged in a study looking 
at the design of transit facilities in light of the potential for terrorism. This entails an analysis 
of the planning and design side of transit to see how different practices, procedures, and 
features could prevent incidents from occurring. Such efforts may also facilitate emergency 
responses to incidents as they do occur and facilitate the recovery of systems in the event of a 
terrorist attack.
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Rhonda Crawley, Team Leader for the FTA’s Safety and Security Research, said that the agency 
has partnered with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and the 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) to research a chemical agent detection 
program in a project titled “PROTECT” that has funded research at Drexel University’s 
transportation center for bio-agent detection and filtration. Additionally, an intrusion 
detection project was underway at MBTA as of June 2004 to pilot a test system to prevent 
unauthorized access to bus tunnels. Congress has also earmarked $6.9 million in FTA funds for 
Florida Atlantic University (and a consortium of Florida universities) to use visual and virtual 
engineering techniques to test the design of transit facilities with respect to security. Florida 
transit properties will also participate. These techniques will enable visual simulation of 
transit facilities before they are built, rebuilt, or retrofitted.
The research being conducted at FTA has several components, including one that deals with 
transit infrastructure. It also touches on communications systems, including emergency 
communications systems and access management. FTA is looking at systems integration in 
terms of networking these things together to complement one another and to provide a higher 
level of security while at the same time facilitating the operations and efficiency of local transit 
systems.
FTA’s assistance to local transit agencies is aimed at trying to standardize practices and provide 
support such that the agencies are prepared for a possible attack and can share information 
with one another, Crawley indicated. The goal is to identify best practices and their 
dissemination to other agencies in similar circumstances. More generically, FTA conducted 
threat and vulnerability assessments for the thirty-seven largest transit properties and 
provided on-site technical assistance to the fifty largest ones. In New York City, the rebuilding 
of PATH and MTA subway stations damaged or destroyed on 9/11 is being overseen by FTA to 
include design for security. This consists of hiring consultants who will review the work done 
by local operators and their contractors in rebuilding the stations.
However, the security needs of local transit agencies vary widely, and each agency needs to 
look at its circumstance and determine what efforts make the most sense. Some local agencies 
are undertaking major expansion programs, including building new facilities, new stations, 
and so on. Those agencies have a different set of opportunities (and challenges) than 
organizations with large, installed infrastructure that have been operational for decades. 
Agencies that have been operating for long periods of time on large, extensive networks have a 
whole different set of constraints and realities than do systems that are expanding anew. 
 Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders
Mineta Transportation Institute
101
Consequently, each agency has to develop its own security approach, again based on its current 
state, threats and vulnerabilities, and financial status. FTA recognizes that transit agencies are 
not equally capable from a financial standpoint, and as agencies develop their strategies, they 
have to base them around the resources that they have available. Lewis Clopton, Director of 
Research Management at the FTA Office of Research Management, said that “from a national 
standpoint the federal government can’t define a solution and expect it to be incorporated by 
everybody. It’s not a one-size-fits-all kind of issue…it’s a matter of generating alternatives, 
processes, and approaches that agencies can apply to where they are.”
Although TSA/DHS has primary regulatory authority, FTA is developing security-related 
guidelines for the construction of transit facilities, although these guidelines are not being 
developed as regulations. Several interviewees stated that the diversity of transit agencies and 
their milieus makes it impractical and undesirable to promulgate uniform regulations on a 
national scale. Said Clopton, “One agency may be able to look at hardening facilities; one 
agency may be able to look at how to locate and how to position things on site; whereas 
another agency may have to rely more upon softer measures in terms of security enforcement to 
achieve the same kinds of outcomes.” So these guidelines—which were expected to be in draft 
form in late 2004—simply inform transit operators of design alternatives and allow local 
agencies to determine which alternatives fit their situation.
Comments from officials at TSA suggest that efforts to enhance security environments may at 
times conflict with the more traditional goal of crime prevention. Said Clopton, “Although 
the threat of terrorism is real, if you spend a lot of money and put in place a lot of practices 
which have no immediate utility, you’ve got a question of convincing an agency that it’s worth 
doing those sorts of things when they have other more pressing needs up front. If we can show 
that these things have benefits that go beyond being prepared for what may be a very 
unfortunate occurrence but is by no means a certainty...” Thus, FTA officials hope to make 
security suggestions that can leverage at least some benefits relative to safety, improved 
operational efficiency, and attracting riders as a byproduct.
According to Clopton, the process of attempting to quantify these efforts to both heighten 
security and achieve efficiencies is highly challenging, given the number of different (and 
possibly conflicting) objectives: 
You have to look at each issue and the particulars. An emergency situation is not 
just a terrorist situation. An emergency situation can be a significant accident or 
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another kind of emergency occurrence on a vehicle or in a transit system. From the 
security standpoint, these communication kinds of things do have a broad impact. 
On the other hand, we don’t want to issue requirements for emergency 
communications that don’t complement an agency that’s getting ready to go out 
and acquire a new communications system. If an agency is getting ready to go out 
and acquire a new communications system, the emergency communication needs to 
be a driving requirement in the decision as to what to acquire. The same could be 
said for a number of other areas. In some cases, we’re pointing to how to quantify 
some of these things, but it really depends on the particular situation that you’re 
looking at.
Despite the fact that multiple agencies are working in this area, those interviewed from federal 
and national organizations were unanimous in their opinion that interagency coordination is 
occurring smoothly. Some commented that this was in part due to the fact that officials are 
working together on a personal, frequently face-to-face basis. Clopton cited the example of the 
effort to create secure credentials for transit workers: 
TSA is clearly going to be in the lead for establishing that requirement [for identity 
cards]. And the question is essentially going to be what are going to be the 
particulars of technology and the particulars of background checks and the 
particulars of application. We’re addressing some of the issues relative to the 
particulars of application in terms of secured spaces versus nonsecured spaces and 
how that identity card will tie into permitting access to various privileges within 
the system. So we’re addressing the operational side of the card assuming that TSA 
will eventually issue a requirement for such an instrument to be adopted by all 
transit agencies.
Similar cooperation has been achieved with the APTA and CTAA, as well as the FRA, 
according to Clopton:
We’re trying to make sure that anything that we do has a reality check such that 
the industry finds it useful and the industry finds it to have some utility. And any 
recommendations that we make we hope have gone through this kind of reality 
testing with various industry groups as we go ahead. We’ve also been working to 
some degree in keeping the FRA advised of the work that we’re doing because on 
the commuter side they become very important there. We’re going to be reaching 
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out more to the engineering/design community…the people that actually design 
and plan these systems in the coming year to make sure that those communities 
review the work that we’re doing before we adopt them as official FTA practices 
and so on… We’ve got to reach out to a fairly diverse and broad community to 
discuss these things before we issue any kind of recommendation about how it 
should be done.
Coordination is also proceeding at the local transit agency level, although funding for such 
agencies is clearly a hindrance as many recently have been scaling back operations as a result of 
the recent recession, trying to identify what are their core functions so they can keep those 
going in a time of fiscal challenge. Additionally, the assumption of vulnerability to a terrorist 
threat varies by locality. “Different agencies may have different perceptions about how 
vulnerable they may be,” commented Clopton.
In sum, the FTA’s effort to enhance the security of local transit environments is a work in 
progress. Technical assistance is perhaps the most tangible reflection of this effort, although 
draft guidelines for transit facility designs (at the time of the interviews) were due to appear 
sometime soon. FTA is attempting to provide helpful advice and guidelines that stand the test 
of the complicated reality of the diverse local rail transit environment. The FTA has also 
provided significant support, worked closely with the transit industry, and developed many 
resources, including funding programs through the National Transit Institute and the Volpe 
Center.
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
The FRA has regulatory authority over freight and commuter (“heavy”) railroad systems. Its 
general safety and security role is to ensure public safety in commuter rail, with security being 
a significant component of that duty. More specifically, FRA is involved in ensuring transit 
security in the following ways:
• Fosters emergency planning for security among local rail systems, including a regulatory 
function over local rail systems—its regional offices conduct audits of local preparedness 
and security.
• Shares information with local rail systems, including participation in the National-Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (which also includes representatives from various federal, state, and 
local law enforcement officials).
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• Participates in Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST-ISAC), 
a consortium of agencies that share information about terrorism threats, incidents, and 
other information.
The primary means by which the FRA acts to enhance the security of local rail systems is 
information sharing, a role similar to and shared with that of the FTA. This includes some of 
the activities listed above, as well as offering training in transit security to local transit law 
enforcement personnel. FRA also assists the FTA in ensuring that federal grants to transit 
agencies include appropriate provisions for security uses.
Some security policy initiatives originate from within the FRA, particularly those that are 
linked to some specific threat. The focus of such initiatives is almost exclusively on security 
operations (in contrast to environmental or system design considerations). According to Bill 
Fagan with FRA security, this is due to the fact that most facilities are privately owned and 
most consist of older infrastructure that cannot readily be modified to address emerging 
security threats. The FRA does offer guidance to the railroads on building design and is 
considering changing these guidelines to reflect the latest research and information. However, 
such changes must clear standard regulatory hurdles and are not immediately forthcoming. 
Rail systems are quite often easily accessible to the general public and the FRA has therefore 
focused much more on the operations side of security enhancement.
Fagan said that, to date, FRA officials are satisfied that the coordinated efforts of the FRA and 
other agencies comprise a “synchronized effort between industry, labor, government, and trade 
associations,” resulting in effective information sharing and thereby enhancing the safety of 
commuter rail transit systems. Yet relatively little concrete progress has been achieved in the 
area of transit facility design and environments.
American Public Transportation Association (APTA)
APTA is a transit industry organization with a membership of over 1,500 transit agencies and 
business representatives from across the United States. The organization historically has served 
as an interface between operators and the federal government; this liaison role is even more 
significant with the issue of transit security. Greg Hull, APTA’s director of operations, safety, 
and security programs, says that the agency has actively engaged individuals in various federal 
agencies working on security issues, particularly DHS and TSA, in order to educate them 
about public transit. According to Hull, APTA has used a Transit 101 presentation with the 
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message that their organization—not the federal government—has the real expertise in 
transit. APTA involves the transit industry in all important stages of planning: 
They [the federal government] may have the expertise in terms of security 
development for certain perspectives, and certainly they have the funds and the 
legislative mandate. But the bottom line is that if there are any directions or 
mandates to the transit industry…the only way that those things can be successful 
is by engaging us at a very early stage so that the industry can have proper buy-in 
and actually have a hand in the development of any such standards that might come 
forward.
One of APTA’s strongest federal partnerships has been with the FTA, due in part to the funds 
available through the agency to develop a wide range of programs and support services. Just 
days after September 11, 2001, APTA sent the FTA a listing of key areas and immediate needs 
both within operations and capital programs. In the program development that followed, 
APTA populated working groups formed by the FTA. Hull described the relationship between 
the FTA and DHS, and in particular TSA, as evolving now that TSA has been given the lead 
role in addressing security-related issues in transportation modes of all types; the FTA will 
play more of a support role for TSA as opposed to taking the lead as they had in the past.
APTA also has worked with the FRA on various transit security issues. Hull cited the example 
of APTA’s involvement in the development of standards for commuter rail systems. The 
organization had not participated in this aspect of transit safety and security management and 
operations until about six years ago. After a series of incidents in the commuter railroad 
industry, the FRA sought to develop standards through collaborative discussions. APTA 
worked with the FRA to establish what are known as “Passenger Rail Equipment Safety 
Standards,” or PRESS Standards. APTA has now created approximately 100 standards for the 
rail-transit industry and recently became engaged in the development of standards for bus 
operations as well; last year APTA also became established as a standards development 
organization, a new role for the organization.
In addition, for the past several years APTA has assisted the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) with a series of studies about the government’s attention to security issues, 
particularly transit security. These include reports about the roles and activities of FTA and 
TSA relative to the needs of the transit industry, with recommendations put forth to provide 
better guidance to those administrations.
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Hull says that there are “tools that enhance security and we certainly see more of the transit 
agencies moving towards introducing a variety of technologies,” but he emphasizes two 
particular security strategies: training and emergency preparedness drills. The first includes 
the formal training of transit staff and also outreach to transit customers—“the whole concept 
of having a broad network of eyes and ears and voices that will look for and let us know when 
they see something that just doesn’t seem right.”
In terms of understanding the threat of transit terrorism at the local level, Hull acknowledges 
that perspectives on the level of risk and threat vary widely. However, he argues, perhaps 
reflecting the breadth of his organization’s membership, that the threat is pervasive regardless 
of whether the transit system is located in a large metropolitan area or a small one: 
Some of us might argue that it doesn’t matter where you are. I mean, look at 
Oklahoma City. This isn’t just Al Qaeda we’re dealing with. There are domestic 
terrorists, there are people who have political missions, there are people who are 
wackos, there are people who are copycats, and so it doesn’t matter, from my 
perspective, it doesn’t matter where you are located, whether in Pocatello, Idaho, or 
Washington, D.C….it doesn’t matter what city you live in or what town you live 
in, there is a need to address these issues. 
Hull also argues that agencies need to address requirements in all modes—from subways to 
buses—and he says that transit terrorism is not confined to the largest population centers. 
However, he acknowledges that practically and realistically, when making decisions about 
security using a risk management approach, local agencies carrying the most passengers do 
pose the greatest vulnerabilities.
Agency coordination and the dissemination of information are also crucial, says Hull. Very few 
people in the transit industry, even among the police forces, have security clearances. He says 
that after 9/11, APTA realized that the transit industry and federal transportation agencies 
needed to access security intelligence information. Transit agencies in major cities usually had 
good working relationships with the FBI through established joint terrorism task forces. 
However, this was not the case across the board. The DOT designated APTA a sector 
coordinator for establishing a Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC), part 
of the umbrella Surface Transportation ISAC, and APTA worked on this project through an 
FTA grant. Hull says that APTA used the grant to contract with a company based in Virginia:
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They have on staff, those people who have backgrounds, past careers with the FBI 
and Department of Defense. They have top-level security clearances. And they are 
able to glean through sources of information and package it in a manner that’s 
meaningful to the transit industry. We are now in the process of connecting all 
transit agencies within this ISAC to be able to access this information. 
Hull says the flow of information is from the ISAC out to transit agencies, but there is also a 
push to have agencies input their own information into the intelligence system: 
If an agency experiences a certain degree of trespassing, they might see that as kids 
getting into the train yards or something. But maybe it’s part of something that’s 
more of a trend in the industry and that becomes good information that needs to be 
analyzed and disseminated out to the industry.
The direct exchange of information among agencies is also a priority for APTA and something 
it helps facilitate: 
We get the permission of the transit agencies to share whatever the best practice 
might be. It might be something like preventive maintenance, it might be a design 
concept in a facility, it might the way that staff are utilized for safety and security. 
Our industry has historically and continues to be very supportive of one another. 
One of the things that has occurred is that, where prior to 9/11 we saw more 
agencies more willing to share their security plans, now that’s a little more closely 
guarded. They may share those plans with one another, but it would be eye-to-eye 
and hand-to-hand as opposed to what we may have seen in prior years. But there’s a 
very, very open sharing of information within the system.
Hull acknowledges that transit security is happening in an international context. As such, the 
organization has formal partnerships with other transit industry groups around the world: the 
Canadian Urban Transit Association, the International Union of Public Transport (based in 
Brussels), the Latin American Association of Underground Networks and Subways 
(ALAMYS), and the Cooperation for the Continuing Development of Urban and Suburban 
Transportation (CODATU), based in Paris and representing transit systems in developing 
nations. A couple of years ago, APTA invited these associations and some of their prime 
agency members to meet with them in Washington. The goal was to share information about 
program development and relationships with government agencies. Hull says that APTA 
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representatives continue to share information with these other groups, and they invite each 
other to special conferences and workshops on security.
Transit Operators in the Northeastern United States 
The New York metropolitan area is home to, by far, the largest network of public transit 
systems in the country. New York accounted for 39 percent of all transit trips taken in the 
entire United States in 2002, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips that same year were 
carried by just one system, the MTA-New York City Transit.107
While the venue of the 9/11 attacks was the air transport system, their effect on New York’s 
public transit systems was dramatic and long-lasting and profoundly tested the ability of 
transit staff to respond to a major crisis. Given New York’s dominant role in U.S. public 
transit and its recent experience with an extraordinary terrorist attack, it is the venue for one of 
our case studies. Accordingly, this section reports on findings from interviews with several 
transit security officials at major agencies in the northeastern United States, including the 
New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
(PATH), and Amtrak.
Security staff remain extremely concerned about the possibility of transit terrorism on their 
systems. Chief John O’Connor at Amtrak believes that the threat of terrorism on transit 
systems is “very real and that it is a question of when rather than if.” For O’Connor, 9/11 was a 
galvanizing force, but it had started to fade somewhat. The events in Madrid in March 2004 
brought the issue of transportation security back to the forefront and “now for most transit 
agencies it’s one of their top priorities, if not the top.” Officials are concerned about the 
publicity as a terrorist target that transit is getting after the events of Moscow and Madrid. 
Attention is now focused on rail and stations such as Penn Station and Grand Central 
Station—large multimodal facilities and landmarks—that are considered targets of particular 
concern.
Passenger outreach and awareness is a strategy that many transit operators in the New York 
City area consider extremely important. At PATH, flyers about security are put out at stations 
and monitors flash messages that say, “Be Alert.” The agency trains all employees and 
contractors about security awareness and “everyone knows what to look for, and if they do see 
something, how to respond.” William Morange of the MTA believes that rider and employee 
awareness is the most effective transit security strategy. He notes that the executive director of 
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MTA had an “If you see something, say something” program in place before 9/11 “where if 
you see something that’s not kosher—the way it should look—report it to the conductors, 
report it to the motormen… Now calls are going up, but it’s worth it for us.”
Policing strategies changed in some transit agencies in New York after the events in Madrid. 
At PATH, police started using patrol tactics that included scrutinizing the areas between 
parked cars and in station vestibules, as well as looking at unoccupied cars at terminal stations. 
In addition, the agency started using more undercover police and also began flooding different 
parts of the system with police at varying times of the day and night. After the Tokyo sarin 
incident, PATH police organized an elite group, the Emergency Services Unit. Half of this 
group was trained in chemical incident response at Fort McClellan in Alabama. Martha Gulick 
of PATH indicated that this was the first civilian or nonarmed forces group to be trained at 
Fort McClellan. This unit provides rapid response in the event of a Tokyo-type attack on the 
PATH system, whereas the response time of federal teams is seen by those interviewed as 
unacceptably long.
Transit operators in the New York metropolitan area are not strangers to environmental design 
as a security strategy. Security staff at the agencies feel that design elements are extremely 
important and ideally should be addressed during the actual building of facilities. Said one 
transit security official, “We’ve now incorporated security in the designs and boilerplates. 
Whereas at one time if you were going to construct a station, you would have only had to do 
safety: fire suppression, fire and life safety, ventilation, lighting, fire alarms. But now there’s a 
security piece that gets incorporated.” By including security as an integral part of the design 
process, agencies can avoid costly and sometimes impossible station retrofits and redesigns. At 
PATH, environmental design strategies have included, among other things, removing trash 
cans, locking down the seats in cars (which were not secured prior to 9/11), taking out recessed 
telephones, eliminating nooks and crannies, and installing access controls on all doors. Gulick 
notes security by design is an underlying philosophy at the new World Trade Center Terminal, 
and FTA expects this to be a model for new construction around the country.
Amtrak’s O’Connor says that after 9/11, the agency took some steps to put environmental 
design features into place. At the major stations, barricades and CCTV systems were installed 
with no major renovations to the stations. In terms of design features for the future, O’Connor 
suggests that agencies will have to think about creating “secure zones” where people are 
screened and checked before they enter boarding areas, particularly for intercity trains. 
However, he acknowledges that this type of system is difficult to implement in the transit 
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environment with people coming and going quickly. He also pointed to the Washington, 
D.C., Metro system as one of the best in terms of environmental design with its clear sight 
lines and few nooks and crannies. He adds that it is not extremely well lit, but it is bright 
enough that people feel comfortable in it.
One transit official points out that security decisions should involve more than just security 
staff because these procedures affect many facets of the system outside of security itself: 
…As the security people come up with ideas that may not fit, if you have 
operations people sitting there, that’s better. We have to reach some sort of a 
balance, some sort of a medium. How do we stop trains, how do we do inspections, 
but weave it into the regular fabric of our operations so our customers hardly 
notice? 
He goes on to describe an example of a situation where security impacts smooth system 
operations, which then leads to other potential safety and security problems: 
If we have a suspicious package, what is the procedure to deal with it? We try to 
minimize the delay to the train while still answering the concern... Because when 
you start delaying trains, you create another safety problem as more trains get 
backed up. Now you’re creating a service disruption. In Penn Station or Grand 
Central, many of the subway stations where they have such volume, just delaying a 
train or two, you can lose a station. We end up having to shut down things. And 
then you get thousands and thousands of people in a panic situation wondering, 
‘What’s going on? Why am I being evacuated?’ Once you can’t run trains, you can’t 
let people into the station because you have a crush load. 
This is a common tension transit security officials face—how to implement security strategies 
and maintain an effective level of security, while keeping the system running smoothly.
This discussion points to an ongoing issue faced by transit security officials: balancing the 
security of their systems with other operations and management objectives. Says Gulick, 
“Inspecting bags is not conducive to operating a rapid transit [system]. Explosive detection 
technology is out there, but to do it would increase the dwell time, taking the rapid out of 
transit. That’s unacceptable in our business.” However, O’Connor at Amtrak does not see 
security and effective system operations as mutually exclusive goals. Rather, he believes that 
they are intertwined, with secure environments bolstering ridership: “If people do not feel safe 
and secure, they won’t use the system; they’ll avoid it if possible… If you allow the system to 
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fall into disorder and decay, it will definitely affect your ridership.” Thus, operators are aware 
that weighing the costs and benefits of system security overall, as well as of particular 
measures, is a complex process and includes variables that can be difficult to quantify.
How do transit security officials in the New York area measure the effectiveness of security 
strategies? How do they decide which strategies to pursue, given the wide range of possible 
measures? Gulick says that at PATH there is an attempt to quantify reductions in risk and 
vulnerability as part of the mitigation project. They recently implemented a risk management 
and vulnerability assessment software package that evaluates terrorist threats for a particular 
site. It is a Department of Defense program modified for civilian use. Gulick says that as 
PATH and other Port Authority businesses put different security programs into action, they 
will be putting that information into this program. The software will actually document and 
demonstrate the effectiveness of mitigation measures. However, she points out that “from a 
cost-effectiveness standpoint, you don’t necessarily go for the cheapest technology. You want to 
go for technology that is going to work on your system.”
O’Connor says that all security strategies are important, and the distinction is between short-
term and longer-term strategies: “On a day-to-day basis, your focus is on operations, police 
deployment, both prevention and response. Long-term, you need to set goals and design 
activities to help achieve those goals. You need to plan long term capital improvement that 
will help you achieve those goals. And you have to constantly—daily, weekly, quarterly, 
yearly—measure the effectiveness of your strategies and tactics to see if they are in fact 
achieving those goals.”
Transit security officials in New York describe a significant amount of interagency 
cooperation, not just in the New York area but in the Northeast corridor generally. O’Connor 
of Amtrak says that his agency deals with the MBTA in Boston, the Connecticut Department 
of Transportation, the Long Island Railroad, New Jersey Transit, the Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Agency (SEPTA), and the Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC). 
Some of these agencies have their own police departments and others do not; some agencies 
provide security services for others. In a place such as Penn Station, there is a 
multijurisdictional structure where the station is owned by Amtrak and Amtrak patrols the 
majority of the facility. Long Island Railroad leases a portion and the MTA police patrol the 
lower level. Finally, the street level and subway entrances are policed by the New York Police 
Department (NYPD).
 Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders
Mineta Transportation Institute
112
Gulick says that PATH has very good relationships with municipal fire services, police, and 
emergency medical service providers. Gulick described a large meeting that included PATH, 
the New Jersey State Police, New York Police, fire departments, Coast Guard, Office of 
Emergency Management staff, and chemical response teams “just to discuss the potential 
threats that were concerns for the last holiday season. It pays dividends because, if they have 
issues, they are very comfortable picking up the phone and saying, ‘Have you considered…?’ 
and vice versa if we need to reach out to them.” PATH has also bridged the gap between 
transit agencies and intelligence agencies. The Port Authority Police sit on the Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces of both New York and New Jersey. These bodies serve to connect the FBI and local 
law enforcement so any intelligence from the FBI is accessible to security officials at PATH. In 
addition to these domestic collaborations, transit security officials mentioned meeting with 
their international counterparts in Tokyo, London, Moscow, Madrid, and Israel to learn about 
past incidents and to share best practices information.
Conclusions 
This section has provided an overview of the efforts of organizations in the United States—
federal agencies, industry organizations, and a sample of key transit operators in metropolitan 
areas of the northeastern United States—to maintain and enhance the security of local rail 
transit system design and environments. The bulk of federal efforts currently appear to be 
focused on the challenges with intelligence, policing, and emergency responses. Officials 
perceive that security operations produce the quickest and perhaps most noticeable results. As 
several officials who were interviewed commented, it is extremely difficult to quantify the 
costs and benefits of the various strategies for enhancing transit security. However, whereas the 
rush to increase security via policing and surveillance is probably warranted, it is possible that 
the longer-term potential benefits from changes in the design of local transit facilities may be 
shortchanged in the process. Additionally, the impact of the recent rash of terrorist attacks on 
foreign transit systems appears to have caused an increased shift in efforts to secure local 
transit, but the nature of this shift makes it difficult to forecast the evolving roles of federal 
agencies in this arena.
Those federal initiatives that are being directed toward the transit system design are either 
currently under development (such as FTA’s guidelines for transit facility design) or in the 
planning and research stages (such as implementation of potential countermeasures at transit 
sites). Thus the implications of these efforts for the future design of transit facilities are 
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difficult to predict. However, federal initiatives are being undertaken to address the diverse set 
of conditions under which local transit agencies operate and are managed.
One of the more positive developments in this regard is the amount of cooperation that 
appears to be occurring among federal and local agencies. Federal interviewees were 
unanimous in their view that relatively little in the way of “turf battles” was occurring as 
agencies juggle their evolving and, in some cases, newly acquired roles and responsibilities, 
although industry and local agencies’ representatives also raised concerns over increasingly 
underfunded federal mandates. The contributions of nongovernmental industry organizations, 
particularly APTA, deserve special mention in this regard. APTA has assisted each of the 
agencies discussed in this section in a variety of ways, including cooperation in the 
development of the ISAC, which facilitates the sharing of security-related information among 
transit and government agencies. APTA and transit operators in the United States also appear 
eager to foster these relationships, both in the domestic and international contexts.
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CASE STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST INCIDENTS
Some of the security measures that we can apply to station design are the result of lessons 
learned by transit agencies that have experienced terrorist incidents. There have been hundreds 
of terrorist attacks on rail systems throughout the twentieth century.108 These have ranged in 
severity from mere threats causing evacuation and service disruptions to sabotage resulting in 
property damage to large-scale attacks inflicting injuries and fatalities. A chronology of these 
incidents can be found in Appendix A. This section consists of case studies of five terrorist or 
quasiterrorist campaigns that inflicted serious property damage, injuries, or fatalities: 
1. The IRA (Irish Republican Army) bombings against the London rail system—early 1970s 
to mid-1990s, London
2. The Fulton Street Station fire bombing—December 21, 1994, New York City 
3. The sarin chemical agent release on the Tokyo subway—March 20, 1995, Tokyo
4. The GIA (Armed Islamic Group) bombings on the Paris rail system—July 1995 through 
December 1996
5. Al Qaeda’s attack on the RENFE (La Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles) subway 
system—March 11, 2004, Madrid
These case studies were chosen because of their severity and high visibility, and because they 
targeted five major transit systems of the world. Additionally, these incidents span a range of 
geographic areas, including Europe, North America, and Asia. The IRA attacks were a 
prolonged campaign that lasted from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s and terrorized British 
rail passengers. The Fulton Street Station bombing was the second bombing by the 
perpetrator and had unique characteristics in comparison to the other three case studies, 
because the bomb was an incendiary device. The sarin chemical agent release was the first time 
a chemical weapon of mass destruction was utilized by a terrorist group in a major attack. The 
Paris bombing campaign was similar in nature to the IRA campaign, but much shorter in 
duration, lasting a couple of years in the mid-1990s. Finally, the Madrid attack was the first 
time Al Qaeda’s new brand of global terrorism hit a major railway system.
This section discusses each of the five case studies, describing the events and identifying the 
key design elements that had a significant impact on the response, recovery, and mitigation of 
the effects of the terrorist attack. Primary sources of information for this section were drawn 
from interviews with transit officials in London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, and Madrid. 
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Additionally, a full array of secondary sources was utilized that included books, reports, and 
newspaper articles written about the different incidents. We should note that the literature on 
each of these attacks is rather scarce when it comes to the role of design in mitigating or 
aggravating the impact of the terrorist incident. Therefore, much information had to be drawn 
from sources written for other purposes, such as news articles, medical journals, and historical 
narratives.
IRA Bombing Campaign: London
(For maps of London’s Underground system, please see http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tube/maps.)
Incident Description
The Irish Republican Army conducted a bombing campaign in London and Ireland that lasted 
over twenty years; the London campaign in particular lasted from the early 1970s to the mid-
1990s. Starting in Northern Ireland in 1969, their terrorist campaign moved to London in 
February 1973 with several coordinated car bombings. According to Coogan (1995) and 
Taylor (1997), the terrorists hoped to bring the reality of “the troubles” of the north to the 
British people. IRA members began targeting British rail facilities in September 1973. After 
that, they bombed or attempted to bomb stations and trains in London no less than twenty-
two times. The following is a timeline of the attacks that occurred on London’s underground 
rail network.
Chronology of IRA Bombings on London’s Rail Network (Source: Jenkins 1997)
9/8/1973 Bomb explodes at Victoria Station (1 injury, 0 fatalities)
9/8/1973 Bomb explodes at King’s Cross and Euston stations (13 injuries, 0 fatalities)
10/9/1975 Bomb explodes at entrance of Green Park Station (20 injuries, 1 fatality)
2/12/1976 Bomb defused at Oxford Circus Station
3/4/1976 Bomb explodes on commuter train minutes after Cannon Street Station stop
3/15/1976 West Ham Station explosion (1 injury, 2 fatalities)
3/18/1976 Wood Green Station bombing (1 injury, 0 fatalities)
2/18/1991 Victoria and Paddington stations bombed (43 injuries, 1 fatality)
8/29/1991 Incendiary devices found under seats of subway train
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Almost all attacks were preceded by a warning of some kind. The IRA’s alleged primary 
strategy was to cause disruption and damage, not fatalities. Therefore, they claimed that the 
injuries and fatalities that occurred were the fault of the British Transport Police, who did not 
heed their warnings and evacuate the system. The relatively small number of injuries and 
fatalities was not, however, entirely a result of IRA’s advanced warning. Many disasters were 
averted because of increased vigilance and systematic interpretation of bomb threats on the 
part of the transit police. Most of the time, the warnings were deliberately vague and often 
resulted in no bomb at all. Of 6,500 bomb threats between 1991 and 1997, fewer than one 
hundred were considered serious and of those, only forty-one required evacuation.109
The incidents that caused the greatest amount of injury were the Victoria Station bombing on 
February 18, 1991, which injured forty-three and killed one person, and the London Bridge 
Station bombing on February 28, 1992, which injured twenty-eight. The Victoria Station 
bombing was preceded by a bomb that exploded at Paddington Station at 4:20 a.m. This 
bomb exploded early enough that there were no injuries. It is likely that this bomb was some 
sort of warning for the explosions that followed. At 7:00 a.m., the IRA called and said that in 
40 minutes, bombs would explode in all eleven of the mainline British Rail stations, but there 
was not adequate time for the police to check each of the stations. At 7:45 a.m., a bomb 
exploded in a metal trash can on the crowded main concourse of Victoria Station, sending 
shrapnel throughout the platform. The explosive used was one or two pounds of Semtex-H, 
with a 60-minute timer. The bomb had been hidden in a trash can near an automatic ticket 
machine close to phone booths, planters, and concession stands. Much of the shrapnel that 
injured the passengers was metal and glass from the facilities.110 The survivors of the blast 
were taken out of the station through the main entrance, which was 150 feet away from the 
site of the blast.111
The London Bridge Station bomb attack was quite similar. At 8:20 a.m., a man called an Irish 
television station to state that a bomb had been left in a station. Within 10 minutes, the bomb 
exploded in the London Bridge Station men’s restroom. Again, it was probably a two-pound 
12/16/1991 Bombing near Clapham Junction Station (0 injuries, 0 fatalities)
12/23/1991 Incendiary devices found hidden on commuter train
1/30/1992 Firebomb found under seat of subway car
2/7/1992 Incendiary device ignited on the subway tracks at Barking (0 injuries,  
0 fatalities)
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charge of Semtex-H that was set on a timer. The bomb blew shards of metal and glass through 
the platform. Most of the injuries were a result of the flying debris.112
Both attacks demonstrate common tactics and results. They were preceded by a telephone 
warning indicating that bombs would explode. The time was perhaps sufficient to evacuate 
the system, but not to find the hidden bombs. Nevertheless, the railway authority did not 
proceed with evacuation, but took a calculated risk and lost. In fact, British Transport Police 
officers were searching Victoria Station when the bomb went off. After the Victoria Station 
bombing, all the stations’ trash cans were removed. This forced the terrorists to place their 
bomb in the bathroom of the London Bridge Station, where it was potentially more visible. 
Both incidents caused major, albeit temporary, disruption in transit service. The Victoria 
Station bombing caused British Rail to close all its mainline rail stations in London for the 
first time in its history. The London Bridge bombing also resulted in a temporary closure of 
the system. In both cases, service resumed later in the afternoon, but thousands of commuters 
were stranded for hours during the morning rush hour.
Design and Policy Responses
The vulnerabilities of London’s rail network were exploited by the IRA as long as possible. 
Jenkins argues that “a target was chosen simply because it was vulnerable, and once it was 
selected, the IRA would continue to attack it for as long as circumstances permitted. London’s 
vulnerable Underground met these criteria.”113 The terrorists targeted the most vulnerable 
and concealed locations of the stations. In response to the IRA terrorist attacks, British Rail 
took a series of measures. Just weeks before the Victoria Station bombing, storage lockers were 
removed from all British Rail stations. In the absence of lockers, the most concealed location 
for a bombs became trash cans. When these were removed after the Victoria Station bombing, 
restrooms became the best place to conceal a bomb.114 The stations were subsequently 
retrofitted so that there would be less opportunity for hiding bombs. 
Most of the serious bomb threats by the IRA were successfully tackled by the police, who 
found the bombs before they were detonated or evacuated the system before bombs exploded. 
This is a result of careful planning, station retrofit, and execution of operational strategies to 
assess risk. Dwyer outlines some of the strategies that the British Transport Police took to 
effectively eliminate targeting of stations. Primarily, it put into place a comprehensive closed 
circuit television (CCTV) system that covered all stations. New stations or redesigned stations 
were developed so that all areas were visible to CCTV cameras. Because bombs were often left 
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in poorly lit parts of the station, lighting improvements were made. Similarly, trash cans, 
which typically provided hiding places for bombs, were removed from stations. Those trash 
cans that were left in stations were replaced with blast-resistant cans in well-lit areas, 
constantly covered by CCTV cameras and located some distance away from secondary 
fragmentation sources such as windows.115
In addition, there were increased patrols of public spaces. To prevent attacks on trains, staff 
were trained to inspect the seats during cleaning. They fitted tamper-evident seals to the seats 
after they were checked to prevent someone from hiding something under seats. The new 
rolling stock was redesigned so that there were fewer places to hide objects.
Some of the strategies utilized by the British authorities in response to railway terrorism were 
summarized by Whent in 1999. They included (1) removal of trash cans; (2) use of a 
coordinated and centralized CCTV system; (3) announcements on trains and in stations; (4) 
the posting of notices such as “Bombs, be Alert”; (5) spatial analysis to identify possible 
terrorist targets; (6) contingency planning for evacuation and re-entry; (7) regular searching to 
prevent a bomb attack; and (8) a system to manage luggage left behind.
The large number of bomb threats made by the IRA made it difficult to make informed 
decisions on whether to evacuate a station or to disregard the threat. British Railway 
authorities employed roaming bomb response vehicles to quickly respond to bomb threats and 
determine whether they were serious or a hoax. The British Transport Police utilized a 
computer algorithm to analyze bomb threats and made judgments as to the credibility of those 
threats based on previous threats.
In 2002’s Transportation Risk Management: A New Paradigm, Appleton reports on the risk of 
evacuating stations due to bomb threats. He demonstrates that the evacuation may at times be 
more dangerous to the passengers than the possibility of an explosion. There are many hazards 
associated with rapidly evacuating passengers, and evacuation should only be carried out when 
there is certainty of a bomb. Some guidelines that he suggests include:
1. Perform on-the-spot threat assessment of suspicious packages by train station personnel. 
They must make informed decisions and their criteria must be consistent among agencies.
2. Provide bomb detection equipment at high-risk stations: many times, the equipment or 
personnel take too long to arrive.
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3. Provide public information: Rather than encouraging the public to report suspicious 
luggage, encourage them to be cautious not to leave their luggage behind.
The previously outlined measures and strategies effectively eliminated the targeting of stations 
in the urban core of London.116 London’s experience with the IRA is unique because it was a 
long bombing campaign that spanned three decades. It is clear that the IRA chose targets 
based on their vulnerability. The Underground stations and transit network were initially 
perfect examples of vulnerable systems. The IRA exploited this vulnerability with two 
devastating bombings and several other less severe attacks. By implementing several design 
strategies such as removal and reinforcement of trash cans, improved lighting, increased video 
surveillance, removal of sources of secondary fragmentation, and redesign of rolling stock, 
terrorism vulnerabilities were effectively eliminated in the subway network. However, these 
design strategies are not enough to deter terrorism. They must be coupled with inspection and 
policing to send the message to terrorists that bombs placed in a station will be found and that 
the risk associated with carrying out a terrorist attack is too great. The London experience 
illustrates the benefits of a coordinated response to terrorist threats that discouraged attacks on 
their system.
Fulton Street Station Firebombing: NYC
(For maps of the New York City (NYC) subway system, please see http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/
nyct/maps/submap.htm.)
The New York City subway system has had relatively less experience with terrorism compared 
to other railway systems, but it is considered a significant target. In 1916, union members 
detonated dynamite on a New York train. In 1927, bombs exploded in two subway stations. 
Another bomb exploded in the Times Square Station on October 30, 1960, injuring thirty-
three people. A small bomb exploded on May 31, 1966, in a subway corridor, injuring two 
passengers. On May 2, 1971, a fire bomb was thrown on a train as it approached a station, 
injuring three people. On December 21, 1980, pipe bombs exploded in lockers at the 
Pennsylvania Station causing damage, but no injuries. The transit systems were also affected 
and partially destroyed by the World Trade Center attacks of 1993 and 2001, but these attacks 
did not specifically target the transit system. The most significant contemporary attack on the 
New York City system took place December 21, 1994, at the Fulton Street Station, when 
Edward Leary detonated two fire bombs that injured fifty-one passengers.
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Incident Description
This attack is relatively minor compared to terrorist attacks on other systems and it is also, 
strictly speaking, not a terrorist attack but a quasiterrorist attack. Little has been written 
about it, but the details of the attack are best described in newspaper articles.117 Although the 
attack is not representative of current terrorist threats, some interesting lessons can be learned. 
This incident was unique in the fact that the attacker was not a part of a larger group or 
movement, but was motivated by greed. Edward Leary attempted to extort money from the 
New York City Transit Authority through a terror campaign that included remote-controlled 
fire bombs and a rifle attack. Fortunately, he was captured before he could carry out many of 
his planned attacks.
Leary’s strategy was to make fire bombs out of gasoline-filled jars rigged with timers and 
detonation devices. In order to inflict the maximum possible damage, he would rig those 
bombs to detonate in the tunnels below the East River. He successfully detonated two bombs 
on the system, but neither worked as planned. The first bomb was left on a Number 2 
Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) train on December 15, 1994. It was presumably timed to 
detonate when the train passed through the tunnel, but did not go off until about 30 minutes 
later. The fire bomb partially detonated at 3:15 p.m. as the train approached the 145th Street 
Station in Harlem. Two teenagers were severely burned; they were initially considered suspects 
in the explosion.
On December 21, Leary boarded the southbound Number 4 train of the Lexington Avenue 
IRT line. He carried a canvas bag with two jars filled with gasoline and an ignition device. As 
the train pulled into the Fulton Street Station at about 1:30 p.m., Leary reached into the bag 
and attempted to set the timer. The timer malfunctioned and the bomb exploded under the 
seat that Leary was sitting on. There were two explosions in rapid succession. The fireball 
filled the car and flames shot out of the doors as the doors opened and fed air to the flames. 
Many people were on fire and smoke filled the platform. An off-duty officer who was on the 
train ran to the token booth and got a fire extinguisher. He quickly put out the flames in the 
car. Because of the presence of this fire extinguisher and the quick thinking of the officer, the 
bomb was much less damaging than it could have been.
Emergency Response
In the end, forty-eight people were injured, seventeen were hospitalized with serious burns, 
and many others were treated for smoke inhalation. The emergency response was “close to 
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miraculous” according to then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Despite the fact that the Fulton 
Street Station is a very large and cavernous station, rescuers were quickly able to react and treat 
the wounded. 
There was no structural damage to the station due to the explosion, but the operations of the 
subway were suspended for hours. Fulton Street Station is a major transfer point, so many lines 
were affected. The transit authority shut down power to some lines for a couple of hours. The 
charred train was left on the tracks for several hours after the attack. This power shutdown 
forced at least 100,000 passengers to use other forms of transportation in Manhattan. 
Fortunately, the bombs did not explode in the tunnels under the East River; otherwise, the 
impact of the explosion could have been much greater. Service resumed on all lines within 
three hours of the bombing.
Design and Policy Response
Apparently the Fulton Street Station bombing was considered an isolated incident and did not 
result in any major design or policy response on the part of the responsible transit authorities. 
According to an official in a 2004 interview, who wished not to be identified, 
Prior to 9/11, security on the New York subway system was very limited. Mostly 
the measures we took on security were through police, and were mostly crime-
driven. New York had had terrorist attacks such as the first World Trade Center. 
There was also a threat of an attack on the Long Island Network in 1997. So we 
were aware of it, but we didn’t really have much going on. 
There were, however, some limited security drills in certain stations (particularly Penn 
Station) for emergency preparedness and security. Also, an emergency response committee for 
Penn Station was formed in 1995, which moved to consolidate three different emergency 
action plans for the station (by Amtrak, New York City Transit, and New Jersey Transit) into 
one cohesive document.
Sarin Chemical Agent Attack: Tokyo
(For maps of Tokyo’s Metro system, please see http://www.tokyometro.jp/network/pdf/
rosen_eng.pdf.)
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Incident Description
The leaders of the Aum Shinrikyo cult decided to attack the Tokyo subway system by releasing 
the sarin agent on three Tokyo Metro subway lines, all converging on Kasumigaseki Station, 
which served as the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters. The attack took place on March 
20, 1995, around 8:00 a.m., during a heavily congested commute time. The cult’s original 
plan was to release the sarin on six different trains, two trains on each line approaching 
Kasumigaseki from different directions. The attack was planned with built-in redundancy to 
enable cult members to arrive from a variety of points in the system (on the Chiyoda, Hibiya, 
and Marunouchi Lines), lessening the chance of detection and enhancing the likelihood of 
successful release of at least some of the chemical agent. They were not able to develop enough 
of the sarin agent for all six trains, so one approach of the Chiyoda Line was eliminated. 
Figure 14 illustrates the relevant Tokyo Metro subway lines and stations targeted in this 
attack.
Figure 14  Tokyo Metro Subway Map Showing Sarin Release Sites
The dispersion tools were very crude, but effective. The sarin, in liquid form, was sealed into 
plastic bags, and terrorists were given two or three bags each. These bags, which contained 
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about 900 milliliters of sarin each, were wrapped in newspaper and placed on the floor of five 
trains. The bags were punctured by perpetrators with sharpened umbrella tips when the doors 
opened at the designated station. The perpetrators then quickly exited, before being exposed 
to sarin. The liquid sarin evaporated quickly and almost instantaneously began attacking the 
nervous systems of those exposed. The sarin also spread to other stations on the line through 
the air current generated by the trains. A large number of passengers collapsed, fainted, or 
convulsed at nineteen stations. In all, twelve people (ten passengers and two Tokyo Metro 
employees) died and about 5,000 were injured. The two Metro employees had carried the sarin 
bag that was placed in the Chiyoda Line train car into the station office. The potential for loss 
of human life was much worse. The sarin used by the cult was only about 30 percent pure. If it 
had been 70 to 80 percent pure, thousands could have died and it would have taken days to 
decontaminate the system.
Even after this attack, Aum Shinrikyo members still attempted to exploit the weaknesses of 
the subway system. On May 5, 1995, and on July 5, 1995, members of the cult left devices 
used to release cyanide gas into the station in the restrooms of Shinjuku and Kayabacho 
Stations. These restrooms were chosen because they have ventilation ducts that go onto the 
platform. These devices, if they had not been found and disarmed, could have potentially 
caused thousands of deaths.
Emergency Response
After the attack, the entire system was shut down and evacuated. At 10:20 a.m., the National 
Japanese Self Defense Force and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department Laboratory 
identified the agent as sarin. This information was not shared with the other emergency 
agencies until 11:00 a.m., and the hospitals were never formally notified that the agent was 
sarin. Because of communication breakdowns, many of the station attendants thought they 
were dealing with an isolated incident. Confusion also resulted when the train driver in the 
Hibiya Line Train reported on his radio that there had been an explosion with white smoke, 
which led to misinformation and confusion regarding the required response. Cross-agency 
communication was a major problem in the response to this attack.118
The operation of the trains also helped to spread the sarin chemical agent. After the trains were 
evacuated, the drivers left them parked by the platform with the doors open. This allowed the 
spread of sarin into the stations. While the trains were traveling, most of the people opened 
the windows for ventilation and went through the doors between the cars to escape the gas. 
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This might have provided temporary relief, but it acted to circulate the air and spread the 
sarin throughout the train.
As much as 10 percent of the injuries were a result of secondary contamination of hospital and 
emergency personnel and police officers.119 The emergency services were completely 
unprepared for such an incident. The first sign that something was wrong was the notification 
of an explosion at Tsukiji Station. As a result, all ambulances were sent to that station. It took 
ambulances over an hour-and-a-half to reach some of the other stations. Even when 
ambulances arrived, there were too many people in need of help. Some victims walked to 
hospitals; others were taken there by radio-dispatched taxis or by passing motorists.120 Many 
victims lay on the ground in the cars or on the platform while they were treated. This made 
the symptoms worse because the concentrations of sarin were higher on the floor. The most 
seriously injured passengers were at Kasumigaseki, Tsukiji, Kamiyacho, and Kodemmacho 
stations. In addition, Kasumigaseki and Kodemmacho stations received little ambulance 
service.
After the evacuation, Japanese Self Defense Force soldiers in full chemical protection 
equipment began decontaminating the system, primarily by washing the cars and stations 
with a bleach and water mixture to neutralize the agent. Limited service was resumed later in 
the day and full service was resumed the following day. Overall, there was a very fast recovery, 
considering the magnitude of the attack.
Design and Policy Response
In response to this terrorist incident, the Tokyo Metro has initiated a series of preventive 
measures according to Makoto Himeda of the Tokyo Metro. In the station environment, these 
measures include:
• Installation at all stations of security cameras with a recording function, placed at strategic 
locations throughout the station. The system now has about 2,200 cameras, which were 
installed after the sarin attack.
• Initiation of new patrols of special security guards trained to watch for suspicious objects 
and activities. There were no security guards prior to the sarin attack, but employees 
patrolled the station during their down time. In the post-sarin and post-9/11 era, this type 
of ad hoc patrolling was considered inadequate, and private security guards were hired to 
patrol the system.
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Measures taken by the Toei subway—Tokyo’s other main subway system—initially included 
the removal of all trash cans from the station circulation areas and concourses.121 The trash 
cans were removed after the sarin attack, but were moved back two years later and placed in 
locations easily surveyed by station masters. Eventually, all the trash cans once removed from 
the station were placed back in their original locations. However, as recently as February 2004, 
trash cans were again removed from the stations as a preventive response to the Japanese 
military involvement in Iraq.
Some design changes also have been introduced on the trains with the installation of windows 
that can open and close easily. Because of the importance of ventilation in a chemical attack, 
newly installed windows have wider portions that can open.122 All train materials are now 
fireproof, and trains are equipped with emergency phones that enable the station master in the 
traffic control office to communicate with passengers in the train. Stickers placed on train 
doors ask passengers to report any suspicious persons or objects to the station staff.
To better increase the readiness and disaster response, the Tokyo Metro has a manual that 
instructs employees how to respond to disasters and communicate with other agencies. 
Employees are cautioned to immediately report to police and fire departments any suspicious 
incidents. According to Makoto Himeda, Tokyo Metro’s assistant supervisor, Technology 
Section, the most important response activity in case of a terrorist event is to evacuate the 
passengers to a safe place without panicking them. In the case of terrorist events, rules 
established after the sarin attack require that all eight lines of the system are stopped 
immediately, even if the incident takes place on a single line.123 After it is confirmed that all 
trains are safe, the Metro will resume the operation on each line.
Finally, Tokyo Metro has established a Disaster Prevention District Network, which has 
divided the system into fifteen districts. Each Metro employee is assigned to the district 
closest to his or her workplace. If an incident happens at one station, all employees of that 
district are supposed to report to the station. 
The attack on the Tokyo subway system ushered in a new reality for terrorism planning. Since 
this attack, there has been some research in design, technology, and operational procedures to 
mitigate the effects of a chemical or biological attack. In “The Use of Technology in Preparing 
Subway Systems for Chemical/Biological Terrorism,” which was read at the 1999 Commuter 
Rail/Rapid Transit Conference, Policastro and Gordon identify three ways that chemical and 
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biological weapons can be dispersed on a subway system: released in the station; released in the 
train car; and released in the tunnel (possibly through a ventilation shaft).
As the trains travel through the tunnels, a large amount of air moves with them, being pushed 
and pulled by the movement of the train. This is known as the piston effect, and it stirs the air 
and spreads the agent throughout the station and system. The higher the proportion of the 
tunnel covered by a passing train, the larger the piston effect. Trains can be slowed down to 
reduce this effect.
A containment strategy to keep the agent from spreading is recommended for biological and 
chemical attacks. Swansiger’s 1998 presentation, “Mitigation of Chemical Attacks in Enclosed 
Public Transportation Facilities,” at the SPIE (International Society of Optical Engineering) 
Enforcement and Security Technology conference, as well as Policastro and Gordon’s 
presentation, warn against using emergency ventilation that is designed for smoke. Venting 
the agent above ground could affect much larger numbers of people than those in the station. 
Additionally, many people can walk faster than the agent can spread, so by turning on 
ventilation fans, those who would have escaped will instead be affected by the more rapidly 
spreading agent. The recommended strategies include platform edge doors (Figure 15 and 
Figure 16) that reduce the piston effect of the trains within the station. Rapid detection 
through CCTV technology from a remote location with incident detection algorithms is 
essential to reducing the negative impacts of the attack and isolating the agent and the 
victims. Chemical detectors are error-prone, but can also be effective tools identifying a 
chemical attack.
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Figure 15  Platform Edge Doors, Hong Kong 
Figure 16  Another View of Platform Edge Doors, Hong Kong
Savage’s 1996 presentation at the Terrorism in Surface Transportation Symposium, “Lessons 
Learned by the New York City Transit Authority from Recent Terrorist Attacks,” discusses an 
investigation of the Tokyo case by the New York City Transit Authority. Some of the strategies 
and lessons learned include the following:
• Provide information and guidance about gas attacks to employees.
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• Establish ventilation procedures for subway cars, stations, and facilities.
• Submit new gas attack procedures for coordination of effort between transit and other city 
agencies.
• Eliminate open and idle space behind token booths and concession stands.
• Remove trash cans in subway stations.
These lessons could have made the effects of the sarin attack less significant. Many of the 
casualties were subway personnel who did not know how to handle hazardous material. Even 
though sarin was released on the trains, 43 percent of the injuries occurred on the platforms, 
32 percent on the trains, 15 percent in other parts of the station, and 10 percent in other 
places.124 This indicates that sarin was effective in leaving the trains and spreading 
throughout the platforms and the station. Operational procedures and design elements that 
help contain the sarin and create an air-tight car and tunnel system relatively separate from the 
platform would have been effective in reducing the effects of the chemical attack. 
Additionally, procedures for speedy evacuation of the station, such as opening ticket barriers, 
would have speeded the evacuation.
Algerian Bombing Campaign on Paris’ Rail Network
(For maps of the Paris Metro system, please see http://www.ratp.info/informer/anglais/
index.php#, or for an interactive map, http://www.ratp.info/cv/cv_en/carteparis.php.)
Incident Description
The Algerians were in conflict with the French during the 1950s and the 1960s, and 
undertook several terror campaigns during that time. A 1991 civil war erupted in Algeria, 
raising the threat of continued terrorism in France. From July 1995 through December 1996, 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) conducted a bombing campaign on the Paris subway system 
in an attempt to reduce France’s influence in the Algerian war.125 The following is a timeline 
of the GIA bombing campaign on the Paris subway.
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Chronology of GIA Bombings on Paris’ Rail Network (Source: Jenkins 1997)
This bombing campaign was very focused and severe, with the terrorists taking advantage of 
the vulnerabilities of the system. The first bombing, at St. Michel Station, had the most 
casualties, as it resulted in eight deaths and over eighty injuries. The following section draws 
from news articles and reports on the design issues that influenced this attack specifically and 
all of the other attacks in general.126
Two youths boarded the Réseau Express Régional (RER) train on July 25, 1995, during the 
evening rush hour. The terrorists left a bag under their seats and exited at Châtalet Station. 
The train arrived at the next stop, St. Michel Station, at 5:30 p.m., and the bomb detonated as 
the train doors opened. The bomb was a 28-pound camping canister that was filled with 
explosive powder, nails, and bolts, and set on a timer. An extremely hot fire started, but 
quickly went out due to the absence of flammable materials in the train and station. Most of 
the injuries were caused by the shrapnel from the bomb and flying glass from the train’s 
windows. Several people were also burned by the ensuing fire. The train sustained heavy 
damage. Its sides bulged out so much that it would not fit through the tunnel. The station 
experienced minor damage, primarily to its communication cables. 
Emergency Response
The response was rapid and efficient. While the police conducted their investigation, a “lifting 
team” removed the doors and pulled in the sides of the train car. The emergency workers set 
up first aid posts in the station according to an organized disaster plan. The station is many 
7/27/95 Bomb explodes in commuter rail line as it pulls into St. Michel Station (8 
fatalities, 80 injuries)
8/18/95 Bomb explodes at Arc de Triomphe near the entrance of the Charles de Gaulle 
Metro Station (0 fatalities, 17 injuries)
8/26/95 Unexploded bomb found on train
10/9/95 Bomb found and detonated outside of Maison Blanche Station
10/17/95 Bomb explodes on subway line in the tunnel between Musée d’Orsay and St. 
Michel stations (0 fatalities, 24 injured)
12/4/96 Bomb explodes on train as it pulls into Port Royal Station (2 fatalities, 83 
injuries)
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feet under ground, so many of the injured required immediate treatment and stabilization 
before being transported to the surface. Within three-and-a-half hours, all of the injured 
passengers were taken from the station. Within five hours, the communication cables were 
repaired and the train was removed from the station. During the night, the station was cleaned 
up and service resumed the next morning. Overall, considering the magnitude of the explosion 
and the deep underground location of the station, the response was very successful. The 
medical attention was sufficient and service was quickly restored.
There were some communication problems. For one, radio communication was poor due to the 
damaged communication cables, and there were difficulties getting information from the 
platform to the surface. Additionally, the evacuation broadcast was only in French, which 
undoubtedly confused non-French speaking passengers.127
Other Terrorist Attacks
This incident was the beginning of a series of bombings that occurred in underground subway 
stations of Paris. Three weeks after the bombing at St. Michel Station, another bomb exploded 
in a trash can outside of the Charles de Gaulle Station near the Arc de Triomphe, resulting in 
seventeen injuries. Two months later, another bomb exploded under the seat of a train in the 
tunnel between the St. Michel and Museé d’Orsay stations. This bomb injured twenty-nine 
passengers. Over a year later, a bomb exploded on the fourth car of a train as it pulled into Port 
Royal Station. The bomb was the same as all others: a 28-pound nail-packed canister was 
placed under a seat and detonated by a timer. There was a subsequent fire and a large amount 
of smoke, which caused many of the injuries. The bomb exploded immediately after the train 
exited the tunnel. If it had been inside of the tunnel, the damage would have been much 
worse. This was the last attack on the Paris subway system.
Design and Policy Response
Even before the first bombing incident in Paris, the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens 
(RATP), the rail agency in Paris, began instituting security measures to protect its system. 
These included the placement of physical barriers to protect vital systems, the installation of 
intrusion alarms, the development of an integrated CCTV system, and a vehicle and personnel 
location system. In an attempt to reduce fire hazards, the agency also removed combustible 
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material and sources of toxic fumes from the stations and rolling stock. A smoke evacuation 
system was introduced to quickly clear smoke and hazardous fumes out of stations.
The bombings resulted in the institution of “Vigipirate,” a policy that mobilized 37,000 
police and troops throughout the Paris metropolitan area. High-profile officers carrying 
automatic weapons started patrolling the subway stations, conducting searches of individuals 
who appeared to be North African. The policy was accompanied by public awareness 
campaigns urging vigilance. These policing efforts were, in many cases, extreme and 
politically unfavorable. The Vigipirate plan, which adds a high number of security agents to 
the stations, is mobilized during periods of high alert and during special occasions (for 
example, the D-Day anniversary in France).
After the bomb explosion in a trash can, the subway authority sealed 8,000 trash cans 
throughout the metropolitan area. They also installed devices to prevent bags being placed 
under the train seats. According to Patrick Dillenseger, Defense Assistant for RATP, during 
the Vigipirate periods, trash cans in the French stations are typically replaced by plastic bags. 
As very high temperatures, fires, and smoke were a part of all of the bombings, RATP 
redesigned train interiors using fireproof materials. More important, the French have 
integrated a series of design innovations in some new and state-of-the-art stations, such as 
Météor, which include more transparent materials in station areas, more natural lighting, and 
spaces with no curves. All these serve to facilitate surveillance from central command posts. 
These station design innovations for security will be discussed in a following section.
Some of the design changes that were initiated before and during the attacks had an effect on 
the mitigation and prevention of terrorist activities. Determined terrorists were successful in 
several bombings in Paris, but the effects were reduced considerably and the attractiveness of 
the target was eliminated due to design changes, advanced disaster planning, and policing.
Al Qaeda Attack on RENFE Subway System: Madrid
(For maps of the Madrid Metro, please go to http://www.metromadrid.es/default.asp?id=293.)
Incident Description
On March 11, 2004, Madrid suffered the most lethal terrorist attack by nonstate actors in 
contemporary Spain and the second deadliest incident in Western Europe. Terrorists detonated 
ten bombs on four suburban commuter trains of the national rail system, RENFE. Later the 
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Spanish police discovered and detonated three remaining bombs in the Atocha station, Spain’s 
largest and busiest rail station and transportation hub. Based on the placement and timing of 
the bombs, we can assume the goal was to decimate the Atocha station, much like the World 
Trade Center in the September 11, 2001, attacks. The terrorist incident in Madrid resulted in 
the death of nearly 200 people and injury to another 1,800.
Spain has had a long history of terrorist attacks, but they had been an indigenous brand of 
terrorism. In the last four decades, the Basque group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) had 
repeatedly detonated explosive devices in a number of public spaces in Spain. As Manuel 
Rodriguez Simons, Security Director for RENFE, explained: 
Unfortunately, we have a huge terrorist problem in Spain, and we’ve had it before 
March 11. ETA in its history has placed around 100 bombs in different places.128
Normally they call when they place bombs to warn us, but anyway, we already have 
this experience. So, we’ve always had to prepare a security device to prevent 
terrorist attacks for each of our facilities. We had already considered the possibility 
of a terrorist attack. Well, we never imagined a terrorist attack so much bigger than 
anything else.
There were a number of things that took the Spanish authorities by surprise, including the 
scale of the attack. In addition, previous terrorist events by ETA typically targeted smaller 
areas or specific individuals. They were mostly preceded by telephone calls giving advance 
warning of the explosion. Finally, the bombs were placed on trains departing stations in 
working-class neighborhoods carrying mainly working-class commuters and students, and did 
not fit the profile of the common ETA targets. According to Jose Molina, Director of the 
Consorcio de Transportes de Madrid, even though RENFE employees were always vigilant 
about suspicious objects and suspicious people with backpacks, no particular antiterrorist 
system was in place for the Madrid commuter rail system. 
To have an antiterrorist system is super expensive. And the type of transportation 
that we provide is mass transportation where you cannot easily implement that 
kind of control. So, there weren’t any antiterrorist methods in place before 3/11. 
There wasn’t an assumption that something so major could occur. Always there was 
a possibility that somebody crazy could do something like start a fire in a station, 
but we never thought there was a capacity to do something like this.
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Emergency Response
Immediately after the attack, RENFE alerted the emergency services in Madrid, and an 
emergency response team of police and fire department forces and medical emergency 
personnel rushed to the rescue of wounded passengers. According to RENFE officials, 
“everything went as well as it could and it was quite well coordinated.” Throughout the day, 
the team managed to evacuate all the wounded people and send them to hospitals. RENFE 
also halted service on affected lines; this did not happen for all the Metro. Soon thereafter, 
police work started to identify the perpetrators and any evidence that would help the police 
investigation. 
The next day, representatives from the police, RENFE, and Madrid Metro held a meeting to 
discuss security strategies. As described by Javier García Cadiñanos of the Madrid Metro, 
We had a meeting and we said, “What do we do?” Nobody knew; the world had no 
experts. We had to use common sense and experience. In criminology this is called 
“the biological maturity.” What do we do to confront a situation about which 
nobody has any idea? The first conclusion we came up with was to have a campaign 
called “To See and to Be Seen.” The elements of security, you have to make very 
clear to give a sense of security to the riders. As a consequence, we put bright 
orange vests on all the security agents. They already had it in London, so we used it 
here. This gave us a very important result because the security agents go through 
dark areas and with these bright colors, they were very obvious and we wanted 
people to think there was a lot of vigilance and security guards watching for their 
security.
Design and Policy Response
The March 11 attack led to the intensification of existing security measures and the adoption 
of new ones. RENFE intensified and redeployed its police forces and directed them to focus on 
attending to the needs of the passengers, but also intensifying their vigilance against 
suspicious persons. At the same time, security forces (the Spanish army) were asked to police 
the railroads. In Spain, the municipal police have oversight in large cities (such as Madrid), 
while the civil guard has oversight in the rest of the country (small towns and rural areas). For 
the first time, the army was asked to give a helping hand in policing railway facilities. RENFE 
officials describe as good the coordination between the army forces, the municipal police, and 
the RENFE security forces.
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Additionally, RENFE is in the process of contracting security dog services and purchasing X-
ray machines, as well as fixed and mobile scanners.129 Mobile scanners will be installed on 
small vehicles operating in large and busy stations. Since the attack, the transit operator has 
expanded the existing CCTV network with the purchase of new cameras. It is also considering 
the purchase of special containers, “portabombas,” in which security staff could put all 
suspicious objects. According to Metro Madrid and RENFE officials, the difficulty of sealing 
150,000 trash cans and the inconvenience to passengers if these were removed prompted them 
not to take any action. 
RENFE was concerned that the adopted measures might raise the already high levels of fear of 
the Spanish public. For this reason, they decided against posting messages, posters, and signs 
on trains and station facilities warning people to be vigilant. As explained by Rodriguez 
Simons, 
We didn’t want to create more alarm and we thought that leaving this as it was 
would be better. There were occasions where people shouldn’t have called, but they 
were calling anyway. Before, the things that were normal in stations, backpacks, 
mobile phone, things people lost, well in those moments after the attack, if 
somebody had left a mobile phone in the seat and exited the train in a hurry, this 
caused alarm even though before it was normal. So, in that moment, we decided not 
to create more alarm and psychosis and leave this technique for another time in the 
future. Now, we’re rethinking it because the amount of calls has already decreased. 
If we think it makes sense, we’ll implement this.
Today, the system seems to have recovered and to a great extent gained back its ridership. 
According to RENFE officials, “We have recovered after March 11; practically all the 
passengers are back, except in the line affected, which now has about two to three percent 
fewer passengers.” Metro Madrid officials attribute people’s return to the railways to the fact 
that the system was hit only once. Javier García Cadiñanos of the Madrid Metro says, 
If there had been an attack following this one, on whatever public transportation in 
Madrid, in all of Spain, in Paris or wherever, if there would have been another 
attack on public transportation, there would have been a lot more terror and we 
would have had a lot more problems. Fortunately this didn’t happen, so practically, 
in 24 hours everything “returned to normal.” The only thing that didn’t return to 
normal right away, and took several months, and in cases still exists, is the 
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conscious fear that people have because about 200 people were killed and it could 
have happened to them. This is what later we had to combat immediately and to 
attempt as soon as possible to return a trust to the rider.
Conclusions
The experiences of rail agencies throughout the world can aid railway station designers in 
developing systems that are more difficult for terrorists to attack and, in the event of an attack, 
more inclined to rapid and efficient evacuation, emergency response, and recovery. Many of the 
attacks have common characteristics, resulting from persons who carried small devices onto 
trains or into stations. Mostly, the perpetrators relied on some sort of delayed effect or timer so 
that the terrorists could escape. Improved CCTV coverage can be an effective deterrent of 
transit terrorism when the perpetrator does not desire to be captured. However, it is ineffective 
in the cases of the recent suicide attacks.
Passenger and staff vigilance inside trains and in the station is an essential aspect of any 
antiterrorism strategy. Passengers, railway employees, and security personnel need to have 
clear lines of sight to all parts of the station and trains. Many terrorists utilized seating to hide 
bombs. Additionally, trash cans have been used as hiding places and should be removed, 
sealed, or reinforced. 
Secondary fragmentation—shrapnel resulting from building materials, such as shattered 
glass—can became a “fragmentation bomb” and cause injuries and havoc. Facilities should be 
designed to reduce secondary fragmentation as much as possible. This applies to ground-level 
glass, vending machines, chairs and railings, and decorations. Facilities should also be fire 
resistant and not emit toxic fumes if exposed to extreme heat. Rapid extinguishing of the fires 
in these attacks resulted in limited injuries due to burns and smoke inhalation. Fire 
extinguishing devices should be readily available in stations and on trains.
In the case of chemical or biological weapons, early detection is essential. Unfortunately, many 
commercially available chemical detectors are costly and error prone. Incident identification 
might be best achieved through remote CCTV monitoring. It has been found that utilizing 
fans designed for smoke might only aggravate the situation and spread the agent faster than it 
would spread otherwise, but not fast enough to lower it to nonlethal levels. Additionally, there 
could be more exposure above ground than in the station. Hoods designed for chemical 
removal and deactivation would be more appropriate, but costly. Platform edge doors separate 
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the airflow in the tunnels from the stations, reducing the piston effect of the trains. These are 
very expensive, but provide additional benefits besides terrorism mitigation. They provide a 
physical barrier between the platform and the railway, improving safety and comfort for 
passengers waiting on the platform. Rapid and informed responses can also greatly reduce 
damage caused by this type of attack. 
Identifying vulnerabilities in rail car and station design and eliminating them can aid in 
securing transit systems from terrorist activity. Providing rapid response and recovery 
minimizes the damage. Removing places where bombs can be hidden, improving surveillance 
and lighting, removing sources of ground-level secondary fragmentation, controlling air 
currents in cars and stations, and providing on-site emergency response equipment and 
training are all design strategies that should be considered when encountering a terror threat. 
Designing stations, rolling stock, and systems that can withstand attacks and quickly recover 
reduces the attractiveness of targeting transit because the attack does not result in the desired 
disruption or alarm. Designing for terrorism has, and will, effectively reduce its threat.
 Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents
Mineta Transportation Institute
138
 Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies
Mineta Transportation Institute
139
TRANSIT SECURITY STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
How are transportation systems in different cities of the world handling issues of transit 
security? What are their concerns and challenges? What mix of strategies do they use? Do 
transit officials around the world perceive terrorism prevention through environmental design 
as a valid security strategy? What lessons can United States transit systems learn from the 
experiences of transit systems in other cities? 
To respond to these questions, we undertook extensive fieldwork research in four cities—
London, Madrid, Paris, and Tokyo—and their railway systems, and also interviewed 
representatives from the International Union of Public Transport (UITP), which has 
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Our fieldwork consisted of interviews with transit 
managers and transit officials responsible for the security of the systems, architects and 
engineers designing systems, and transit industry group officials. We also visited many 
stations in each system to see some of the design measures identified in the interviews. In some 
cities, we were shown the control and command centers of the transit systems. We also visited 
stations that had been recently designed or renovated to comply with state-of-the-art measures 
of security, such as the Alto del Arenal station on the Madrid Metro’s Line 1, the Gare de Lyon 
Station on Line 14 in Paris, and the recently retrofitted St. Lazare station on the Eole line in 
the same city.
In Paris, we interviewed officials with the Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), a 
multimodal transit operator in Paris; with SNCF (French National Railways); and 
representatives from CERTU in Lyon, a think-tank technical agency of France’s Ministry of 
Transportation. In Tokyo, we interviewed officials responsible for security at Tokyo Metro Co., 
Ltd., which operates the Tokyo Metro, and the Transportation Bureau of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government, which operates the Toei Subway system, also in Tokyo. In London, 
we interviewed transit officials from the London Underground, Transport for London, and 
Network Rail; a security chief with the British Transport Police; and a managing architect 
with Jefferson Sheard Architects, an architectural firm specializing in the design of 
transportation infrastructure. In Madrid, we interviewed officials from the Madrid Metro, 
RENFE, Spain’s national train system, and Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid 
(CRTM). Finally, in Brussels we interviewed officials from the UITP, an international 
association aimed at promoting public transport in Europe and around the world. This section 
discusses the major findings of our empirical research in each of the five cities.
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Paris
The French perceive Paris as a “potential target for domestic or international terrorism.” 
According to Patrick Dillenseger, Special Assistant for Defense at RATP, the transit 
infrastructure in Paris is an obvious target for terrorist attacks. In our interview, he admitted, 
however, that international terrorism may be aimed mostly at countries, like the United 
States, Great Britain, and Spain, that participated in the war against Iraq. Nevertheless, the 
French remain extremely vigilant against terrorist threats. According to Dillenseger, the 
domestic terrorist attacks against the French transit systems (described in the section “Case 
Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents”) have led to considerable reflection about how to 
better protect transit systems. At the same time, François Blasin of CERTU says the French 
recognize that “the threat has evolved and morphed from single modest man-made bombs, 
both limited in scope and capacity to harm, to multiple impact and large-scale paramilitary-
style bomb attacks, such as those recently witnessed at the World Trade Center or in Madrid.” 
Therefore, the French clearly recognize that security is today a global issue, says Michel 
Poulain of SNCF. According to the officials we talked to, “security, without forgetting daily 
vandalism and also safety, has become a ‘hot’ goal, regarding the reality of today and the high 
vulnerability of crowded public transport systems.” Therefore, they perceive their primary 
goal to be to “create an efficient feeling of security rather than reduce the risk to zero, which is 
practically impossible,” according to François Rambaud of CERTU.
The Role of Government and Centralized Planning
Prior to the mid-1990s different security measures were adopted by agencies with little, if any, 
coordination between them. Patrick Dillenseger of RATP says the terrorist attacks led the 
French transit agencies to realize that “it was time for a holistic approach to transit security 
with government support and guidelines and private sector backing.” Consistent with the 
arguments we heard from transit operators in the other international cities of our survey, the 
French transit authorities also argued that the evaluation of and response to security threats go 
beyond the prerogatives and responsibilities of operators and transit agencies. The 
international situation has certain consequences to national security. Transit agencies simply 
have neither the capacity nor the financial resources to address such a dire threat in a 
comprehensive way. Therefore, in France, it is the Office of the Prime Minister, assisted by the 
Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Transport, that draws up comprehensive security plans and 
guidelines, and conducts and responds to threat assessments. 
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Regional authorities (generally the prefect or prefet de zone de defense) have locally approved 
general emergency plans for civil security such as le plan rouge, which is executed in response to 
major disasters with many victims, such as record floods or massive forest fires and explosions. 
These plans are coordinated by the prefect.130 In each region, local security committees exist 
that coordinate operators, police, and local representatives of the government. According to 
Michel Persin of SNCF, the first transit security plan dates back to 1978, but was not adapted 
to today’s threats of global terrorism. The French government did not produce any new 
security plans until 1990, when the First Gulf War started. Then the global situation, along 
with increases in public transit crime and incivilities, led the government to initiate global 
security plans, integrating forces of municipal and transit police and representatives of 
national governments and regional authorities, as a global answer to the growing insecurity in 
urban areas, including public transit. These plans are organized and implemented by the 
Ministry of Interior as well as transit operators. For Paris, in particular, after the attacks of 
Algerian terrorists against the French railway in 1995, the authorities elaborated the 
Vigipirate plan, which can mobilize a significant number of police forces during periods of 
high alert and during special occasions (such as the D-Day anniversary in France). 
The early French security plans were simply a series of memos about security. The events of 
1995, however, resulted in a push for the integration of the various security components into a 
comprehensive plan for transit security, which was adopted in 2000. According to Persin: 
...early on there wasn’t a real service in charge of transit security. The [terrorist] 
events pushed public authorities to move toward institutionalizing security 
management in public transit through existing measures and directives. This was 
rather hard as there wasn’t a central authority within SNCF dealing with these 
issues. From four people we had to develop departments where 100 people are 
working today. And what triggered the new awareness of transit security were 
terrorist attacks; efforts accelerated after September 11.
CERTU, a technical agency of the French Ministry of Transport for infrastructure, transport, 
and spatial planning, is in charge of building up and sharing the knowledge available on a 
broad variety of urban issues. It deals with prioritizing transit safety needs and capitalizing 
security matters on sensitive sites. Evaluation of the potential danger of each site, based on the 
degree of hazard they represent to the population, highlights various security responses. These 
may range from preventing intrusions in sensitive areas to developing a safe zone perimeter 
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around certain facilities or putting train cars under permanent surveillance, and finally even 
changing the route of cargo transit. SNCF’s Persin said, 
The answer in many cases is identical whether it’s a terrorist attack or equipment 
failure; we need to minimize casualties and environmental pollution among many 
other impacts. It is therefore crucial for us to map these industrial zones and hazard 
corridors which are not part of our network but whose proximity to the grid or 
stations could endanger our customers’ lives. 
An area that the Ministry of Transport and other French governmental agencies have 
emphasized after 9/11 is the protection of the transit system against a chemical or biological 
attack, because it was in this area the French felt they had the least experience, says SNCF’s 
Persin. Today, both RATP and SNCF have agents trained by civil defense authorities, as well 
as firefighters who can respond to biological or chemical threat, in charge of decontamination 
in the case of attack and who are ready to intervene 24 hours a day, seven days a week in Paris 
and Ile-de-France. As a way to prepare for and anticipate risks from chemical and biological 
attacks, the French authorities staged a nerve agent attack simulation in Paris in October 
2003. According to Persin, this simulation, which had been in the works for months, was 
designed to test a plan, “Piratox,” put in place last year for dealing with chemical attacks. The 
agency also has similar plans for dealing with biological and radiological threats. 
The Role of Transit Operators
Two major transit operators in Paris are RATP and SNCF. RATP, which is a regional and 
multimodal public transit operator, operates four mass transit systems or networks: the 
subway (Paris Metro), the Commuter Express Rail (RER), buses, and trams. In cooperation 
with SNCF, it also operates the Orly airport driverless rail shuttle, Orlyval. SNCF operates the 
French railway system. Representatives of these two operators believed that their facilities and 
systems are the primary targets of any transit attack in France. The budget dedicated to 
security clearly sets these two agencies apart from other national operators.131 
Our interviewees from SNCF told us that their office of security (called “defense pole”) 
evaluates risks in their service based on information coming from the French ministries. They 
also implement the general plans issued by the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Transport, and 
Ministry of Interior. Additionally, some of their services respond to situational crime, and they 
employ about 2,300 officers throughout France. SNCF translates the general policies from the 
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central authorities into concrete measures for each of the twenty-three regions of its 
jurisdiction. They also conduct research and gather data and statistics with respect to security. 
Communication and coordination are essential for SNCF for crisis management and 
emergency response to attacks. The following excerpt from our interview with Michel Persin 
shows the extent and importance that the French operators place on coordination and 
integration of various security measures: 
There is a central center of coordination (dispatching center) which coordinates 
different regional centers that we could put in service within one hour. Here, in 
front of our offices, we have the crisis headquarters of national management of 
SNCF which is responsible for communication and emergency response. Here we 
answer to general guidelines and we work in cooperation with those in charge of 
immediate response to any crisis. SNCF has opted for a strong planning of security 
strategy. The result of these years of planning is that in case of a terrorist attack 
SNCF is capable of coordination with other actors. The main policy in the case of 
attack is to create a synergy between actors to maximize our capabilities to face a 
disaster. SNCF can organize a group of 2,000 to 3,000 people in response to any 
attack. This obviously is the result of a strong will to put forward the operational 
segment of railway transit security. 
At the same time, we do have an eye on long-term strategies, and how we should 
organize and build a new secure environment. The difference with Spain is that 
they had been used to fast response to crisis as the terrorists [ETA] traditionally had 
called a few minutes before an explosion and authorities need to be fast in their 
responses. The explosion in Madrid showed that this was clearly not enough. Of 
course today nothing in France can prevent a terrorist attack 100 percent. We have 
put in place a wide variety of policies such as detection portals, a canine group with 
dogs which are trained to detect explosives, as well as mobile de-mining 
equipments. But with 32,000 kilometers of railways we can obviously not have 100 
percent security. As far as to what degree and where we prioritize which segment, it 
is rather case by case. On the operational side, it is mostly public health authorities 
who, in coordination with the governor and the government, establish priorities. 
On the systemic and long-term strategy side, we do work in cooperation with our 
European colleagues through inter-European programs. Nationally we are putting 
our efforts in synergy with RATP, firefighters, Municipality of Paris, Electricity of 
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France, Aeroports de Paris, and Air France, among many other actors involved. We 
all have terrorism in mind but the way we perceive and answer to this risk may be 
different. For this reason we need to coordinate. In one word, our security strategy 
is rather systemic. We do integrate these segments in evaluating risks, anticipating 
threats, informing users, and in the case of a disaster, administer assistance and 
speed up decontamination if necessary.
Indeed, comprehensiveness, coordination, communication, and the adoption of a systemic 
approach were the keywords used repeatedly by the different French officials we interviewed. 
They identified as a “systemic approach to security” one that takes into account all the 
vulnerabilities of the transit system and responds to them in a comprehensive way, and argued 
that effectiveness cannot be achieved in terms of single actions, but is also about coordination 
with other agencies and integration of different strategies, without forgetting design matters 
of infrastructure and rolling stock. 
Coordination with Other European Agencies
The importance of coordination with other European agencies and transit operators was also 
strongly emphasized by Patrick Dillenseger of RATP. According to him, “the future of public 
transit security (PTS) resides in pan-European cooperation, and the UITP has taken the lead in 
this respect.” Such coordination is absolutely necessary, since many of the European transit 
operators (for example, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom) have highly integrated grids. Dillenseger pointed out that such cooperation is 
already underway and is based on sharing experiences, statistics and data, and to a lesser 
degree, the outcome of various simulations of terrorist attacks. 
A European program with the objective to formulate policy recommendations for the future of 
public transport in Europe was the Voyager program. Voyager is an initiative of the European 
Union’s Directorate General for Transport and Energy, Clean Urban Transport Unit.132
Originally, the goals of promoting public transit and increasing ridership motivated the 
Voyager program. Today, the project is split into two phases. The preliminary phase examines 
state-of-the-art security practices and identifies key barriers and challenges to the 
implementation of competitive and attractive public transport systems. In its second phase, 
Voyager considers global trends likely to impact the future of public transport. This is to 
facilitate the drafting of policy and recommendations for all public transport stakeholders at 
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local, regional, national, and European levels. As will be discussed later, the terrorist attacks in 
New York and Madrid brought the issue of security to the forefront of Voyager’s concerns.
Security Strategies
The integration of different security strategies can be best seen in the design and 
implementation of a new line. In Paris, Météor (Métro Est-Ouest Rapide) is an excellent 
example of integrating security elements in the design of the railway network. Météor, which 
is now Line 14, was designed to ease the rush-hour traffic on the overcrowded east-west link of 
the Commuter Express Rail (Réseau Express Régional, RER), a long-distance heavy-rail Métro 
line serving the distant suburbs of Paris. Météor is 8 kilometers in length, and extends from 
the northwest suburbs, through the high-traffic areas in the center of Paris, down to the 
southeast suburbs. Its eight stations provide direct connections with eleven existing Paris 
Métro lines, five RER lines, numerous bus lines, and two railroad stations (Gare St. Lazare and 
Gare de Lyon). 
The line’s computerized and automatic trains are under constant surveillance by the command 
center (PCC) or traffic control center, which both operate the trains and monitor the station 
attendants. On the platforms, glass doors enable an unobstructed view of the other platform as 
well as trains which arrive at 1.5- to 2-minute intervals. Locks on train doors and platforms are 
adjusted and can be manually activated to prevent the escape of criminals. Traffic control 
oversees all operations including maintenance, technical support, and basic security. Staff and 
field agents are equipped with two-way radios. If a given situation gets out of hand or becomes 
life threatening, the matter is handed over to the RATP security control center (PC Securité or 
“SECURITY”). At PC SEC, uniformed staff, as well as attendants in civilian clothes, are 
constantly present and in communication with the Regional Transport Police (RTP). In the 
Metro and RER networks, remote-controlled closed-circuit cameras (CCTV) are linked to line 
PCCs and activated through intercoms, call buttons, and emergency alarms. These enable 
SECURITY to communicate to passengers through loudspeakers. Line 14 is equipped with 
both fixed cameras on the platforms and discreet CCTV located in the trains. Each of these 
cameras is easily selected for live or remote viewing from traffic control.
The environment and context of the stations of Line 14 is quite different from the rest of the 
network. Absent are the maze-like access ways and tunnels to the platforms and exit doors as 
well as the dead angles, which characterize pre-Météor classic design and slow down any 
intervention of police forces to prevent or respond to a terrorist attack. In place there is a very 
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linear glass-enclosed track, the monotony of which is occasionally broken by soft curves, 
linking spotless and brightly lit stations sharing a homogeneous design. Spaces are wider, 
lending better opportunities for remote surveillance. Station materials are mostly transparent, 
reflective, and resistant to graffiti and vandalism. There is maximum use of direct natural or 
indirect artificial light. Overall the feeling for the user is that of high security, warmth, and 
cleanliness, which is quite different from the rest of the network. According to Patrick 
Dillenseger, the use of these materials and lighting complements and supports the surveillance 
technology and minimizes opportunities for situational crime and terrorist attacks. 
Other environmental design innovations are implemented at the Eole Line, which is a 30-
meter underground line connecting the stations of St. Lazare and Gare du Nord in Paris. To 
minimize the negative consequences of terrorist attacks and bomb explosions, architects used 
new materials such a shatterproof fiberglass. The construction of wooden access bridges is 
sufficiently strong to resist the blow impact of an explosion. At Gare du Nord, in case of fire, 
there is pressure or an air curtain that isolates the sector involved from the rest of the platform. 
It is hoped that such a feature will help in the case of a chemical attack as well. The station 
lighting is designed to enhance a feeling of security. 
The retrofit of the old St. Lazare station has integrated design features to respond to concerns 
of crime and terrorism. The station now has limited entrances and exits, which are all well lit. 
Warm-colored materials, such as green panels above the access bridge and red plexiglass panels 
above the station platforms, reflect and redirect the light.
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Figure 17  Red and Green Lighting at Retrofitted St. Lazare Station, Paris
Figure 18  Transparent Elevator, St. Lazare Station, Paris
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Station entrances can be easily closed or blocked by police in the case of an attack, and the old 
and new parts of the station can be easily separated. The passages connecting the entrances to 
the platforms as well as the lobby areas are wide, which prevents overcrowding. Straight, wide 
passageways leave no room for corners, dead spaces, and blind spots, adding to the feeling of 
security. Arches, overhead passages, and bridges have an open view to the lower levels and give 
a feeling of spaciousness. Similarly, the platforms are wide and straight and have high arches. 
They are equipped with CCTV cameras, which can be activated by rapid movement or loud 
voices. Public telephones, ticket seller booths, and elevators are constructed with transparent 
and resistant materials. Transparent and reflective materials on the walls and light-colored 
floors are designed to reflect lighting.
While these examples represent good models of how to implement design strategies for transit 
security, the French officials do not believe that they can be easily applied to their whole 
railway network. As Patrick Dillenseger argued:
While in new construction, we are taking lessons of past terrorist attacks such as at 
St. Germain and we are integrating design features to minimize risk, it is hard to 
consider any major changes to the environmental design of old segments of the 
network. It is indeed very costly to make major physical changes to cavernous and 
old access areas, platforms, and tunnels. To make these spaces more secure, there is a 
need to be creative but there is very limited margin for maneuver, as we can not 
break the old fabric and rebuild all the access areas or platforms. A trend which is 
increasingly followed by operators and agencies is, as in the case of Lille’s metro, to 
create new structures and command centers dedicated solely to security. It is the 
case in Paris with the new lines. In the past it was the operator which had to 
regulate the line to take care of security and inform end-users. The result of that 
was a single structure which was constantly overloaded with work and had 
difficulties in prioritizing when there was a security concern coming up. The new 
trend is structures which are dedicated to security alone and which integrate 
different levels of security.
During Vigipirate periods, minor design measures were implemented at the stations which 
could have an impact on security. These included sealing off garbage cans in stations and on 
platforms, or replacing them with plastic bags, and closing or removing lockers and safe boxes. 
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In addition to design strategies, the French interviewees also talked about the importance of 
technology for security, referring to the development of new techniques, currently underway, 
that would greatly improve video surveillance and object detection by integrating smart 
programs.133 They also referred to the importance of information and security awareness 
campaigns to educate transit riders about the different aspects of threat in public transit. As 
Francois Rambaud, from the French Ministry of Transport, claimed, “We have to combine and 
juxtapose environmental design, audio/video surveillance, rescuing, policing, prosecuting, and 
information campaigns in order to create an effective feeling of security for all passengers.” 
This is, after all, the major goal of transit authorities and operators.
Tokyo
The sarin attack of 1995 took the Japanese society in general, and the Tokyo transit operators 
in particular, by surprise. The Japanese were used to a safe society and were quite unprepared 
for such an incident. Shocked by the attack, Japanese transit operators took measures and 
initiated a protocol for emergency response (refer to the section “Case Studies of Contemporary 
Terrorist Incidents”), but they still perceived it as an isolated incident. The event was 
characterized by Japanese society at the time as an indiscriminate large-scale murder, not a 
terrorist incident, said an official in the Transportation Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Government. According to another official in the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, it was not 
until the World Trade Center bombing, when the definition of terrorism started being 
discussed worldwide, that the Tokyo sarin attack came to be recognized by the Japanese as a 
terrorist incident.
The Role of Government
Unlike the situation in France, where the national government plays a major role in the 
issuance and enforcement of security plans, in the prioritization of security needs, and in 
conducting safety audits of transit facilities, the national government in Japan seems to have a 
much looser relationship with transit operators. Transit operators may receive, at times, 
guidance from the national government on security issues, but this comes in the form of 
suggestions rather than regulations. Ultimately, it falls upon the transit operators to decide 
what security measures should be employed. According to Yukio Takagaki, Assistant Section 
Chief in the Safety Section of the Tokyo Metro, transit operators 
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...are contacted in advance by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
and are asked about, for example, whether it is feasible to install English sentences 
on electronic schedule boards at platforms. When the Ministry sends an official 
guidance memo, usually, they contact transit operators to ask if their guidance is 
realistic enough to be implemented; otherwise, they would end up issuing 
directions that transit operators cannot follow. In this manner, we get to exchange 
information with the government. In some cases, the police also send their 
guidance through the Ministry.
Thus, for example, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport sent its most recent 
guidance to public transportation operators on April 27, 2004. This involved thirty-two 
sections covering aviation, railways, automobiles, buses, ships, ports, roads, rivers, and 
construction sites. For each of these categories, there were several suggestions as to what 
transportation agencies should do to improve security. Examples of such suggestions include 
the posting of signs in English on trains and platforms and the issuance of announcements 
from public speakers to passengers to raise their security awareness and cooperation. However, 
the suggestions issued by the national government typically are not accompanied by financial 
support for implementation. As one official of the Transportation Bureau exclaimed,
Basically, the national government wants us to implement their guidance at our 
own expense. As for the police, they also issued a request to strengthen security in 
our facility as of June 8, 2004. In this document, they used the expression, 
“voluntary guarding,” which means that they suggest that we should voluntarily 
intensify the guarding of our facility. As I said, there is neither funding nor 
regulation attached to those requests. Therefore, there is no enforcement power. 
The national government did provide, however, some funding for hiring private security 
guards to patrol transit facilities. 
Today the transit operators of Tokyo’s two main subway systems, the Tokyo Metro and the Toei 
Subway,134 perceive terrorism as “a very serious threat” to their subway systems, says an 
official of the Transportation Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. In the wake of 
the attack against Iraq, the national government sent a note to transit operators warning them 
to be on alert for suspicious persons and objects and asking them to increase surveillance of 
their system. The number of security guards was increased in some stations, trash cans were 
removed, and employees in supervising positions were asked to patrol the stations and check 
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the way other employees work in the stations and on trains. For the first time in 2003, drills 
designed for explosives and sarin were initiated in the Toei Subway.135 
The Role of Transit Operators
The subway operators in Tokyo pursue some mutual collaboration, coordination, and 
information exchange regarding security strategies against terrorism with the use of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. They also keep in touch with police and fire authorities and 
are informally exchanging information with other transit companies. This information is 
particularly relevant for emergency response, rather than preparedness. According to an official 
in the Subway and Streetcar Service Division of the Transportation Bureau, each of the railway 
companies has its own traffic control office that is in charge of operations management. But 
the traffic control office of the Transportation Bureau (which operates the Toei Subway) and 
that of Tokyo Metro are connected, so that information on unusual incidents on both systems 
is directly exchanged. 
For Tokyo Metro, broad security directives and strategies are decided by the Board of 
Directors, while smaller issues are discussed and decided upon by the company’s Safety Affairs 
Division. The company is composed of five divisions,136 and all division chiefs have regular 
meetings to discuss what security measures to employ in response to the security guidance 
issued by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. For the Toei Subway, the four 
divisions of the Transportation Bureau are responsible for the inception and implementation of 
security strategies.137 The Bureau has established a safety committee, which is composed of 
the Director-General and the director of each division. According to an official of the Subway 
and Streetcar Service Division of the Transportation Bureau, the committee holds meetings 
four times a year to discuss security concerns and decide on security strategies and measures.
Security Strategies
The sarin attack of 1995 prompted Japanese transit operators to identify the need for two 
different categories of antiterrorist measures: measures aimed at restraining terrorist activities 
and preventing attacks, which include a mixture of surveillance, technology, information, and 
design strategies; and measures aimed at emergency preparedness and disaster response. The 
second category of measures initiated a disaster response protocol, which includes the 
development of instructional manuals with detailed guidance for employees as to how to react 
and respond in the case of a terrorist incident.138 
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In terms of priorities, Japanese transit operators tend to favor policing and patrolling 
strategies by private security guards and their staff, and surveillance with the help of security 
cameras and CCTV technology, says an official from the Subway and Streetcar Service Division 
of the Transportation Bureau. Following the sarin attack, both the Tokyo Metro and Toei 
Bureau of Transportation contracted out policing to private security companies. Additional 
patrols were added to the Toei Subway after the Japanese government announced its intention 
to send a force to Iraq. In addition to the private guards, municipal police have been on patrol 
in the most sensitive stations since the railway bombing in Madrid. These include terminal 
stations, stations that have major civic and government buildings in close proximity, and 
stations attracting large numbers of passengers. Transit officials reason that “our passengers 
feel safer seeing our company making efforts for improving transit security. Patrolling has 
allowed the main office employees to communicate with our customers, such as being asked 
directions and getting to directly know the customers’ opinions on our subway services.” 
The purpose of these patrols is to warn of suspicious persons and contain criminal acts. At the 
same time, Japanese transit operators hope that potential terrorists can be dissuaded by the 
presence of security guards. They argue that the increased level of policing on their transit 
system has effectively minimized crime, but they are not as certain regarding its effect on 
terrorist prevention. As an official from the Subway and Streetcar Service Division of the 
Transportation Bureau stated, “It is really hard to claim that such patrolling efforts have paid 
off and have prevented terrorism in our system.”
Figure 19  Monitoring Notice, Kiyosumi-Shirakawa Station, Tokyo Suburb
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Figure 20  Increased Security Notice, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo
Since the sarin attack, 2,200 security cameras have been installed at all stations. They are 
placed at strategic points covering the different platform areas, ticket gates, and restroom 
areas. Prior to the sarin attack, there existed only simple surveillance cameras without 
videotaping functions. Transit authorities believe that such cameras can be very beneficial 
against criminal acts. Indeed, installing security cameras has become the main crime 
prevention strategy by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. They also believe that cameras 
may have the potential to deter terrorists, since suspicious actions can be observed by the staff 
in the controls and operation center. The station staff monitors camera images but cannot 
monitor the screens every second. Other security hardware includes two metal detectors, one 
in Kasumigaseki Station and the other in Ginza Station.
A third strategy is user outreach. Takagaki reasoned that, 
The railway system is open to the general public. It is impossible to check every 
person. Therefore, we have to take preventive measures by reaching out to our 
passengers. We have made posters, placed stickers on train windows, and have 
public announcements that ask passengers to report suspicious persons and objects 
to station staff or the police. The warning note in Japanese and English is being run 
on electronic information boards for train schedules at the platforms. With the 
passengers’ cooperation, we can improve security in our system. Informing 
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passengers will facilitate their cooperation when something happens. For example, 
when we guide passengers to evacuate, informed customers will be more prepared 
and less likely to be panicked, and they will be more cooperative with the station 
employees. 
Before the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Madrid, design strategies for security were 
not on the agenda of Tokyo transit operators. According to an official from the Construction 
and Maintenance Division of the Transportation Bureau, station planning and design in Japan 
takes into consideration the safety, comfort, and convenience of passengers. However, in the 
design of existing stations, safety considerations primarily have involved preventing accidents 
and fires. Because of the low transit crime rates in Japan, operators did not perceive a major 
need to incorporate CPTED elements in station design. According to officials from the 
Transportation Bureau, 
If anything, concerns about fires have greatly influenced the station design since it 
is closed underground space. In general, the subway is not a place with high crime 
rates in Japan. Drunk passengers and gropers have been our main concerns… It 
does not mean that crime prevention is not considered at all in station design. It has 
affected lighting and views in the stations to some degree. But crime prevention 
was not our top priority in station design. 
The recent terrorist events, however, have caused Japanese transit operators to reconsider their 
attitude towards the role of design. In our interviews, they expressed a concern with dead 
spaces and lack of visibility at stations. According to Transportation Bureau officials,
...there is not much flexibility in underground subway stations, and the available 
space is highly limited. In the limited space, designers arrange platforms, 
concourses, and station offices, trying to minimize dead spaces and obstructed 
views. But some dead spaces cannot be avoided at certain locations. That is a 
problem to be solved, but we do not create large dead spaces any more.
Similar views were expressed by Yukio Takagaki and Makoto Himeda, from the Tokyo Metro, 
Safety Section: 
We have made efforts to minimize dead space, especially around the places where 
employees are stationed. Since subway stations are built underground, the space 
arrangement is limited. Therefore, some dead spaces are necessarily generated, for 
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example, when the station has entrances far away from ticket gates. But we place 
security cameras and monitor those dead spaces.
According to Transportation Bureau officials, crime prevention through environmental design 
has been increasingly incorporated in station design. For example, the walls of station elevators 
are now constructed with translucent materials. Because elevators and escalators are often dead 
spaces and difficult to watch by stationmasters, they are now equipped with surveillance 
cameras. The newly opened Oedo Line has fewer station employees than other lines, but there 
are more surveillance cameras monitoring dead spaces, and those images on the cameras are 
checked in the monitor room.
Sweeping design changes are difficult and costly to implement in existing stations. Therefore, 
only selected design and security measures are incorporated in the retrofit of existing stations, 
such as the installation of security cameras and emergency buttons and securing and making 
inaccessible to the public certain station areas (for example, storage spaces, basements, 
electrical rooms). Renovation projects also include the construction of restroom areas away 
from secluded station spaces, with wide, unobstructed entrances intended to be more inviting 
for passengers. 
Figure 21  CCTV Monitor, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo
 Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies
Mineta Transportation Institute
156
Figure 22  Emergency Button, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo
Figure 23  Restroom Entrance, Kasumigaseki Station, Downtown Tokyo
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Since February 2004 (when the Japanese government announced its intention to send some 
troops to Iraq), trash cans have been removed from stations and subway trains.139 Authorities 
have also removed all cigarette receptacles, since smoking has been prohibited in all stations. 
According to Takagaki, this antiterrorist measure had a surprising effect. The system now has 
much less trash, because the Japanese passengers take their trash home with them and do not 
discard it in the trains and stations.
According to an official in the Rolling Stock and Electricity Division of the Transportation 
Bureau, 
We have also made train materials fireproof. We have installed a communication 
system that enables a train crew or a stationmaster in the traffic control office to 
talk to passengers over emergency phones. But all those things have been done in 
preparation for accidents, not for terrorism. Maybe the only design change adopted 
as part of an antiterrorism measure is the stickers put on the train doors that ask 
passengers to report suspicious persons and objects to the station staff. 
According to Makoto Himeda of the Tokyo Metro, the sarin attack prompted a few design 
changes on train wagons. “Due to the increased use of air-conditioning, many of our train 
windows used to be designed not to open, but we have installed train windows that can be 
opened and shut more easily since we learned the importance of ventilation after responding to 
the sarin attack.” 
A Disaster Prevention Network has been established, and all the Tokyo Metro lines are now 
divided into fifteen districts. All Tokyo Metro employees who work outside the train stations, 
such as rolling stock, railroad, electronic line, and facility maintenance engineers, are assigned 
to one of the fifteen districts near their workplace. In the case of a disaster at a station in their 
district, these employees from outside have to come to support the station employees to 
respond to the incident. The district assignment is designed to facilitate mutual support 
among the districts. Our interviewees stressed the importance of coordination and information 
sharing in the case of a terrorist attack, and Takagaki from the Tokyo Metro said:
We have learned the importance of sharing information. For immediate response to 
an incident, it is most important that it is reported quickly as to what is happening 
and where. The stationmaster works as the chief of the Incident Headquarters at the 
station for response and recovery. The Incident Headquarters and the General 
Control Office exchange the information. If it is a large accident, the Incident 
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Headquarters is established in the General Control Office. The staff in the General 
Control Office receives the accident information from the station employees and 
provides response and recovery strategies to them.
The adjustment from the perception of a “safe society” to a “risk society” is slowly but surely 
taking place in Tokyo, as in other cities. The importance of having a safe and secure transit 
system was underlined by Yukio Takagaki. 
Of course, it is costly to add security measures. However, we should take some 
financial burden and invest in maintaining safe transit services for our customers. 
Once something happens, we can easily lose trust from our customers. No matter 
how hard we may work to maintain safety, only one accident can ruin trust and lose 
customers. Thinking this way, we should be willing to invest in security and safety 
to some degree. 
An official from the Subway and Streetcar Service Division of the Transportation Bureau also 
emphasized the challenges of striking a right balance between security and passenger 
convenience, expressing the view that “subways should be easily accessible by passengers, as 
long as they pay the fare. The passengers cannot be security-checked as they are at an airport or 
seaport. If the same security level at those facilities were introduced into the subway system, it 
would be just too inconvenient for the passengers. We have to strike a balance between 
security and convenience.” 
Another issue that troubles transit operators is finding the right balance between cost 
effectiveness and adequate security. As explained by an official from the Subway and Streetcar 
Service Division of the Transportation Bureau, 
It is unrealistic to say that our security measures are perfect. As transit operators, 
we have to do as much as we can to guard our system, but we cannot afford an extra 
budget on security more than what we are implementing right now. We are 
implementing our security measures to an extent in which the society feels that we 
are doing as much as one transit operator can do to improve transit security. At the 
same time, our budget is too limited to spend enormous amounts of money. Our 
current security level is a product of balancing out those things. 
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London
Because of the attacks of the Irish Republican Army over the last thirty years, the British have 
had a long and intense experience dealing with terrorist attacks on their railway system. As a 
result of this, they have developed a layered system of directives, security standards, and 
procedures that far exceeds those encountered in the other countries included in this study. For 
many years prior to 9/11, the British authorities put many strategies into action to prevent 
terrorist events on what is perceived to be the most vulnerable part of their railway network, 
the London Underground. The attack against the Tokyo Metro, and subsequently the 9/11 
attack and the attacks on the Madrid and Moscow railway systems, made the British realize 
that they had to deal with a different brand of terrorism than the one they were accustomed 
to—one that involved coordinated attacks on a much larger scale and on multiple targets, and 
which was carried out not by opportunist terrorists avoiding capture but by determined 
individuals, who had meticulously planned their actions and who often did not care about 
escape options.
First, the sarin attack against the Tokyo subway served as a wake-up call for the British 
authorities in terms of their system’s vulnerability to massive chemical attacks. According to 
Adrian Dwyer of the British Transport Police,
Tokyo impacted on the activities of the British Transport Police dramatically. You 
have a system in Tokyo that is not dissimilar in many respects to the London 
Underground, although cleaner and arguably more efficient. And it was very clear 
that they got so many things wrong in their response because they weren’t 
expecting what happened. They didn’t stop trains quickly; they didn’t stop people 
moving ahead; they didn’t identify what had happened as an attack within the first 
hour. They didn’t know it was a chemical agent called sarin until three hours after 
the event. So we looked in detail at Tokyo. We had the Japanese railway persons 
over here talking to us. We sent people out to Japan. A lot of contact was made 
particularly with our colleagues over in the States looking at their interaction 
because they’re much closer to the Japanese than we are. And I think it’s fair to say 
again that for us there was a more dramatic change in the way we police the 
railways following Tokyo than there was in the way we police the railways 
following 9/11. 
According to London Underground officials, even though the 9/11 events did not bring about 
an immediate or dramatic change, they did result in a change in mindset about security 
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among transit operators—the recognition that this is an international threat and there needs 
to be a reevaluation of security procedures, more training on security awareness and 
contingency planning, and even a closer collaboration with other countries and coordination 
and help from the British government. 
According to Graham Marshall, the security specialist of Network Rail, the infrastructure 
manager of the railway responsible for all major stations in London:
Post-9/11, the thinking has moved more toward a terrorist base that does not 
follow the norms we knew until then. As we saw in Madrid, there were extensive 
civilian casualties. If we look at other parts of the world, we have terrorists that are 
prepared to die. All of that brings a different dimension to it. And although for 
probably about five years before 9/11, we were talking about and thinking about 
the issues to deal with chemical, biological, and radiological terrorism, post-9/11 
that has taken on a new energy because this weaponry may well be used by this type 
of terrorists. We never really thought the Irish Republican terrorists were going to 
get into these weapons. Whereas perhaps the more international type terrorists, the 
more fundamentalist terrorists will perhaps be able to do so. 9/11 has injected a 
new sense of urgency. 9/11 was a different scale of things, and subsequent to that 
there has been more work about what we are calling catastrophic scale terrorism in 
London and what role the railway industry could play in part of that response. 
The Role of Government and Centralized Planning
Transit security in Great Britain includes a web of governmental agencies, which interact with 
the police and the local transit operators to define the criteria for prevention planning and 
emergency response. At the national level, the Rail Safety and Standards Board is a nonprofit 
company responsible for setting safety standards, and the Department for Transport is the 
agency that oversees the railway industry and mandates its security requirements. The 
Department has a number of boards and committees. The most important for transit safety 
and security is Transport Security, shortened to TRANSEC, which regulates airports, seaports, 
and most recently (after 9/11) the rail transport industry in terms of security. TRANSEC is 
responsible for a document called the National Railway Security Program (NRSP), which sets 
out the minimum standards to which rail operators must adhere if they want to run a rail line. 
Such standards include the layout and design of station facilities, and their equipment such as 
type and location of lockers, bicycle-securing facilities, “litterbins” (that is, trash cans), and 
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CCTV technology. TRANSEC also issues guidance to local authorities regarding the street 
furniture and parking around the station. TRANSEC has regulatory powers and issues 
recommendations on how security should be enacted. In certain instances, it also issues 
statutory instructions, which relate to the operation of stations and have the force of law. 
TRANSEC also has enforcement powers and employs inspectors to ensure that the statutes and 
standards are being met by the railway companies. “Given the fragmentation of the former 
National British Railway into a number of private companies, TRANSEC’s regulatory action 
helps to make sure that common security standards are applied across the railway industry,” 
said Adrian Dwyer of the British Transport Police.
In addition to the baseline security mandates, the government informs the transit operators 
about the threat level, which defines the strategies to be followed. According to Graham 
Marshall of Network Rail (the infrastructure manager of the railway in charge of the London 
stations), 
The government security services and TRANSEC give us the threat level and the 
British Transport Police give us their steer on operational response. And depending 
on what they tell us, we then determine what we are going to do. The transit 
operator will reach an agreement with the transport security regulators as to what is 
realistic according to the threat and risk level. We can vary what we do within 
reason. 
Another important contribution of the central government is in the area of funding. Despite 
the fact that the railway operators are now private companies, they still receive significant 
public subsidies for operation and security purposes. While in general railway companies are 
supposed to cover expenses for security from their income, it is possible to make special cases 
to the government for special funding to cover emergency services or specific security 
equipment.
Another governmental body, this at the municipal level, is Transport for London (TfL), which 
coordinates all the different modes of transportation in the greater London area. According to 
Barrie Wickens, TfL and the London Resilience Team coordinate and facilitate the efforts of all 
the disparate transportation agencies in emergency planning and disaster recovery. They 
interact closely with the British Transport Police (BTP), the police force of the railways in 
England, Scotland, and Wales. Dwyer says that BTP typically responds to incidents of a 
security nature, but also gives advice and informational briefings to transit operators about the 
implications of their security decisions. BTP has developed assessment procedures for 
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unattended items, as well as a threat analysis process, to evaluate whether or not a phone call 
threat should be taken seriously. According to officials from London Underground, 
...our relationship with BTP is quite key, and it has probably been the cornerstone 
of our response to deal with terrorism for the last thirty years. We pay for their 
services, something in the region of thirty million pounds per year, and for that we 
get a pretty good service.... The big advantage of having BTP is that they 
understand the environment and the importance of not interrupting the service 
unnecessarily, and so they’ve always got in their mind this balance between what is 
a real threat and the fact that if we’ve got trains still in tunnels that creates 
potentially a bigger risk for us. They work very closely with us if there is an item 
that is identified as suspicious or they believe that it’s one that needs to be taken 
seriously. BTP liaises closely with other police forces and emergency services. If 
they get suspicious items they’ll make an assessment using X-ray or other 
equipment. If they deem the item as explosive, they’ll call in the bomb squad. If 
they think there’s a real terrorist incident, they will call the antiterrorist branch of 
the metropolitan police. 
The Role of Transit Operators
While the government provides the baseline mandates and security standards, different 
transportation companies also develop an additional layer of security measures, based on advice 
they pull in from TRANSEC, TfL, and BTP. While security on trains is the responsibility of 
transit operators, security on the station is primarily the responsibility of Network Rail, the 
infrastructure manager, which is responsible for all major railway stations in London. Twenty-
six private transit operators of passenger trains and some freight trains pay access fees to use 
the lines maintained and secured by Network Rail. According to Graham Marshall of 
Network Rail, 
The transit operators expect Network Rail to deal with the security at the stations 
and the infrastructure it controls. They are quite happy because they know that we 
are going to do that. We would of course consult with them if what we would do 
impacts on their operations. They will deal with the security on their trains and 
depots if that’s appropriate to them. 
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At the same time transit operators, like London Underground, have their own security 
division, which provides advice to the management about the security of their system, oversees 
the implementation of security standards, and at times develops better ways to meet them. 
These multiple layers of agencies from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors that legislate, 
regulate, implement, and police require a very significant level of coordination. This 
interagency coordination received high marks by everyone interviewed. Graham Marshall of 
Network Rail said,
...coordination is pretty good, actually, because there is usually one person in each 
of the companies responsible for security and we get to know each other even 
though it’s roughly 30 people… Inevitably, there are some issues and areas where 
our business needs are slightly different and so one has to deal with that. But 
actually, it’s a fairly cooperative process, with no frictions, and a good working 
relationship. There are some times where TRANSEC would indicate that they want 
to introduce some security instructions and the industry and operators will enter 
into a dialogue about the practicality of that because you know clearly they are 
coming from a perspective of saying “we really want to introduce these security 
measures,” and we are coming from a perspective of “well how do we do that and 
run a railway?” But I don’t think that is so much of a friction. I think it is a 
practicality issue, one of pragmatism. And there is an acceptance that terrorism has 
to be dealt with and threat levels have to be abided by and responded to. So I’ve 
found that it’s always been a very close working relationship. 
However, coordination and partnership require work and time investment. As the officials 
from London Underground state, 
A couple of things learned are through actual incidents in London, one of which is 
that terrorism is not an opportunity for point gathering or for making out which 
agency is the best. We all have to make our contribution. The other thing is that 
partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time 
to meet your counterpart in other agencies. So that means you have to do drills and 
exercises and more drills and more exercises, to not just know that they exist and 
what the organization is, but to know who our colleagues are and what they look 
like and coordinate with them and all these sorts of issues that take time and 
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resources, but at the end of the day it makes that incident management run so 
much more effectively and smoother.
Coordination with European Agencies
At the same time that the different British agencies coordinate with one another to tackle 
issues of transit security, they are also recognizing that the threat is international, and hence 
the collaboration and coordination should also be at a level that transcends national 
boundaries. Like the French, who discussed the merits of a pan-European cooperation, the 
British also stressed the importance of sharing information and knowledge about security with 
their neighbors on the Continent. According to Graham Marshall, 
There have been some well established links with continental Europe, and there are 
a number of committees that a few of us go to that are related to railway security 
across Europe. We share best practices and such on these issues, which is quite 
effective. Different countries approach security in slightly different ways and the 
threat to those countries is different. Some of them perceive themselves to be more 
at risk than others. But there is a good relationship there. We have not had the 
same collaboration with our American counterparts—not because there has been 
any problem—it’s not just seen to be necessary at the moment to have that 
relationship with American transport operators. 
Security Strategies
The British make a distinction between “counterterrorism” and “resilience” and craft different 
strategies to address each. They develop counterterrorist measures to try to prevent terrorist 
acts on their railway systems and resilience measures to respond in an expedient and efficient 
way if such acts occur. Our interviewees in Great Britain talked about an integration of 
security strategies that include a mix of security technology, customer outreach, design, and 
policing measures. As one official of the London Underground put it, “I don’t think one of 
these four strategies sits out on its own. You’ve got to do each one. And you’ve got to have an 
element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or crime in general. One can’t 
work in isolation.”
The London Underground vehicles and stations are equipped with an extensive system of over 
6,000 CCTV cameras, some of which have been in place for twenty years and are being 
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upgraded or replaced. The British Transport Police advises railway operators in terms of what 
sort of CCTV to install, where to locate it, where to view the system, how long to hold the 
tapes, and who has access to them. Cameras in sensitive areas are connected to alarms, which 
will go off in the case of an intrusion, and the CCTV will automatically switch to the 
appropriate monitor. There are two distinct CCTV systems in the London railways: a CCTV 
system that is in place for the safe running of the trains, so that the driver, for example, can see 
whether the last set of doors are clear of the platform (known as Platform Train Interface—
PTI); and a CCTV system that is used to safely manage the station environment, but that also 
has an additional crime prevention and detection role by using real-time monitoring and 
recording capabilities. A significant number of these cameras are fed back to a central location 
that is under both operational and police control. 
In the early years, the system was placed as a deterrent to crime, and according to BTP, many 
prosecutions of criminals have been successful primarily because of the quality of the CCTV 
evidence that was presented. However, the TfL representative expressed some doubt about the 
current effectiveness of the system against crime: 
As a generality in the UK, we seem to be great believers in CCTV systems. 
Personally, I think their value is often overstated, particularly in the media. 
Criminals have reached a point where they have realized that most CCTV systems 
are not monitored all the time. They also can disguise themselves. So the 
probability is that there won’t be a rapid enforcement response if an incident 
happens. I’m not talking about major incidents like bombs, but about basic crimes 
like shoplifting, assaults, robberies, things like that.
In regards to CCTV’s effectiveness against transit terrorism, the British Transport Police 
stated, 
It’s a little more difficult to prove it has deterrent value. But what we can say is that 
there is good circumstantial evidence that terrorists who do not want to get caught 
go out of their way not to be seen by CCTV. That either means they do not carry 
through their terrorist act at CTTV stations or they start doing things like putting 
up their collars and pulling down baseball caps and actually drawing attention to 
themselves as people who are trying to avoid CCTV. And that’s just as good as 
actually putting up a flag and saying, “Hey, look at me.” You can certainly chart a 
move away in terms of terrorist attacks from stations with CCTV to stations 
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without CCTV. That could be coincidental, although I don’t think it is. But there’s 
no way to prove it because the terrorists won’t tell us what influenced their 
decision. 
The difficulty of constant monitoring of the TV screens of the system by humans was 
emphasized as a weakness of CCTV. Nevertheless, Marshall of Network Rail expressed his 
conviction that surveillance technology will spread to “virtually every facet of [public] life in 
the UK over the next 10 to 20 years,” because this intrusion of privacy for security reasons is 
generally accepted by the British people.140 
Other than the CCTV technology, transit operators in Great Britain are trying to keep abreast 
with emerging new technologies that could help them identify the spread of chemical, 
biological, nuclear, or radiological agent (CBNR) attacks on their system. Whereas bomb 
explosions typically cover a relatively small geographic area, CBNR agents can spread quickly 
through the tunnels of a railway system. Indeed, as in the other cities of our case studies, 
transit operators seemed to be particularly concerned with CBNR attacks because of the 
difficulty of detecting and responding to them in the railway network, and the agencies’ 
relative lack of experience in dealing with such attacks. 
Policing by the trained officers of the BTP is considered absolutely essential for the safe and 
secure operation of the railways in Great Britain, and for this reason the number of officers has 
steadily increased in the last years. Currently, the London Underground commissions 530 
dedicated officers, and this number will likely increase to 630 by the end of 2004. This is from 
a total, nationwide force numbering some 3,000 officers. Interestingly, BTP is not an armed 
police force. Dwyer said the British believe that having a force dedicated completely to transit 
security is advantageous as it provides consistency across the system and familiarity on the part 
of the officers with issues and concerns that may be unique to transit systems.
While the presence of dedicated police officers helps give transit passengers a perception of 
protection, transit operators argue that they also rely on vigilance by their staff and customers. 
Dressed in very visible blue uniforms, the staff often conducts station patrols and checks 
station entrances. They are trained on how to deal with unattended bags and how to recognize 
potential chemical and biological agents. Nevertheless, they are always instructed to call the 
BTP for any incident that may require immediate response.
The transit operators value customer feedback and have launched information and outreach 
campaigns to raise the vigilance of the public. Posters at the stations and stickers on train 
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windows remind passengers to report any suspicious activity or unattended bag. Officials from 
the London Underground described the importance of public participation: 
We’ve got over three million customers who use our system every day and they are 
very good at reporting things that are unusual and bringing them to our attention. 
The community must help police itself; the police can’t do it all by themselves. 
There are just not enough of them. We’ve been really careful about raising 
awareness without raising fear, which is a thin line… In that sense, the public here 
are well educated especially where you’ve got regular commuters. They understand 
after all those years of IRA terrorism that they’ve got to be careful and alert and 
raise the alarm. One of the difficulties from our part is not to keep on raising public 
awareness too often or unduly because people will switch off. We haven’t reached 
that point, fortunately.
Indeed, people are so vigilant and “raise the alarm” so frequently that the London 
Underground has to deal with reports of about 10,000 unattended items every month.
In Great Britain, the strategy of using environmental design to design out crime and terrorism 
in transit facilities emerged gradually in the last decade. According to Thom Rhys Jones, 
Managing Director of Jefferson Sheard Architects, a London-based architectural firm that 
specializes in public transportation facilities, security is one of the major factors considered in 
the design of a railway station. As he argued, “the consequences of not designing for security 
are overwhelmingly more dire than the consequences of maybe not achieving some of the other 
factors such as good image or accessibility.” He distinguished between passive means of 
security (for example, good sightlines, lighting, elimination of dead spaces) and active security 
means, such as CCTV systems built into the design. Today, Barrie Wickens of TfL 
characterizes design as the key criterion, explaining that: 
...it’s much easier, quicker, and certainly cost effective to have a trained security 
professional sit down with an architect or an engineer with the plans of whatever 
type of structure it is and for that security specialist to say well “Why is that door 
there?” “Does it have to be that way?” “What sort of glazing have you got there?” 
“Don’t you think that would be better if it was laminated with bullet-resistance 
glazing?” “Why do you have to have a glass roof?” If a bomb went off below that, 
we know that fragmentation is the biggest killer, not necessarily the blast. There is 
so much risk potential that you can design out.
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Some of the design measures that transit operators in Great Britain are focusing on include the 
elimination of places where people can conceal explosives without being noticed. Vending 
machines and telephone booths are built with sloping tops, so that nothing can be hidden on 
top of them. Hiding places have been eliminated from the rolling stock. Trash cans have been 
completely banned from the stations that TRANSEC perceives as the most vulnerable; at the 
remaining stations, they have been replaced with receptacles that have a plastic ring holding a 
bin of see-through plastic. 
London Underground also tries to secure the in-between spaces—the walkways, the escalators, 
the storage rooms, the power supply rooms—which often receive less attention from a 
planning and design perspective than the platforms and entrances. Rooms with no public 
access remain locked. For some public restrooms, the station management has just instituted 
mechanically operated latches so that the staff know when someone wants to use them and 
who is going in. Finally, the system does not have one centralized control room, but many 
scattered in different places. According to London Underground officials, this is a security 
measure, as terrorists cannot knock out with one blow all of London’s transport because it is 
not all in one place.
The cost of retrofitting the subway stations of the London Underground was mentioned as a 
major hurdle in the effort to design out terrorism. According to the London Underground 
officials, 
If you can make those design changes before the bricks and mortar, it saves a 
fortune in monetary terms… The problem for us is that we have a system that’s 140 
years old and of course it’s not just cut and cover like you have in places like New 
York and Washington. But you’ve got deep-level tube, and the very nature of the 
original design will give you places to conceal things. Working them out of the 
system is always very difficult. 
Additionally, many stations are built under historic buildings (or “listed” buildings as called 
by the British), which makes a deep retrofit impossible.
In discussing the mix of security strategies that make up their arsenal against terrorists, our 
interviewees in London did not fail to mention the many hurdles and challenges they have to 
encounter. These include: the inherent vulnerability of a railway system, the balance between 
security measures and passenger convenience, and the high costs of safety. 
The BTP were the first to stress the challenges of securing an open mass transit system: 
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There is an inherent vulnerability and if you want to run an open mass transit 
system you live with the vulnerabilities and you probably tackle them through 
intelligence. You have to take them out before they pose a threat. Once they are in 
it, it’s probably going to be quite difficult to do anything about it. When I was in 
Moscow back in March, and there you have a system where the Moscow metro has 
loads of police, it has loads of armed militia, it has loads of dedicated security 
guards guarding individual cross passages on the system, and yet they get suicide 
bombers on the trains. Now if they can’t stop it, it seems unlikely that anyone else 
is going to, to be honest. So if we’re looking at advances, I think probably what 
we’re looking at are more strategic advances in terms of better intelligence and 
stopping these people before they actually get in. The flip side of that of course is 
that if they do get in and something happens, you should deal with it much more 
effectively. One of our main concerns is that we don’t want to end up doing the 
terrorists’ job for them by shutting the system unless you absolutely have to, or 
maximizing the disruption over a larger area than is necessary. Therefore having a 
system that rapidly proves it is all right again is actually as important as 
establishing what has gone wrong. 
The issue of striking the right kind of balance between adequate levels of security and 
operational efficiency was emphasized by the officials of London Underground: 
It’s very difficult to apply aviation-type controls to a rapid transit system. We’ve 
got 250 access points just by stations alone. Let alone all the interchanges, that 
probably brings us up to 1,000 or more. You can’t put those sorts of controls into 
place in a railway system. It’s just not practical. So we have got measures in place 
that are appropriate for the environment and for the type of system that we run, but 
some of the things you can’t do. You don’t want people to have to wait too long in 
the course of their travel. 
For this reason transit operators reject at this time the idea of mass screening of passengers, 
unless new sensing and radar technologies are developed.
Finally, there is the tension between what Graham Marshall of Network Rail called “the twin 
demands of security and operating a railway.” Funding the security improvements is always an 
issue for transit operators trying to run a profitable business. Striking the right balance 
between what will make their customers feel protected and what they can afford paying for is a 
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challenge. As one operator admitted, “As a security specialist, I could do a lot more but I’d 
probably ruin the business.” As Marshall so poignantly stated, 
You always have to find the right balance, and this balance probably is more than 
the balance of money, the availability of funds to do these [security improvements]. 
It is about allowing people to go about their normal daily business using the 
railway as part of that daily business. But in a way that brings the maximum 
security. And that’s always a balance.
Madrid
Similar to the British, the Spaniards also have long experience with terrorism because of the 
activities of the Basque autonomist organization ETA over the last four decades. Nevertheless, 
as described in the previous section, Al Qaeda’s attack on the national commuter rail system 
RENFE Cercanias in Madrid on March 11, 2004, took them by surprise. As a result of this 
attack, the Spaniards now understand that the terrorist threat can be “general” and 
“international” and can hit any train system in any country. Taking action to diffuse such a 
threat and make passengers feel safe again has been the overriding consideration of the transit 
operators in Madrid since the attack of 3/11. According to Manuel Rodriguez Simons, 
Director of the Security and Civil Protection of RENFE, the largest railway company of Spain, 
We know that the security is a parameter without which nothing can work. You 
can have the cleanest trains in the world, you can have the most luminous stations 
in the world, and you can have the most comfortable trains in the world, and you 
can have the most punctual trains in the world. But when you go in a train and you 
do not feel safe because there are people that produce insecurity, you’re not going to 
use the train. So, we, not as department, but as the entire company, have a 
philosophy. Security is a very important factor and it is necessary to take care of it. 
You go to other cities that after certain hours, people do not use public transport 
because they are afraid of what can happen. We do not want anyone to stop using 
our trains because of their fear. 
Similar views were expressed by Javier García Cadiñanos, Director of Security of Madrid’s 
metro system. 
When riders demand security, we need to give them security. Today, the first 
demand of the citizen is security. You have to consider that there is a condition that 
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must always be considered. There is a premise that is strictly fulfilled in all public 
transportation—that security does not make public transportation work well. But 
if the security does not work well, public transportation does not work well. 
While Spanish transit operators perceive security as the overriding factor for the successful 
operation of their system, they also believe that first and foremost it is the national 
government that should have the onus of identifying and tackling security threats. 
The Role of Governmental Agencies
The role of the government is to provide information to transit operators about security threats 
as well as instigate regulations pertaining to security standards. According to RENFE officials, 
the strategy of the rail companies is to follow the instructions given by the Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the police, and follow the preventative measures as part of a 
national strategy and plan. Manuel L. Rodríguez Simons, Director of Security and Civil 
Protection at RENFE says planning for stations and trains is, therefore, not completely in the 
hands of transit operators, but RENFE and Metro Madrid can “count on the Security Forces 
because they are really those who have the vision most adjusted to reality because they are 
living this day to day and have the pertinent information.”
Another important actor in the security of the railway systems is the police force. RENFE has 
its own force and receives assistance from Spain’s Civil Guard and National Police, while 
Metro Madrid is protected by the municipal police. The police give the transit operators “the 
most pertinent points and suspicions.” Transit operators immediately report to the police any 
suspicious item or activity observed in their premises. Coordination between the 
governmental, municipal, and transit agencies is very important; therefore, representatives 
from each agency meet regularly to discuss security threats, measures, and strategies. 
According to Rodríguez Simons, this close coordination was crucial in preventing another 
fatal blow to RENFE, on April 1, 2004. On that date, a RENFE operator detected a suspicious 
cable on a high velocity (AVE) train from Madrid to Seville. RENFE immediately notified the 
Civil Guard, who discovered 12 kilograms of explosives and were able to deactivate the bomb.
Coordination of Transit Operators
The two major rail operators in Madrid are Metro Madrid and RENFE. At the moment, 
transit operators in Spain are public sector companies.141 Each company has its security 
department, which is responsible for the prevention of and response to criminal acts and 
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accidents. Transit operators are coordinated by the CRTM, a public sector agency that 
coordinates services, networks, and fares so as to offer consumers a consistent and high-quality 
service.
Representatives of CRTM, RENFE, and Metro Madrid meet consistently to discuss common 
security strategies. According to Rodríguez Simons of RENFE and García Cadiñanos of Metro 
Madrid, 
There is a great relationship between CRTM, RENFE, and Metro Madrid. We have 
activities together and always join in the same strategies. We habitually act 
together on requests to the administration. We not only have good relations with 
departments of security similar to ours, but we have relations with other systems of 
security—with other train and metro systems, other organizations; even if they’re 
not train systems, they have common problems. For example, big commercial 
centers, the highway transport system security, the telephone company. That is, we 
have relations with the biggest users of security in the country. We have an 
association in which we’re all members. We meet two times a month and we discuss 
all the problems that we have and we look at all the solutions that each agency has 
taken in security matters. 
Security Strategies
The 3/11 terrorist attack on RENFE has resulted in increased security measures. Officials 
claim that this is primarily a response to citizen demand, as surveys have shown them that 
riders want more security on their system. At the same time, they emphasize that despite their 
desire to be responsive to passenger requests, they want to also achieve the appropriate level of 
security so that their systems do not turn into “armored bunkers.” Similar to other transit 
operators in other countries, RENFE and Metro Madrid believe that the primary 
responsibility of security lies with the government. As stated by Garcia Cadiñanos, 
We in the Metro are going to continue increasing the security for attacks of all 
types—from common delinquency to terrorism—with the measures that we can, 
but we know that the way to fight terrorism is not through the metro security 
service. It is through the security services of the state. It is the police with 
information services that must prevent terrorist attacks. And we collaborate with 
them, but we, for example, are not going to put explosive detectors in all the 
entrances of the metro because it is impossible. We have thousands of people who 
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enter the network, it would produce chaos in the city, and we cannot do this. No 
metro in the world does this. Not even in a country that actually had more terrorist 
attacks in their network, such as Moscow. 
RENFE and Metro Madrid have retrofitted their stations with anti-intrusion and detection 
systems and have added many more video and security cameras. Passengers embarking on the 
high-speed (AVE) trains of RENFE have to enter a pre-embarking area with scanners, where 
only passengers can pass. According to RENFE officials, “This is a great method from the 
security point of view. And contrary to what we thought when we implemented this, 
passengers appreciate it and understand it like another attribute—something good that makes 
them feel more calm. It also seems that passengers consider this space as a luxury—nobody can 
bother them, they have free air, etc.” This measure, which started in 1992, applies to the line 
connecting Seville to Madrid, and Madrid to Leida, but it is in the plans to provide such pre-
embarking spaces for many more lines. 
Figure 24  Security Scanner, Atocha Station, Madrid
Public outreach focuses on the training of employees so that they know how to respond in 
cases of emergency and how to protect the system more effectively. Unlike transit operators in 
Great Britain who give a big emphasis on outreach campaigns with warning posters and 
advice for the public, the Spaniards have not pursued such a policy, due to fear that they may 
scare their passengers. According to RENFE officials, “We wanted the passengers to feel the 
same as before March 11. A lot changed, but what we wanted was for the people not to 
notice.” 
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Police surveillance is a critical component of the security strategy. RENFE has contracted 
private security officers who constantly monitor their facilities and watch over the passengers 
and staff. In the first months after the 3/11 attack, the national police provided an additional 
layer of surveillance at the stations. Similar to the situation in Tokyo, transit operators in Spain 
have observed that this increased police presence has resulted in a considerable decrease in 
crime at the stations and on trains.
The importance of design for station security was emphasized by officials at RENFE and 
Metro Madrid. 
Security is based on prevention, and prevention begins with design. A station 
designed without security criteria in mind would be much more insecure and much 
more expensive to protect. To feel safer and for a facility to be safer, you must count 
on design elements. In the past, the stations were created with other criteria. For 
example, we had many entrance points to bring citizens closer to the metro. Today, 
things have changed. One hundred years later, the citizen does not care so much if 
he walks along the street or inside the metro. What he does worry about is feeling 
secure that nobody is going to rob or attack him. 
Javier García Cadiñanos and Rodríguez Simons offered the following recommendations for the 
design of new stations:
• Have one entrance point, if possible at the same level with the street, so that the rider does 
not have to enter an access by stairs.
• Utilize central platforms instead of lateral platforms because the most risky elements are 
the passageways. If you have a central platform where the train goes, you can avoid 
passageways. 
• Use transparent materials in station design; make platforms, waiting areas, halls, and 
corridors as clear and transparent as possible.
• Construct footbridges and above-ground passageways so passengers can see and be seen.
• Install panoramic elevators (you should be able to see everything from inside).
• Eliminate dark zones; install good lighting.
• Eliminate long and winding corridors.
• Fit vending and automatic teller machines (ATMs) in specific niches of the wall with no 
space on top or underneath, and supervise the recharge/reload area by CCTV.
 Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies
Mineta Transportation Institute
175
• Instead of having trains with several compartments, the wagons should be converted into 
one long wagon.
Figure 25  Nooks and Crannies Offer Hiding Places, Madrid Metro
In contrast to the other systems of our study, the Spaniards do not think that the elimination 
of trash cans from stations would help security. According to Jesus Rodriguez Molina of 
CRTM, “If there is an attack like the one on 3/11, there is nothing about the trash cans that 
would make a difference; the trash cans are an element of low importance. If somebody wants 
to be a suicide bomber, trash can or no trash can [it’s] not going to do anything.”
The challenges that transit operators in other cities and countries had described were also 
echoed in the responses of Spanish operators. For one, they were concerned with maintaining a 
proper balance between safety and convenience. As RENFE officials pointed out, 
When you have to pass from a scanner, this is an inconvenience. So what we try to 
do is explain to the passenger that we know it’s an inconvenience, but at the same 
time, communicate that it’s important for him, so that he feels more secure….If 
you put more barriers, more barriers, more barriers, the more you put, the safer the 
system, but it’s more uncomfortable for the passengers. That is the problem. The 
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security is possible, it’s easy to put up several barriers. But, it is also necessary to 
have limits.
Figure 26  Police at Central Madrid Station
The inherent vulnerability of an open system against terrorists who could attack suddenly, 
anywhere, and with no regard for their own lives was also discussed. At least one Spaniard, the 
Technical Director of Concorcio Transportes Madrid, appeared quite cynical about the 
effectiveness of security measures. According to him, the best thing that measures can do is to 
make passengers feel safe. 
In the first place, unlike those politicians who guarantee security, from the point of 
a technical person, I have to say that security does not exist. What does exist are 
methods to lessen insecurity. You never know what’s going to happen and I’m 
telling you this because when the politicians tell you that these methods will 
guarantee our security, it’s all false. What we can do is implement some measures 
that make us feel more secure and those measures depend on the costs….We can 
implement the most methods possible and create a theater of security, but this does 
not mean that anything is more secure in the face of terrorism. In its own quality, 
inflicting pain is very easy and preventing pain is extremely hard. And in a public 
mass transportation, like the one we provide, the only way to guarantee security in 
the metro is to close the metro. Yes, they do things, they put into works projects of 
putting in more CCTV and they’re developing ideas. But, all of this is because you 
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have to do something to increase the feeling of security or diminish the feeling of 
insecurity. We’re not convinced that the methods that we can adapt are going to do 
anything against Islamic terrorism. To control everything is very complicated. We 
have to be humble and attempt to improve other types of insecurity of aggressions, 
theft, etc. If we speak about general security, yes we can do a lot. But regarding 
terrorism, no. The security against terrorism makes more sense in the airport and 
planes, because they have the luxury of time. Here, in this transportation, no.
The above attitude was, however, the exception rather than the norm. While most transit 
operators we talked to readily admitted that they had no way of measuring the effectiveness of 
their different security measures, they also believed that these measures did make things more 
difficult for potential terrorists. 
A Pan-European Collaboration: UITP
The events of 9/11 in New York and 3/11 in Madrid have triggered a new type of cooperation 
among European operators, and the European community has become more active in the field 
of security than before. The European transit officials in our interviews stressed the importance 
of this pan-European collaboration in the fight against transit terrorism. In their view, such 
collaboration is imperative because many trains transcend national borders, connecting cities 
in different countries. The organization that works to promote this collaboration is the 
International Union of Public Transport, which has its headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The 
European Union has allocated a significant budget for cooperation on issues of public transit, 
and of course security has become a very important element in this cooperation. UITP has 
regional offices in different parts of the world (but not in the United States), and members in 
eighty different countries. Its members are public transport operators, transit authorities, and 
bus and train manufacturers. One of their research projects, the Voyager Project, is financed by 
the European Union and dedicated to developing future urban transport policies. 
UITP has instituted setting primary guidelines, benchmarking, and recommendations for 
coordinating security standards across the European Union.142 UITP also promotes and makes 
known examples of security measures or new designs that have been most successful in 
anticipating terrorist threats and minimizing the risk of terrorist attacks. UITP also 
disseminates security information drawing from experiences in the United States and Japan. It 
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also informs and contributes to projects such as Prismatica/Chromatica dedicated to 
optimizing audio-video surveillance.
In early 2003, a subcommittee of the Voyager Project took on the task of creating policy for 
transport security. So far UITP has established a platform for discussion and policy making, 
creating a permanent security group of UITP members from different countries. It has also 
signed a declaration emphasizing security issues in public transport. One of the declaration 
requirements urges every transit operator to carry out a vulnerability analysis on their system. 
According to Andrea Soehnchen, Project Manager of the Voyager Project, 
UITP wants to work with the big operating companies who have resources 
necessary to develop security guidelines, technologies, and methodologies that 
could be used by smaller-scale operators who simply don’t have the resources to 
start from scratch to redo everything. Something we have in mind could, for 
instance, be like a checklist of weak points in infrastructure where you have to 
think about. So this could be very helpful for small-scale operators.
The motivation for UITP activity around security is the realization that the terrorist threat is 
international and that the public transport network is a very easy target for terrorists. While in 
the past terrorism was considered a localized event, the events of 9/11 showed to the world 
that the threat could touch everyone. Then the attacks in Madrid and Moscow demonstrated 
that it could happen in Europe’s public transport. This has led to an increasing awareness of 
European operators and by the European Union, which plans to invest significant funds in 
assisting member states to carry out vulnerability analysis and inspections at stations.
UITP believes that the fight against terrorism will be much more effective if agencies across 
countries join hands. “Preventing terrorist attacks costs a lot of money, so we need to work 
together at the international level. We cannot work in an isolated way. Speaking of terrorists, 
they collaborate. They have international networks of terrorism and we need to also have 
international antiterrorism efforts. To inform each other about the threat as soon as there is a 
risk is very important.” UITP hopes, therefore, for an interagency, interdepartmental, and 
international dialogue around security to define a common understanding of security aspects, 
and hopefully lead toward the adoption of common standards and common emergency plans in 
the mass transit industry—an approach already followed by the airline industry. This is 
certainly a challenge because different agencies are structured differently. In terms of policing, 
for example, some operators have their own dedicated police, while others rely on municipal or 
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even federal police. Since the fight against transit terrorism involves agencies at different 
levels, a major concern, according to UITP, is to establish who is responsible for what and how 
agencies can better support each other rather than compete. According to Mohamed Mezghani 
of UITP:
What is important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible 
for operations. They are not security agencies. So first they have to satisfy the 
mobility needs of their citizens—of course, in a secure environment. But they are 
not the security agencies and the responsibility of each one has to be defined very, 
very clearly. The public authorities are responsible for security and if there is an 
incident or attack, the public transport companies are responsible to restore traffic 
as soon as possible. They should help the authorities organize the first aid in the 
emergency situations, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or to 
investigate the terrorist threat, if we are speaking about terrorism. This is the task 
of the public authorities and the security agencies. So having a discussion on who is 
responsible for what is very important.
While coordination between the different agencies responsible for transit security is 
imperative, UITP also stresses the importance of coordination and communication with the 
press and other mass media. According to Mezghani: 
The relationship with the media and the press is very important. How they report 
on security problems and how they report on attacks, reasons of an attack, and 
consequences of an attack is very important. We have to establish confident 
relationships with the media and to communicate with them in a permanent way, 
not only when there is a problem. If you take the example of Paris, they have 
periodic meetings with the journalists to communicate about public transport, and 
not only when there is a problem. I think this is very important to make them 
better understand. Because if you only speak with them when there is a problem 
then they don’t know your system, they focus only on the problem and don’t try to 
understand what is happening and why you reacted in that way.
According to UITP, standardization would be helpful in emergency procedures, security 
audits, announcements and signs, as well as design and materials. In Europe, there are a variety 
of standards at the moment, which may create confusion to passengers. Coordination in staff 
training would also be cost-effective, since agencies would not have to develop their own 
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training programs, and which could take place in selected centralized locations and follow a 
commonly adopted procedure. This would save money and also may lead to greater security. 
As explained by Andrea Soehnchen, “If something were to happen in Paris, for example, they 
could bring staff to help from other places and this staff would automatically know his place in 
the whole system, in the information chain, in the reaction chain, and they could handle the 
equipment.” 
In summary, the message that UITP seeks to send to its members is that collaboration, 
coordination, communication, and standardization of strategies, tools, and procedures are the 
all-important attributes in the transit industry’s fight against terrorism. 
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WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED, WHERE ARE WE HEADED?
You can have the cleanest trains in the world, you can have the most luminous stations in the 
world, you can have the most comfortable stations in the world, and you can have the most 
punctual trains in the world. But if you cannot step on a train without feeling safe, you are 
not going to use that train. 
—Madrid transit official following the March 11, 2004 attack
Overview: Public Transit in a Post-9/11, Post-Madrid, Post-London World
Public transit systems around the world have for decades served as a principal venue for 
terrorist acts. While the most significant of these attacks—such as the sarin attack in Tokyo or 
the bombing of the Paris Metro—garnered worldwide public attention during the 1990s, 
popular and political response in the United States was generally muted. Perhaps this was 
because attacks on U.S. transit systems were still quite rare; perhaps this was due to 
Americans’ legendary parochialism; or perhaps it simply reflected wishful thinking. Whatever 
the reasons for this indifference among many elected officials, it was not justified.
During the mid-1990s, four separate acts of terrorism and extreme violence on U.S. transit 
and rail systems killed 14 and injured more than 1,000.143 While police and intelligence 
officials who oversee transit properties grew much more vocal in the late-1990s in calling for 
increased attention to the vulnerability of public transit systems to terrorist acts, the issue still 
had not caught the attention of most transit passengers, voters, members of the media, or 
elected officials.
This all changed, of course, on September 11, 2001. While the focus of the 9/11 attacks was 
on a different part of the transportation system, the effects on the affected public transit 
systems were dramatic and, in the case of New York, long-lasting. The vulnerability of open, 
accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts was cast in sharpest 
possible relief. Concern over the vulnerability of transit systems has been heightened further 
by the more recent, deadly March 11, 2004, attacks on commuter rail trains in Madrid, Spain, 
and the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground and bus system. The London attacks in 
particular dominated news coverage for at least a week and raised popular concern over transit 
terrorism in the United States, such that transit security in the United States is now widely 
viewed as an important public policy issue.    
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The attention and subsequent fear generated by these attacks clearly motivated policymakers 
into action. Indeed, one of the more sobering lessons from this research is that significant 
system- or industrywide changes in security planning have often required either prolonged 
exposure to lower-scale attacks (such as those perpetrated by the IRA against transit systems in 
greater London) or a mass casualty event (such as in Tokyo or Madrid). Absent such events, 
concern, even repeated, dire warnings by vigilant police and intelligence officials, have too 
often gone unheeded by many elected officials.    
Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part 
of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security in 
several ways. Perhaps most important, we employ a wide array of approaches and methods to 
examine a complicated issue: How are transit managers around the United States and around 
the world working to better protect their systems and passengers from terrorist attacks? To 
address this question we have pursued a multipronged research approach.
First, we reviewed and synthesized nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism 
and updated previous efforts to systematically chronicle previous terrorist attacks on transit 
systems around the globe.
• We complemented these detailed case studies and interviews with a comprehensive survey 
of 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States regarding prior threats and 
attacks, past and current security planning and policing efforts, and approaches to four 
security strategies—policing, technology/hardware, public education/outreach, and crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED).
• We conducted detailed interviews with federal officials here in the United States
responsible for overseeing transit security, and with transit industry representatives both 
here and abroad to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning.
• We conducted detailed case studies of terrorist attacks on transit systems in London (prior 
to July 2005), Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. These case studies 
involved reviews of documentary evidence and other written materials, in-depth interviews 
with transit officials and other key stakeholders, and physical inspections of the systems 
and sites of the attacks.
Thus, our multipronged research approach is both domestic and international, as well as 
qualitative and quantitative, all in an effort to increase the reliability of our findings on this 
complex issue.
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A second distinguishing feature of this research reflects the experience and expertise of the 
research team. We are scholars of architecture and urban design, civil and transportation 
engineering, and transportation and urban planning, and not intelligence, policing, or 
security. We have, therefore, approached this research from the perspective of the people who 
finance, design, build, operate, and use public transit systems, rather than from the 
perspective of those who police them.
For example, the role of system design in transit security has received far less attention in most 
previous research on transit security than policing or surveillance. A specific focus of this work 
is on system design. We conducted inspections of transit stations in each of the systems 
studied, and we collected detailed information on attitudes toward and applications of crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies in our survey of U.S. transit 
operators.
A third and final distinguishing feature of this research is that it updates the findings and 
conclusions of many previous studies in this fast moving and rapidly evolving literature. We 
found from our survey, for example, that security planning efforts have progressed 
significantly at U.S. transit systems since a 2002 U.S. GAO survey of transit operators was 
published in 2003.
Given this overview of our research, the next section provides a synthesis and discussion of 
twelve principal findings from the study.
Findings: A Dozen Lessons Learned
1. Public transit systems are open, dynamic, and inherently vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks; they simply cannot be closed and secured like other parts of the 
transportation system.
Public transit systems are a central part of urban life. They assemble strangers from diverse 
economic, social, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and convey them though a wide array of 
neighborhoods and districts. They are, by definition, open, dynamic systems that cannot be 
closed and regulated like the air transport system.144 Such sentiments were expressed 
repeatedly by the hundreds of people interviewed and surveyed for this research. Not 
surprisingly, most of the transit managers and security officials who responded to our survey 
viewed their transit systems as “very vulnerable” to terrorist attacks. 
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While public officials understandably call for efforts to make transit systems 100 percent safe, 
it is simply impossible to secure the thousands of bus stops, hundreds of miles of bus routes, 
many dozens of miles of rail rights-of-way, and the hundreds of stations used daily by millions 
of passengers in most large metropolitan areas. The challenge is especially daunting given a 
growing wave of suicide bombers who are willing to risk capture or death to execute an attack. 
According to an official interviewed in Madrid, “I have to say that security does not exist. 
What does exist are methods to lessen insecurity. You never know what is going to happen. I 
am telling you this because when the politicians tell you that these methods will guarantee our 
security, it is all false.” 
Said another Madrid official, “You should accept that there is an inherent vulnerability to the 
system, and if you want to run an open mass transit system you live with the vulnerabilities 
and try to tackle them through intelligence and stopping these people before they actually get 
in.”
Such sentiments raise legitimate, and perhaps troubling, questions about whether transit 
security planning efforts are perceived by transit officials as more symbolically effective (at 
creating a sense of safety among the public) than substantively effective (in reducing the 
likelihood and/or magnitude of a terrorist attack). At the very least, they reflect the daunting 
challenges to security planning for open, accessible transit systems.
2. The threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal; most attacks in the 
developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities.
While the chronology of terrorist attacks on transit systems reviewed in the second section, 
“Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of the Literature,” and in 
“Appendix A: Chronology of Terrorist Events,” documents hundreds of incidents occurring 
over many decades, the deadliest and most politically influential of these have occurred on the 
largest transit systems in the most politically and economically powerful world cities, such as 
London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris, and Tokyo. This suggests that efforts to combat 
transit terrorism should be focused on cities and transit systems where the likelihood and 
potential effects of terrorism are greatest.
This observed asymmetry of risk likely reflects both the symbolic importance of particular 
world cities, and the fact that transit use tends to be concentrated in the largest and most 
densely developed metropolitan areas. As noted in the section “Securing Transit Systems in the 
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Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators,” the ten largest U.S. transit systems 
(operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to the 
Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the rest of the transit systems carry the 
remaining 35 percent. Thirty-nine percent of all 2002 U.S. transit trips occurred in one 
metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips were carried by just one 
system, the New York MTA.145 
While the most dramatic attacks have occurred mostly on major systems in world cities, this 
does not mean, of course, that local bus service or smaller cities are safe from attack. In the 
developing world, terrorist attacks on transit are more likely to occur on buses than on trains. 
Further, as noted in the sections “Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A 
Review of the Literature,” and “Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: 
Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders,” security experts report that some terrorists have on 
occasion chosen to attack unexpected targets in order to elevate fear and anxiety among the 
general population. But while smaller U.S. cities—like Oklahoma City—are clearly not safe 
from terrorist attacks, the very small role played by public transit in these cities (where the 
mode share of trips can dip below 1 percent) suggests that they are a far less likely venue for an 
attack than larger cities where the role and visibility of public transit are proportionally much 
greater.
3. The asymmetry of transit terrorism risk is at odds with a political system of public 
finance that favors distributing funding somewhat equally across jurisdictions. 
Given the observed asymmetry of risk, how should security resources be deployed? If strategic 
transit security policies start from the premise that attacks will inevitably occur, then 
“success” is not elimination of all attacks, but preventing and/or minimizing the most 
damaging attacks—which are most likely and most deadly on the largest transit systems. 
While focusing security efforts on large transit systems in New York, Washington, D.C., and 
Los Angeles, for example, may motivate terrorists to shift their focus to smaller systems and 
smaller cities, such a shift could be viewed as evidence of success in securing the most 
symbolically significant and attractive targets.
However, there is a strong tendency in the public finance of transportation, and indeed in most 
realms of public finance, to distribute funding widely among political districts and 
jurisdictions. This helps to explain why federal per-rider subsidies tend to be far higher in 
places like Chapel Hill, North Carolina, than in places like New York City. This natural 
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tendency to spread out money evenly does not square with the asymmetry of transit systems’ 
risk of terrorist attack and may undermine the effectiveness of federal and state transit security 
policies and programs. Thus, despite New York’s domination of U.S. public transit patronage, 
it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress—comprising entirely geographically based 
representatives concerned with the distribution of resources among their competing 
jurisdictions—will see fit to devote a third or more of all federal transit security resources to 
the New York metropolitan area.
4. Transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of 
increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers.
Transit managers are in the business of attracting and conveying paying customers. They 
endeavor to provide safe, fast, and reliable service at a reasonable price, but transit systems 
worldwide have struggled in a losing, century-long battle with private vehicles for market 
share in urban travel—especially in most U.S. cities. Thus, from the perspective of transit 
system planners and managers, safety and security are important, albeit intermediate, means 
to the end goal of carrying passengers. As one transit industry official put it, “What’s 
important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible for satisfying the 
mobility needs of citizens. They are not security agencies.” 
With respect to the sometimes competing objectives of maximizing security versus 
maximizing ridership, one London interviewee noted,
Our primary function is to get loads of people to use trains. Security, I would 
suggest, is still seen as a secondary but integral function. So you won’t have the 
world’s most secure station built, but you’ll have the world’s most cost-effective 
station built with security enhancements.
Calls for increased attention to security have come in recent years from passengers, the media, 
local officials, and state and federal governments. With respect to the latter, mandates for 
regular and comprehensive security planning, more formalized safety and emergency response 
procedures, increased policing and surveillance, and so on, were criticized by many of the 
transit officials we interviewed (both domestic and internationally) as unfunded mandates that 
strain already depleted transit system budgets. Indeed, the need for increased security funding 
was the central finding of the 2003 GAO study of transit security in the United States, and 
such calls for increased funding were echoed in this research.
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According to one transit official interviewed, transit terrorism is a tremendous burden for 
agencies because they “have to be lucky all the time, while the terrorists only have to be lucky 
once.” Regarding the need for public subsidies to support security expenditures, another 
interviewee noted, “In the end public transport is a business… There comes a point at which 
the businessman will say that the security measures will cost him more than the revenues. The 
key issue for addressing risk is to get things down to ‘ALARP’ as we call it, ‘as low as 
reasonably practical.’”
In addition to concerns over the costs of security programs that many of those surveyed and 
interviewed see as tangential to the central goals of transit agencies, many of those surveyed 
and interviewed also expressed concerns over the uncertain nature of the risks and the 
uncertain effectiveness of increased security expenditures. “How,” several of those interviewed 
asked, “should systems evaluate costs and benefits in such uncertain environments?” Further, 
what techniques or approaches offer systems the most security bang for the buck? In response 
to such questions, the transit systems examined for this study have pursued an array of ways to 
prioritize expenditures on security:
• customizing security measures based on a detailed evaluation of risk for each site (Paris).
• assessing risks based on station location, sociodemographics of the region, and delinquency 
rates of surrounding population (Madrid).146 
• focusing efforts on terminal stations, the most heavily patronized stations, and stations near 
government buildings (Tokyo). 
• giving top priority to securing sites with concentrations of hazardous materials (Paris).
• conducting public surveys of riders’ perceptions and concerns to help prioritize needs 
(Madrid).
5. Given the varying roles and mandates of agencies of the central government 
(ministries, federal agencies, and so on), intelligence services, police agencies, and 
transit operators on matters of security, close coordination and cooperation are 
critical to effective transit security planning. 
Many of our interviewees spoke of the need for a multilayered and multipronged system of 
security in which various agencies play very different roles. Many transit officials with whom 
we spoke suggested that interagency cooperation is common to the industry, which bodes well 
What Have We Learned, Where Are We Headed?
Mineta Transportation Institute
188
for increased coordination with police and security agencies in the years ahead. One U.S. 
transit industry representative put it this way:
The transit industry, because it’s public, is very mutually supportive. Transit 
agencies aren’t in competition with each other. In fact, we have a long history of 
aiding one another with training programs. Even if you’ve hired a consultant to 
help you with a program, we’ve seen people really sharing that program or that 
information. One of the roles that [the American Public Transportation 
Association] plays [is that] we’re a conduit for the sharing of a lot of that 
information.
Many of those interviewed emphasized the importance of clearly defining roles and 
responsibilities among actors. Several also stressed the need for frequent and regular 
interaction among agencies to share information and agree on common strategies and tactics. 
Concluded one London interviewee,
Partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time 
to meet your counterpart in different agencies... Resilience is about coordinating 
and facilitating efforts of all the disparate, separate agencies to ensure better quality 
of performance, aiding and leading to a more effective prevention or recovery than 
might otherwise be the case.
Finally, several of the transit officials interviewed noted that the American Public Transit 
Association (APTA), the leading U.S. transit industry organization, has come to play an 
increasingly central security coordinating and information-brokering role, and, in doing so, 
has come to more closely resemble the activities of the International Union of Public Transport 
(UITP) outside of the United States.
6. An important benefit of improved coordination is standardization of emergency 
training, security audits, and disaster preparedness procedures, and the issuance of 
common guidelines about security.
While the airline industry has adopted common international security standards and 
procedures, many other modes—and in particular public transit—have not done so. For 
example, several of our European interviewees noted that while many EU member countries 
have developed highly integrated international passenger rail service, similarly integrated 
systems of rail security have been slow in coming.
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Likewise, while the many transit agencies typically operating in larger metropolitan areas have 
developed reciprocal integrated fare and passenger information protocols, efforts to integrate 
and standardize security practices and procedures among transit systems within metropolitan 
areas and between them are relatively new.
Such standardization can be particularly helpful to smaller transit operators that do not have 
the resources to independently develop security standards and procedures. For example, 
standardizing safety guidelines and signage, the structure and content of security 
announcements, and the marking of emergency exits on trains and in stations can all help 
passengers avoid confusion in times of emergency. Likewise, standardizing security training of 
personnel—drivers, supervisors, and managers—can improve coordination with police, fire, 
and intelligence officials in times of emergency. Many of the respondents from U.S. transit 
agencies surveyed for this research noted that, under the guidance of the federal government, 
standardized security plans and training programs were being integrated into already 
established emergency response training programs traditionally aimed at responding to 
personal and property crime and smaller-scale emergencies.
7. Despite significant progress in increasing coordination between transit and 
police/intelligence agencies, however, much work remains.
Despite significant and ongoing efforts to improve the coordination and cooperation between 
the many, largely independent transit agencies operating in large U.S. metropolitan areas, 
seamless integration of routes, schedules, and fares has long proven elusive. Given the widely 
divergent goals and objectives of public transit and police/intelligence agencies, the challenges 
to increased coordination and cooperation are even greater.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to improved coordination identified in this study concerns 
ambiguity and uncertainty over lines of authority and responsibility. Put simply, it is not 
always clear who is responsible for what. Said one European transit industry representative we 
interviewed,
The public authorities are responsible for security. If there is a terrorist incident or 
attack, the transit authorities are responsible to restore traffic as soon as possible. 
They [the transit agencies] should also help the public authorities to organize first 
aid and emergency response, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or 
to investigate the threat.
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Despite the many challenges, nearly everyone queried agreed that increased coordination was 
needed. Such coordination could take many forms: (1) coordination between neighboring 
transit agencies; (2) coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement officials; (3) 
information sharing with the media and the public; (4) the improved dissemination of best 
practices in security planning; (5) consistent emergency response procedures and protocols; (6) 
improved integration of different security-related technologies; and (7) increased international 
cooperation in sharing information and best practices. With regard to the latter, one official 
interviewed noted, “The threat is international and the way you need to deal with it is an 
international effort,” although several other interviewees cautioned that while international 
threats call for international collaboration, security measures should not be applied equally in 
all places; they should be customized according to local organizational/governmental 
structures, transit system size, age, and characteristics, and the specifics of local cultures and 
norms.
8. Passenger education and outreach is a challenge; informed passengers can increase 
surveillance and safety, fearful passengers may stop using public transit.
While most of the officials surveyed and interviewed agreed that public education and 
outreach had become an important part of transit security planning, respondents were in 
general more ambivalent about education and outreach than about policing, technologies, or 
crime prevention through environmental design. In particular, many cited the challenge of 
raising awareness without raising fear. One of the officials we interviewed in Madrid said that 
their goal following the March 11, 2004, attacks was to augment feelings of security and 
diminish feelings of insecurity: “The methods we chose and implemented after the March 
attack were not so much about combating terrorism; rather they were used to help riders 
recover a feeling of security.”
While our interviews suggest that passenger outreach efforts on security have been more 
common outside the United States, nearly all those to whom we spoke agreed that it is a 
delicate balance between creating a perception of excessive, pervasive security (which is both 
costly and can incite fear among passengers) and too little security (which can promote a sense 
of danger and unchecked lawlessness). Said one transit industry official, “You have to reassure 
but not scare off passengers, because if you exceed a certain level [of police activity] it might 
be considered that you are in a very insecure place.”
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Enlisting the public’s help in security surveillance can be effective, but entails risks. Excessive 
marketing of vigilance can create an environment of paranoia, where everything and everyone 
can be viewed as potential threats. Such paranoia can suppress ridership while overwhelming 
transit officials with security tips, and panicked passengers can compound damage after an 
attack.
Further, a strong emphasis on police and public surveillance can lead to social profiling, and 
with it losses of privacy and civil rights. Said one interviewee,
Here [in Spain] there would be a lot of problems and it wouldn’t be convenient to 
start screening passengers. People will not accept being identified, profiled, and 
searched, even if it is a random manner, because when you select, you elect and you 
have to do this with a certain objective and clear parameters. You will be accused of 
discrimination because this is labeling, marking people with certain physical 
features.
9. The role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is 
waxing.
Most of our survey and interview respondents were familiar with the concept of crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and most viewed CPTED—which 
considers how the physical design of spaces can affect both the likelihood and impact of 
criminal or terrorist activity—as an important longer-term strategy to address both crime and 
terrorism on transit systems. According to the respondents to our survey, CPTED was given 
much less weight in security planning prior to 9/11. Since 9/11, however, over 80 percent of 
the respondents now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very effective strategy in 
preventing terrorist attacks. This ranking of effectiveness is similar to both policing and 
security hardware and technology strategies, and well ahead of public education and outreach.
According to one of our interviewees in Madrid, “Security is based on prevention, and 
prevention begins with design. A station designed without security criteria would be much 
more insecure and expensive to protect.”
While the potential effectiveness of CPTED was widely touted by those queried, many also 
noted that design is a longer-term strategy. CPTED strategies can be cost-effectively 
incorporated into new stations and terminals, such as in the new Météor and Eole Lines in 
Paris, the new Line 11 in Madrid, and the new Bilbao subway in Spain. On the other hand, 
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most interviewees thought retrofitting old stations to be extremely costly for the most part. 
Concluded one interviewee regarding the retrofit of older stations, “The best you can do is to 
use some passive methods such as mirrors, cameras, and increased lighting.”
Even among officials interviewed who work primarily in policing and security, knowledge of 
and enthusiasm for CPTED principles was widespread. For example, one London transit police 
official said,
If you take a station like Baker Street, it’s a very dark [and listed as a historically 
significant] building so there are limitations on what can be done to change the 
appearance and structure. Not very much can be done at all. We’d like better 
lighting, more CCTV (closed-circuit television). We’d like cleaner lines—any 
vending machines that are brought in, we’d like them to have sloping tops so 
nothing can be put on top of them. We’d like them to be totally accessible or 
totally enclosed so they’re easy to search or impossible to put something in. We 
look at tamper-evident seals [on entryways to areas closed to the public], which 
can’t be physically locked. When it comes to new stations, bigger, brighter areas, 
clear sight lines, certainly those are the kinds of things that we would seek to 
influence. 
10. Since 9/11, transit agencies are more likely to adopt comprehensive, multipronged 
approaches to security planning than in years past. 
Our survey and interviews focused in detail on four types of security strategies—policing, 
technology, education and outreach, and CPTED. We found that attention to all these 
strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half of the respondents now view all four 
strategies as central or significant parts of security planning efforts.
Prior to 9/11, most of the respondents to our national survey of large transit operators 
emphasized policing and hardware/technology in security planning and placed far less stock in 
either public education or CPTED. While the survey respondents believed that the 
importance of policing and hardware/technology increased after 9/11, their assessments of the 
importance of public education and, especially, CPTED increased even more.
This broad support for all four security strategies reflects a consensus among those surveyed 
and interviewed regarding the need for a comprehensive, multipronged approach to transit 
security planning. Several interviews cautioned against becoming too reliant on just one or 
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two strategies. As one of our London interviewees noted, “Each one [strategy] on its own can’t 
work in isolation. I don’t think that one of them sits out on its own. You’ve got to do each one. 
And you’ve got to have an element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or 
crime in general.”
11. The public transit industry is vulnerable to security policies or programs that 
reduce the speed, comfort, or convenience of transit, and may benefit significantly 
from policies that increase the attractiveness of transit.
Despite significant public investments over the past three decades, public transit systems 
around the United States continue to lose market share to private vehicles. Many transit 
systems have made important strides in increasing the comfort, safety, and convenience of 
using transit, but matching the speed and flexibility of private autos remains a challenge. 
Transit security policies and programs that increase the hassle of, or delays in, riding buses and 
trains may significantly undermine an already vulnerable and distressed industry. For example, 
the random bag and parcel inspections instituted on the New York City transit system 
following the July 2005 attacks on the London public transit systems added stress and delays 
to travel on the United States’ most heavily patronized transit system—stress and delays that 
inevitably make traveling by other modes relatively more attractive.
Many of the transit system managers interviewed for this study expressed concerns than new 
security measures should enhance the perceived safety and attractiveness of their systems and 
not add to delays, inconvenience, or perceptions of heightened risk. The importance of 
creating safe, attractive systems for passengers, report some transit officials queried, is 
sometimes lost on security officials; as one interviewee from London stated prior to the July 
2005 attacks, 
It’s trying to balance providing maximum security while still providing the kind of 
service people expect. People still want to go from point A to point B as fast as 
possible. They don’t want to be delayed, even for security reasons. So that’s the 
balance...it’s still a struggle...I think that is something that in the future has to 
evolve, to where you have that perfect balance where you can say, “I think we’re 
providing as much security as we can,” but it’s also seamless to the customer so you 
don’t have an operational slowdown.
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12. Given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible 
benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a 
reduction in transit-related personal and property crimes.
Terrorist attacks on transit systems in the United States and abroad have increased in recent 
years in both frequency and severity. Likewise, public and political concern over the issue has 
skyrocketed since 9/11. The fact remains, however, that transit patrons remain far more likely 
to be victimized by personal crime than a terrorist act. 
According to Federal Transit Administration data, an average of 279 people have been killed 
on or by public transit each year over the past decade. In addition, an annual average of 18,784 
people have been injured on or by public transit over the same period. Crime ostensibly 
unrelated to transit use—such as being robbed and killed while waiting at a bus stop—would 
push those figures far higher. This means that, between September 11, 2001, and August 11, 
2005, more than 1,100 people have been killed on or by public transit, and more than 75,000 
have been injured on or by transit in the United States.147
Further, studies have repeatedly shown that fear of crime is a significant deterrent to transit 
use for many people.148 So while political attention and public resources are currently focused 
on transit terrorism, reductions of personal and property crimes on public transit systems 
could prove to be a significant collateral benefit of safer, more secure public transit systems.
In both our review of the research literature and in several of our interviews were repeated 
suggestions for a “dual-use strategy,” whereby antiterrorism measures may be effective in 
reducing transit crime. Coincident with new security measures on the Tokyo Metro, both 
robberies and thefts are down substantially. Likewise, fewer crimes were reported in the period 
following the implementation of random parcel inspections in Madrid.
Such complementary benefits, however, are not assured without careful attention to 
congruency between anticrime and antiterrorism measures. Some of those interviewed 
suggested that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts are not always reciprocal and 
complementary. “By preparing your system to react to terrorist attacks, you also prepare it to 
react to different types of crime… But the other way around is not always true” (Madrid 
transit official).
However, others argued that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts worked very much hand-in-
hand. Said one London transit security official,
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It’s easier for a terrorist to operate in an environment that is disorderly, that does 
not give the appearance that someone is in charge, the area does not look secure. 
Actually taking care of the little things, and insuring that there is order and 
maintenance, sends a signal that it’s hard to operate illegally or carry out an attack 
in this environment. There’s a deterrent effect. 
Postscript
Whether these findings are discouraging or heartening depends on one’s perspective. The 
stakes are high, the risks uncertain, and the solutions unclear. The July 2005 subway and bus 
attacks in London offer a sobering reminder that transit systems remain inherently vulnerable 
to terrorist actions, even on systems where security and vigilance have been the modus 
operandi for decades. While public transit systems are likely to remain attractive and 
vulnerable targets for terrorists, U.S. transit systems are today better coordinated, policed, 
monitored, and designed, and staff and passengers are better informed and prepared than just a 
few years ago. How effective these efforts will be (or have already been) in deterring or 
minimizing a terrorist attack is unclear. What is clear, however, is that crimes of all types—
political, personal, and property—drive riders away from transit systems. So if the recent rise 
in transit security planning deters a major terrorist attack, or simply the activities of a lone 
pickpocket, the transit industry will be better off as a result.
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ID Date Country City/Region Event Summary Device Facility
Above/
Below 
Ground
Injuries Fatalities Responsible Party Terrorist Event Description Source
1 31-Aug-04 Russia Moscow Suicide bombing kills 
10 outside Moscow 
subway
Bomb Station 
Perimeter
Above 10 Islambouli 
Brigades
A female suicide bomber set off a powerful 
homemade bomb outside a Moscow subway 
station Tuesday evening, shooting metal 
shrapnel through a crowd of commuters and 
killing at least 10 people. Suicide bomber turned 
away from the subway station after seeing police 
officers checking documents at the entrance. 
http://
www.washingtonpos
t.com/wp-dyn/
articles/A49376-
2004Aug31 
.html
2 7-Apr-04 Thailand Songkhla 
Province
Two bomb blasts on 
southern Thailand rails
Bomb Train Above 75 3 First bomb exploded in station. Killed one child 
and injured 37 others. Evidence indicates that 
the bomb was put in a suitcase and left at an 
information counter on the platform. Police 
report having found evidence of C-4 explosives. 
A third explosion (second was at a hotel) 
occurred on Saturday night at a gas plant next to 
the railway station in Songkla province. The blast 
derailed a train running from Yala to Bangkok. 
Authorities haven’t ruled out that the explosion 
might have been accidental.
http:// 
www.irrawaddy.org/
news/2001/april-
7.html
3 2-Apr-04 Spain Madrid Guard finds bomb on 
high-speed train line 
tracks
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb-disposal experts alerted by a railway 
employee found 22-24 pounds of dynamite 
under the rail line about 40 miles south of 
Madrid on the rail line running to Seville. 
Explosives were connected to a detonator with a 
430-foot cable.
http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/04/03/
world/main610143 
.shtml
4 12-Mar-04 Greece Serres Greek train bomb plot 
thwarted: Five 
propane rail cars 
crossing Bulgarian 
border were rigged to 
explode
Sabotage Train Above 0 0 Bulgarian 
Mafia
Five train cars due to transport propane were 
rigged with a large quantity of explosives. Train 
was traveling from Bulgaria to Thessalonica.
http://
www.freerepublic.co
m/focus/f-news/
1096423/posts
5 11-Mar-04 Spain Madrid Simultaneous 
explosions kill 191, 
injure 1,800
Train Above 1,800 191 Ten near-simultaneous explosions during rush 
hour on 4 separate trains. Backpack bombs
Various
6 6-Feb-04 Russia Moscow Suicide bomber blows 
up a subway car in the 
Moscow metro during 
rush hour
Bomb Train Below 100 41 Chechen 
rebels
Russia, Moscow: a suicide bomber blew himself 
up on a Green Line Subway train during morning 
rush hour. The bomb equivalent in force to 9-11 
pounds of TNT, made of ammonia saltpeter and 
aluminum powder, exploded in a tunnel 
between Avtozavodskaya station and 
Paveletskaya station; 41 people died, and more 
than 100 were injured.
http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/02/06/
world/main598471 
.shtml
7 5-Feb-04 Russia Moscow A bomb blast in 
Moscow’s 
Byelorusskaya subway 
station injures 15 
people
Bomb Station Below 15 0 A bomb blast in Moscow’s Byelorusskaya 
subway station injures 15 people. The bomb was 
probably meant to explode after a train arrived 
on the platform to cause more casualties.
http:// 
www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/
europe/02/06/
russia.explosion/
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8 24-Dec-03 Spain Madrid Police thwart Basque 
plot for Christmas Eve 
train bombing 
Bomb Train Above 0 0 ETA Police foiled a plot to detonate two powerful 
bombs aboard a train headed to busy Madrid 
railway station on Christmas Eve. One of the 
two 25-kilo (55-pound) bombs was found on 
Wednesday on the train traveling from the 
Basque city San Sebastian to Madrid, but police 
stopped the train in the northern city of Burgos, 
evacuated it and removed the bomb. One of the 
two detainees was found carrying a similar bomb 
before it could be planted on the train. Both 
bombs were hidden in suitcases or knapsacks. 
The one found on the train was timed to go off 
just before 4 p.m. (1500 GMT) at Madrid’s 
Chamartin Station. 
http:// 
www.aljazeerah.info/
News%20archives/
2003%20News%20
archives/December/
24%20n/Police% 
20thwart%20Basqu
e%20plot%20for%
20Christmas%20Ev
e%20train%20bom
bing.htm
9 5-Dec-03 Russia Southern 
Russia
Suicide bombing of a 
commuter train in 
southern Russia.
Bomb Train Above 150 44 Chechen 
rebels
The 10-kg bomb detonated as the train was 
pulling into Yessen-tuki Station, on a line that 
had been bombed just three months ago. 
Surviving passengers said a woman detonated 
the bomb (suicide), thought to have been in a 
bag packed with bolts and other metal objects. 
http:// 
www.channel4.com/
news/2003/12/
week_1/
05_russia.html
1
0
27-Sep-03 Ethiopia Adiquala A bomb kills two and 
injures nine on a 
passenger train 
traveling from Djibouti 
to Ethiopia
Bomb Train Above 9 2 The bomb exploded under a seat when the train 
was near the town of Adiquala, about 190 
kilometers (115 miles) from the border with 
Djibouti.
http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/africa/
3144190.stm
1
1
8-Jul-02 Thailand Yala Province Two injured in 
southern Thai train 
bomb explosion
Bomb Train Above 2 0 The two injured--a railway policeman and a 
security officer--were inspecting the train after it 
had reached the final stop. They found a box left 
in the last car and were trying to examine it 
when it blew up, the railway officials said.
http://
www.nationmultim
edia.com/
page.arcview. 
php3?clid=2&id=6
2373&usrsess=1
1
2
14-Mar-03 India Bombay Eleven people were 
killed in a bomb 
explosion on a 
commuter train. 
Bomb Train (in 
station)
Above 50 11 Blast hit carriage reserved for women 
passengers. The explosion happened in the busy 
Mulund Station during the evening rush hour. 
http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/south_asia/
2848123.stm
1
3
10-Aug-01 Angola Land mine attack by 
rebels on a passenger 
train kills 100, injures 
150
Landmine Train Above 152 146 UNITA 
(National 
Union for Total 
Independence 
of Angola)
Train was carrying civilian passengers when it 
was derailed by a landmine and then attacked by 
UNITA rebels. Train was 150 km southeast of the 
capital Luanda as the train headed for the town 
of Dondo.
http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/africa/
1489317.stm
1
4
30-Dec-00 Philippines Manila Bomb kills nine on 
metro
Bomb Station 60 9 Abu Sayyaf Bomb on light rail train explodes as it enters 
Blumentritt Station
Jenkins
1
5
16-Dec-00 Russia Moscow Bomb threat against 
Moscow metro
Threat Station Below 0 0 Bomb threat forces closing of Dmitrovskaya 
Station
Jenkins
1
6
26-Oct-00 India Punjab Bomb on passenger 
train kills one
Bomb Train Above 30 1 Bomb explodes on train Jenkins
1
7
20-Oct-00 United 
States 
Bomb threat halts 
Amtrak train
Threat Train Above 0 0 Bomb threat forces the evacuation of an Amtrak 
train
Jenkins
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1
8
17-Oct-00 United 
Kingdom 
Train accident raises 
terrorism concerns
Sabotage Line Above 35 4 High-speed train derails Jenkins
1
9
14-Aug-00 India Uttar Pradesh Bomb on train kills 10 Bomb Train Above 36 10 Kashmiri 
Extremists
Bomb explodes on express train Jenkins
2
0
10-Aug-00 Russia Moscow Explosives found in 
Moscow railway 
station
Bomb Station 0 0 Explosives found in Kazansky Station lost 
luggage office
Jenkins
2
1
8-Aug-00 Russia Bomb kills eight in 
underground passage
Bomb Below 8 Chechens Bomb explodes in underground passage Jenkins
2
2
31-Jul-00 India Assam Bomb on passenger 
train kills 12
Bomb Train Above 12 ULFA 
(Liberation 
Front of 
Assam)
Bomb explodes on passenger train Jenkins
2
3
27-Jul-00 Germany Düsseldorf Bomb explodes at 
entrance to Düsseldorf 
Underground
Bomb Station Below 9 0 Bomb explodes in underground station Jenkins
2
4
24-Jul-00 Ukraine Passenger train 
derailed
Sabotage Line Above 40 0 Damaged track causes derailment Jenkins
2
5
20-Jul-00 Russia Moscow Terrorist plots failed Bomb Station 0 0 Chechens Bomb plot for Kursky and Volgograd stations 
foiled
Jenkins
2
6
19-Jul-00 United 
Kingdom 
London Bomb threats disrupt 
Underground
Threat Station Below 0 0 IRA Bomb found and detonated in an Underground 
station
Jenkins
2
7
16-Jul-00 Pakistan Hyderabad Bomb on train kills 
nine
Bomb Train Above 35 9 Bomb explodes on train just outside of 
Hyderabad
Jenkins
2
8
30-Jun-00 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin Rail line linking Belfast 
and Dublin bombed
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bombing of tracks Jenkins
2
9
23-Jun-00 Latvia Riga Group threatens a war 
of the rails
Bomb Line Above Fighters of 
Democratic 
Latvia
Bomb damages tracks Jenkins
3
0
13-Jun-00 United 
Kingdom 
Coventry Vandals attack 
commuter train
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Equipment placed on track in an attempt to 
derail train
Jenkins
3
1
12-Jun-00 United 
Kingdom 
Daventry Vandals attempt to 
derail high-speed train
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Equipment placed on track in an attempt to 
derail train
Jenkins
3
2
7-Jun-00 Philippines Manila Bomb found on 
Manila Metro
Bomb Below 0 0 Bomb found and detonated in Manila metro Jenkins
3
3
3-May-00 Russia St. Petersburg Bomb threats delay 
trains in St. Petersburg
Threat 0 0 Bomb threat delays several trains Jenkins
3
4
18-Apr-00 Belgium Three boys cause 
trains to derail, killing 
one
Sabotage Line Above 22 1 Train derailed Jenkins
3
5
28-Mar-00 Brazil Sao Paulo Angry commuters set 
fire to train
Fire Train Above 0 0 Commuter set fire to train after it broke down Jenkins
3
6
21-Mar-00 India Bombay Bomb injures four on 
commuter train
Bomb Train Above 4 0 Bomb exploded on local commuter train Jenkins
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3
7
6-Feb-00 Pakistan Hyderabad Bomb on train kills five Bomb Train 44 5 Bomb explodes on passenger train after it left 
Hyderabad Station.
Jenkins
3
8
26-Jan-00 India Bombay Explosive device 
found on Mumbai 
train
Bomb Train 1 0 Small bomb in a clock found on a train exploded Jenkins
3
9
19-Jan-00 India Assam Bomb derails train Bomb Line Above ULFA 
(Liberation 
Front of 
Assam)
Bomb explodes on track causing derailment of 
freight train
Jenkins
4
0
6-Jan-00 India Old Delhi Bomb injures 12 at rail 
station
Bomb Station 12 0 A bomb in a suitcase was placed under a seat in 
the railway station and exploded.
Jenkins
4
1
27-Dec-99 Japan Tokyo Bomb explodes at 
train station
Bomb Station 1 0 Bomb explodes in locker at Urawa train station Jenkins
4
2
26-Dec-99 Japan Narita Fires on three trains to 
Narita
Fire Train 0 0 Arsonists set fire to express trains Jenkins
4
3
24-Dec-99 Japan Osaka Bomb found in trash 
bag on bullet train
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb found in trash bag of train Jenkins
4
4
1-Dec-99 Pakistan Hyderabad Fifteen-pound bomb 
found on main track
Bomb Station 0 0 Bomb found at Kotori railway station and 
defused
Jenkins
4
5
11-Nov-99 India Jammu-
Kashmir
Thirteen killed in 
bomb explosion on 
train
Bomb Train Above 50 13 Bomb explodes on express train Jenkins
4
6
4-Nov-99 Pakistan Muridke Bombs kill one Bomb Station Above 3 1 Bomb explodes near a railway station Jenkins
4
7
20-Oct-99 Brazil Sao Paulo Bomb explodes on 
commuter train in Sao 
Paulo
Bomb Train 7 0  Bomb explodes on a commuter train Jenkins
4
8
17-Aug-99 Russia North 
Caucasus
Attempted bombing 
of passenger train
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Man stopped while boarding a train with a 
bomb
Jenkins
4
9
16-Aug-99 India Calcutta Explosives found at 
railway station
Bomb Station 0 0 Explosive found in rail station Jenkins
5
0
9-Aug-99 India Bomb derails train in 
northeast
Bomb Train Above 5 0 Bomb caused freight train derailment Jenkins
5
1
7-Aug-99 India Bomb damages bridge 
just ahead of 
passenger train
Bomb Bridge Above 0 0 ULFA 
(Liberation 
Front of 
Assam)
Bomb destroys bridge Jenkins
5
2
6-Jul-99 Australia Sydney Bomb explodes at 
commuter railway 
station
Bomb Station 3 0 Bomb explodes in station Jenkins
5
3
17-Mar-99 Sri Lanka Colombo Bomb found on rail 
line
Bomb Line Above 0 0 LTTE (Tamil 
Tigers)
Bomb found on tracks and disarmed Jenkins
5
4
19-Dec-98 Germany Three rail sabotage 
incidents
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Friends of the 
Railways
Tracks tampered with Jenkins
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5
5
18-Dec-98 Germany Three rail sabotage 
incidents
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Friends of the 
Railways
Tracks tampered with Jenkins
5
6
10-Nov-98 Mexico Chihuahua Gunmen attack train, 
killing one
Gun Train Above 3 1 Gunmen attack passenger train Jenkins
5
7
10-Nov-98 Colombia Guerrillas dynamite 
railroad track
Bomb Line Above 0 0 FARC 
(Revolutionary 
Armed Forces 
of Columbia)
Tracks bombed Jenkins
5
8
28-Sep-98 Congo Brazzaville Several killed at rail 
station
Station Attack occurred at Goma Tsese Station, killing 
several
Jenkins
5
9
19-Sep-98 Russia Moscow Bomb threat at St. 
Petersburg railway 
station
Threat Station Below 0 0 Bomb threat forces evacuation of Moskovsky 
Station
Jenkins
6
0
28-Jul-98 Bosnia Sarajevo Bomb explodes on 
Sarajevo trolley
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb explodes on trolley Jenkins
6
1
27-Jul-98 Germany Bomb threats disrupt 
Deutsche Bahn service
Threat Station 0 0 Bomb threats force evacuation of several 
stations
Jenkins
6
2
25-Jun-98 India Train derailed in 
Kashmir
Bomb Line Above 23 0 Kashmiri 
Extremists
Bomb explodes on rail line causing passenger 
train to derail
Jenkins
6
3
24-Jun-98 India Assam separatists 
detonate bomb in 
railway station
Bomb Station 80 9 ULFA 
(Liberation 
Front of 
Assam)
Jenkins
6
4
1-May-98 Japan Unidentified saboteurs 
strike high-speed 
bullet train tracks
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Kakumaruha Saboteurs removed bolts from high-speed rail 
track, but it was discovered before train passed
Jenkins
6
5
19-Mar-98 Russia Moscow Poison gas attack 
threatened
Threat Below 0 0 Aum Shinrikyo Man threatened to release gas on Moscow 
metro
Jenkins
6
6
10-Mar-98 Pakistan Lahore Bomb on commuter 
train kills eight
Bomb Train Above 34 8 Bomb explodes on a commuter train Jenkins
6
7
8-Mar-98 Pakistan Punjab Bomb in Punjab kills 
seven
Bomb Train Above 35 7 Bomb explodes on express train Jenkins
6
8
3-Mar-98 Germany Antinuclear activists 
sabotage railway 
cables
Sabotage Infra-
structure
Above 0 0 antinuclear 
activists
Power lines downed serving the track Jenkins
6
9
23-Feb-98 Algeria Algiers Bomb kills 18 on 
commuter train
Bomb Train Above 25 18 Bomb exploded on a commuter train Jenkins
7
0
15-Jan-98 Belgium Antwerp Bomb injures five near 
central train station
Bomb Station 5 0 Bomb explodes at a café near the central train 
station
Jenkins
7
1
12-Jan-98 Russia Moscow Gunmen open fire on 
tram
Gun Train Above 3 1 Man opened fire on a crowded tram Jenkins
7
2
1-Jan-98 Russia Moscow Bomb injures three in 
subway station
Bomb Station Below 3 0 Bomb explodes in Tretyakovskaya Metro Station Jenkins
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7
3
30-Dec-97 Turkey Bomb on commuter 
train injures six
Bomb Station 6 0 Bomb explodes under a seat in Bakirkoy Station Jenkins
7
4
6-Dec-97 India Tamil Nadu Three bombs on trains 
kill 11
Bomb Train Above 54 11 Islamic 
Defense Force
Three bombs explode on separate passenger 
trains
Jenkins
7
5
14-Nov-97 Tajkistan Dushanbe Bomb destroys 
railroad tracks on 
bridge
Bomb Bridge Above 0 0 Bomb explodes on bridge Jenkins
7
6
1-Oct-97 India Three bombs on train Bomb Train Above 2 30 Kashmiri 
Extremists
Three bombs explode on New Delhi to Amristar 
train
Jenkins
7
7
28-Sep-97 Georgia Zugdidi Bomb explodes on 
passenger train
Bomb Train 1 0 Bomb explodes on train Jenkins
7
8
20-Sep-97 Germany Antinuclear protestors 
sabotage railway
Fire Line Above 0 0 antinuclear 
activists
Demonstrators set fire to railway Jenkins
7
9
9-Sep-97 Venezuela Caracas Explosive device in 
Caracas subway 
station
Bomb Station Below 0 0 Small bomb found in subway and deactivated Jenkins
8
0
9-Sep-97 Russia Moscow Bomb threat on 
Moscow Metro
Threat Station Below 0 0 Inactive grenade found in Komsomolskaya 
Metro after a bomb threat
Jenkins
8
1
7-Sep-97 India Jammu-
Kashmir
Passenger train 
damaged by bomb
Bomb Line Above 5 0 Kashmiri 
Extremists
Remote control bomb explodes on track as 
passenger train passes
Jenkins
8
2
21-Aug-97 Czech 
Republic 
Prague Bomb threat to 
Prague metro
Threat Below 0 0 Bomb threat halted service for hours on metro 
line
Jenkins
8
3
4-Aug-97 India Bangalore Bomb explodes in 
passenger train
Bomb Train Above 15 0 Explosion on train Jenkins
8
4
4-Aug-97 India New Delhi Train sabotage injures 
ten
Sabotage Train Above 10 0 Train derailed Jenkins
8
5
8-Jul-97 India Punjab Bomb on train kills 36 Bomb Train Above 70 36 Sikh 
separatists
Bomb planted under the floor of a passenger 
train
Jenkins
8
6
1-Jul-97 Hungary Kelei Firebomb thrown at 
railway station in 
Budapest
Fire Station 0 0 Firebomb thrown at station, setting fire to a shop Jenkins
8
7
26-Jun-97 Algeria al-Harrach Bomb explodes on a 
train
Bomb Train Above 40 0 Bomb in coach explodes Jenkins
8
8
11-Jun-97 India Raya Morh Bomb explodes on 
train track in Jammu-
Kashmir
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bomb on tracks damages cargo train Jenkins
8
9
4-Jun-97 India Hyderabad Naxalites damage 
railway in Andrah 
Pradesh
Sabotage Line 0 0 Naxalites Sabotage of train and station Jenkins
9
0
21-May-97 Thailand Narathiwat Bomb destroys train 
track in Narathiwat 
province
Bomb Bridge Above 0 0 Bomb destroys part of track on bridge Jenkins
9
1
21-Apr-97 United 
Kingdom 
London Bomb threats strand 
commuters
Threat Station Below 0 0 IRA Bomb threats at several stations cause 
evacuations.
Jenkins
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9
2
18-Apr-97 United 
Kingdom 
Leeds Two explosions and 
bomb threats cause 
rush hour havoc
Bomb Station 0 0 IRA Bombs at Leeds and Doncaster stations Jenkins
9
3
8-Apr-97 Spain Alsasua Disturbances in 
Basque region, attack 
on train
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Firebombs thrown at passing train Jenkins
9
4
25-Mar-97 Turkey Istanbul Twelve-pound bomb 
rendered safe in 
subway
Bomb Station Below 0 0 Bomb found and rendered safe in Aksaray 
Station
Jenkins
9
5
14-Mar-97 India Jalandhar Bomb in Punjab 
injures at least six
Bomb Train 10 7 Bomb explodes in train after it left New Delhi 
station
Jenkins
9
6
25-Feb-97 Germany Saboteurs attack train 
lines
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 antinuclear 
activists
Power lines downed serving the track Jenkins
9
7
14-Feb-97 Germany Rails sabotaged Sabotage Line Above 0 0 antinuclear 
activists
Power lines downed serving the track Jenkins
9
8
21-Jan-97 Turkey Istanbul Bomb in Istanbul 
rendered safe
Bomb Station 0 0 Bomb found by a bank cash machine in Sirkeci 
Station
Jenkins
9
9
17-Jan-97 Russia Moscow Bomb threat in two 
train stations
Threat Station 0 0 Threats closed Kazansky and Kursky stations Jenkins
1
0
0
17-Jan-97 Germany Pylon damages train 
in extortion attempt
Sabotage Infra-
structure
Above 0 0 A pylon was sabotaged and fell onto an empty 
train
Jenkins
1
0
1
16-Jan-97 Russia Dagestan Chechen rebels attack 
train
Train Above 1 Chechens Rebels attacked a passenger train Jenkins
1
0
2
2-Jan-97 India Goreswar Bomb on railroad 
bridge in Assam state
Bomb Bridge Above 0 0 Bodo militants Bomb destroys bridge Jenkins
1
0
3
31-Dec-96 India Assam Bomb on passenger 
train kills at least 50 
people; bombed 
bridge may be linked
Bomb Train Above 160 Bodo militants Bomb explodes on train Jenkins
1
0
4
23-Dec-96 France Marseilles Bomb rendered safe in 
Marseilles
Bomb Station 0 0 Bomb left in a plastic bag in front of a post office 
near St. Charles train station
Jenkins
1
0
5
5-Dec-96 India Jammu-
Kashmir
Bombs rendered safe 
along train track in 
Jammu-Kashmir
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bomb disabled on track Jenkins
1
0
6
4-Dec-96 France Paris Bomb at Paris RER 
station kills two 
people, injures 83 
Bomb Station Below 83 2 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
A propane canister packed with projectiles 
exploded in a rail car as it pulled into Port Royal 
RER station.
Jenkins
1
0
7
2-Dec-96 India Jammu-
Kashmir
Twelve killed, 37 
injured on train blast 
in Punjab
Bomb Train Above 37 12 Bomb explodes in sleeper car Jenkins
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1
0
8
19-Nov-96 Japan Tokyo Gas attack on Tokyo 
train
Chemical Train 0 0 Teenagers sprayed an unknown gas on a 
commuter line, causing irritation to and 
suspending service.
Jenkins
1
0
9
4-Nov-96 Pakistan Punjab Explosion on 
passenger train kills 
five people
Bomb Train Above 20 5 Bomb in toilet compartment exploded Jenkins
1
1
0
31-Oct-96 Australia Sydney Bomb in toilet of 
Sydney subway 
station
Bomb Station Below 0 0 Bomb explodes in the men’s toilet of St. James 
Cityrail subway station. Officials closed all toilets
Jenkins
1
1
1
28-Oct-96 Algeria Baba Ali Train bombing kills 
eight and injures at 
least 30
Bomb Line Above 30 8 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb under tracks explodes as passenger train 
passed
Jenkins
1
1
2
24-Oct-96 Germany Railways sabotaged Sabotage Infra-
structure
Above 1 0 antinuclear 
activists
Power lines downed serving the track Jenkins
1
1
3
14-Oct-96 Hong Kong Anonymous threat of 
gas attack on Hong 
Kong subway
Threat Below 0 0 Aum Shinrikyo Threat to gas subway network Jenkins
1
1
4
30-Sep-96 United 
Kingdom 
IRA had planned 
Chunnel blackout
Threat Infra-
structure
Below 0 0 IRA Plan foiled to blow up electricity to the Channel 
Tunnel
Jenkins
1
1
5
14-Aug-96 South Africa Bombing at Pretoria’s 
Properitas railway 
station
Bomb Station 0 0 Bombing at Pretoria’s Properitas railway station Jenkins
1
1
6
13-Aug-96 Russia Trubnaa Bomb on Volgograd-
Astrakhan train
Bomb Train 9 0 Bomb explodes in train stopped at Trubnaya 
Station
Jenkins
1
1
7
12-Aug-96 Algeria Naciria Train derailed by 
Muslim militants
Bomb Line Above 0 0 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb on track causes derailment Jenkins
1
1
8
6-Aug-96 Russia Astrakhan Bomb found on train Bomb Train 0 0 Two bombs were found on trains Jenkins
1
1
9
25-Jul-96 Sri Lanka Colombo At least 70 killed, 200 
injured in train blast
Bomb Train Above 200 70 Tamil Exiles Bombs explode in two separate train 
compartments
Jenkins
1
2
0
21-Jun-96 Ethiopia Dire Dawa Train bomb kills one, 
injures five
Bomb Train Above 5 1 Bomb explodes on train Jenkins
1
2
1
12-Jun-96 Russia Moscow Subway bomb blast 
kills four, injures 12
Bomb Train Below 12 4 Bomb attached to the bottom of a seat explodes 
in a subway car near Tulskaya Station
Jenkins
1
2
2
23-May-96 Myanmar Yangon Nine killed in train 
attack
Bomb Train Above 7 9 KNU (Karen 
National 
Union)
Bomb explodes under train Jenkins
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1
2
3
30-Apr-96 Germany High-speed train link 
closed after bomb 
threat
Threat Line Above 0 0 antinuclear 
activists
A fake bomb was found after a bomb threat Jenkins
1
2
4
15-Apr-96 Greece Salonika Bomb explodes in 
empty train car
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb on empty train Jenkins
1
2
5
28-Mar-96 South Africa Umlazi Three killed, five 
wounded when 
gunmen fire on train
Gun Train Above 5 3 Gunmen open fire on train Jenkins
1
2
6
13-Mar-96 Algeria Oran GIA train bombing 
kills 12
Bomb Line Above 20 12 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb explodes on tracks under a train Jenkins
1
2
7
22-Feb-96 Greece Thessoloniki Bomb destroys train Bomb Station Above 0 0 Bomb explodes in a train at the rail station Jenkins
1
2
8
12-Feb-96 United 
Kingdom 
Docklands IRA bomb blast kills 
two, injures 100 in 
London
Bomb Bridge Above 100 2 IRA Bomb explodes under a bridge Jenkins
1
2
9
26-Jan-96 Egypt Asyut One person wounded 
in train attack
Gun Train Above 1 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen open fire on train Jenkins
1
3
0
30-Nov-95 Egypt Another attack on 
tourist train
Gun Train Above 0 0 al-Gamya 
al-Islamiya
Gunmen open fire on train Jenkins
1
3
1
27-Nov-95 United 
States 
New York City Subway token booth 
set on fire, clerk 
seriously injured
Fire Station Below 1 0 Attackers sprayed flammable liquid in token 
booth and ignited
Jenkins
1
3
2
18-Nov-95 Egypt al-Gama’a members 
fire on tourist train
Gun Train Above 1 1 al-Gamya 
al-Islamiya
Gunmen open fire on train Jenkins
1
3
3
9-Nov-95 Egypt Farshut Islamic extremists fire 
on train
Gun Train Above 2 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen open fire on train Jenkins
1
3
4
17-Oct-95 France Paris GIA bomb blast in 
central Paris, 24 hurt
Bomb Line Below 24 0 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb explodes on subway line in the tunnel 
between Musée d’Orsay and St. Michel stations
Jenkins
1
3
5
10-Oct-95 United 
States 
Arizona Terrorist sabotage 
possible in Amtrak 
derailment
Sabotage Line Above 65 1 Sons of the 
Gestapo
Tracks were sabotaged, causing a derailment of 
the Amtrak line
Jenkins
1
3
6
9-Oct-95 France Paris Two GIA bomb 
attacks over the 
weekend
Bomb Station Above 13 0 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb found and detonated outside of the 
Maison Blanche metro station
Jenkins
1
3
7
28-Sep-95 Algeria Algiers Railway bomb kill five, 
injures 11
Bomb Train Above 11 5 Bomb explodes under a locomotive Jenkins
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1
3
8
26-Aug-95 France Lyon Unexploded bomb 
found on train
Bomb Train GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb found on railway line Jenkins
1
3
9
18-Aug-95 France Paris Bombing near Arc de 
Triomphe injures 17
Bomb Station Above 17 0 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
Bomb explodes in trash can outside the Charles 
de Gaulle Metro station
Jenkins
1
4
0
14-Aug-95 Switzerland Bern Arsonists hit French 
TGV train
Fire Train Above 0 0 Arsonists firebomb and empty train Jenkins
1
4
1
27-Jul-95 France Paris Bombing on Paris 
commuter rail line kills 
8
Bomb Train Below 80 8 GIA (Armed 
Islamic Group)
A propane canister packed with projectiles 
exploded in a rail car as it pulled into St. Michel 
Station.
Jenkins
1
4
2
12-Jul-95 South Africa Two killed in train 
station explosion
Bomb Station Above 2 A mine explodes in a train station Jenkins
1
4
3
5-Jul-95 Japan Tokyo Cyanide devices found 
in subway
Chemical Station Below 0 0 Aum Shinrikyo Two chemical release devices were found in the 
subway system, one in the Kayabacho Station 
women’s toilet and one in the men’s toilet of 
Shinjuku Station. Devices designed to release 
cyanide gas.
Jenkins
1
4
4
27-Jun-95 Cambodia Khmer Rouge blow up 
northwest rail link
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Khmer Rouge Guerrillas destroyed rail link Jenkins
1
4
5
7-Jun-95 Chile Santiago Groups threaten sarin 
attack
Threat Below 0 0 Threats of sarin release in the subway system of 
Santiago
Jenkins
1
4
6
5-May-95 Japan Tokyo Another attempted 
poison gas attack on 
subway
Chemical Station Below 0 0 Aum Shinrikyo Chemicals to make hydrogen cyanide were left 
in the men’s toilet of Shinjuku Station. It was 
found before the chemicals could mix and 
spread through the ventilation system
Jenkins
1
4
7
19-Apr-95 Japan Yokohama Mystery gas detected 
in Yokohama
Chemical Station Below 200 0 Strange gas found in Yokohama Station, causing 
eye and throat irritation
Jenkins
1
4
8
18-Apr-95 Sweden Stockholm Bomb found on 
Stockholm subway
Bomb Station Below 0 0 Crude bomb found in Hotorget subway station Jenkins
1
4
9
20-Mar-95 Japan Tokyo Sarin nerve gas in 
Tokyo subway
Chemical Train Below 5000 12 Aum Shinrikyo Five subway lines were contaminated by sarin 
gas. Gas spread throughout system as trains 
continued to run after the incident was detected. 
Jenkins
1
5
0
27-Feb-95 India Assam Bomb on train kills 27 Bomb Train Above 30 27 National 
Socialist 
Council of 
Nagaland
Two bombs exploded in a passenger train Jenkins
1
5
1
12-Jan-95 Egypt Gunmen open fire on 
train
Gun Train Above 6 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen fire on train Jenkins
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1
5
2
21-Dec-94 United 
States 
New York City Bomb explodes on 
subway
Bomb Train Below 48 0 Bomb explodes in subway car Jenkins
1
5
3
15-Dec-94 United 
States 
New York City Bomb explodes on 
subway
Bomb Train Below 2 0 Bomb explodes in subway car Jenkins
1
5
4
8-Nov-94 Lithuania Explosion demolishes 
bridge
Bomb Bridge Above 0 0 Bridge bombed Jenkins
1
5
5
31-Oct-94 Cambodia Battambang Six die, 15 hurt in 
bomb attack on train
Bomb Train Above 15 6 Khmer Rouge Bomb hidden in a vegetable basket explodes on 
a train
Jenkins
1
5
6
10-Oct-94 Cambodia Battambang Khmer Rouge 
sabotage key railway 
line
Sabotage Bridge Above 0 0 Khmer Rouge Guerrillas bomb bridges Jenkins
1
5
7
28-Sep-94 Egypt Malawi Gunmen attack tourist 
train
Gun Train Above 2 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen fire on train Jenkins
1
5
8
13-Sep-94 Ireland Dublin UVF bombs Belfast-
Dublin train
Bomb Train 2 0 UVF (Ulster 
Volunteer 
Force)
Small bomb explodes under seat as train arrives 
in Dublin
Jenkins
1
5
9
6-Sep-94 India Allahabad Bombs found on 
express train in Uttar 
Pradesh
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Five unexploded bombs found in the bathrooms 
of a train
Jenkins
1
6
0
28-Jul-94 Cambodia Kampong 
Trach
One hundred held 
after Khmer Rouge 
ambush train
Hijack Train Above 9 Khmer Rouge Guerrillas attack train and take passengers 
hostage
Jenkins
1
6
1
26-Jul-94 Israel Tel Aviv Bomb found on train Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb found on train Jenkins
1
6
2
6-Jun-94 United 
Kingdom 
Kent Bomb discovered at a 
railway station
Bomb Station 0 0 IRA Bomb safely detonated in Kent Station Jenkins
1
6
3
6-Jun-94 India Rajnandgaon Bomb on train kills 
two
Bomb Train Above 25 2 Naxalites Bomb explodes on train as it leaves Rajnandgaon 
Station
Jenkins
1
6
4
23-May-94 Egypt Manfalout Gunmen fire on tourist 
train
Gun Train Above 1 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen fire on train Jenkins
1
6
5
3-May-94 Venezuela Caracas Bomb on Caracas 
Metro wounds five
Bomb Station Below 5 0 Urban 
Commando 
Union of the 
Popular 
Resistance 
Front
Leaflet scattering bomb explodes in metro train 
as it stopped at Parque del Este Station
Jenkins
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1
6
6
25-Apr-94 Thailand Nakhon Sri 
Thammarat
Bomb kills three at 
southern railway 
station
Bomb Station 22 3 Grenade explodes at a station restaurant after a 
man left a parcel
Jenkins
1
6
7
18-Apr-94 Egypt Abu Tig Gunmen fire on train 
near Asyut
Gun Train Above 0 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen fire on train Jenkins
1
6
8
14-Apr-94 Russia Dagestan Train blast kills four in 
south
Bomb Station Above 4 Bomb explodes in train at Dagestanskiye Ogni 
Station
Jenkins
1
6
9
30-Mar-94 Thailand Sungai Kolo Train derails after 
explosion
Bomb Line Above Bomb explodes under track causing derailment Jenkins
1
7
0
21-Mar-94 Algeria Boumerdes Gunmen hold up train 
in tunnel
Hijack Train Below 0 0 Train hijacked in a tunnel and set on fire Jenkins
1
7
1
19-Mar-94 Azerbaijan Subway bombed Bomb Train Below Bomb exploded under the seat of the first car in 
a subway train
Jenkins
1
7
2
15-Mar-94 United 
Kingdom 
Kent IRA bomb found near 
rail line
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bomb found near rail line Jenkins
1
7
3
8-Mar-94 Thailand Hat Yai Bomb damages train 
in south
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb explodes on tracks under a train Jenkins
1
7
4
7-Mar-94 Egypt Sanabu Trains attacked in 
Upper Egypt
Gun Train Above 12 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Train fired upon Jenkins
1
7
5
24-Feb-94 Egypt Asyut Bomb on train 
wounds six tourists 
and five Egyptians
Bomb Train Above 11 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Bomb in luggage rack explodes as train left 
station
Jenkins
1
7
6
23-Feb-94 Cambodia Pursat Khmer Rouge attacks 
train
Train Above 8 3 Khmer Rouge Guerrillas attack train Jenkins
1
7
7
22-Feb-94 Egypt Asyut Militants attack luxury 
train
Gun Train Above 4 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Gunmen fire on train Jenkins
1
7
8
14-Feb-94 Turkey Istanbul Bomb in Istanbul train 
station
Bomb Station Above 26 5 PKK (Kurdish 
Workers Party)
A bomb exploded in a trash can in a suburban 
train station
Jenkins
1
7
9
24-Jan-94 India Hardwar Six injured in Uttar 
Pradesh train blasts
Bomb Train Above 6 0 Bomb explodes on express train Jenkins
1
8
0
20-Dec-93 Italy Florence Small bomb explodes 
on railway
Bomb Station 1 0 Bomb explodes at station Jenkins
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1
8
1
14-Dec-93 United 
Kingdom 
Woking Blast disrupts rail 
traffic
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bomb explodes on tracks Jenkins
1
8
2
6-Dec-93 India Hyderabad Train blast kills one, 
injures 22
Bomb Train 22 1 Bomb explodes on express train Jenkins
1
8
3
29-Oct-93 India Bombay Fifteen injured in 
Bombay train blast
Bomb Station 15 0 Bomb explodes on train when it arrived to 
Matunga Station
Jenkins
1
8
4
13-Oct-93 Thailand Khok Pho Homemade bomb on 
railway track
Bomb Line Above 0 0 PULO (Patani 
United 
Liberation 
Organization)
Bomb found under railroad tracks Jenkins
1
8
5
8-Oct-93 Germany Saarbruecken Bombing at train 
station
Bomb Station 1 0 RZ  
(Revolutionary 
Cells)
Bombing at main train station Jenkins
1
8
6
2-Oct-93 United 
Kingdom 
London Three bombs explode 
in North London
Bomb Station Above 0 0 IRA Bomb explodes opposite a railway station Jenkins
1
8
7
21-Sep-93 Italy Rome Explosives found 
aboard Palermo-Turin 
overnight train
Bomb Train 0 0 Bomb found in lavatory of train at Ostiense 
Station
Jenkins
1
8
8
30-Aug-93 Egypt Ismailiya Three time bombs 
defused in Ismailiya
Bomb Infra-
structure
Above 0 0 Bombs defused on footbridge serving train 
stations
Jenkins
1
8
9
24-Aug-93 Thailand Muslim separatists 
attack train
Rocket/
Gun
Train Above 7 2 PULO (Patani 
United 
Liberation 
Organization)
Militants attack train Jenkins
1
9
0
16-Aug-93 Cambodia Two killed in Khmer 
Rouge train ambush
Rocket/
Gun
Train Above 5 2 Khmer Rouge Guerrillas ambush train Jenkins
1
9
1
4-Aug-93 Cambodia Kampot Railway line 
ambushed
Gun/
Bomb
Train Above 30 10 Khmer Rouge Mines stopped train and attackers fired upon 
train
Jenkins
1
9
2
15-Jul-93 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast Bombing at Central 
Station in Belfast
Bomb Station Above 0 0 IRA Bomb explodes in front of Central Belfast Station Jenkins
1
9
3
14-Jul-93 Russia Vladikavkaz Explosion derails 
Caucasus train
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Ossetian 
Separatists
Bomb explodes on rail line causing freight train 
derailment
Jenkins
1
9
4
1-Jul-93 Angola Huila At least 19 die in 
railway attack
Bomb Train Above 2 19 UNITA 
(National 
Union for Total 
Independence 
of Angola)
Mine on tracks hits passenger train Jenkins
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1
9
5
7-Jun-93 India Bombay Two blasts in Bombay, 
security concerns
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bomb explodes in empty car at station Jenkins
1
9
6
27-May-93 Angola Huila Rebels attack train, 
100 dead
Train Above 100 100 UNITA 
(National 
Union for Total 
Independence 
of Angola)
Rebels attacked a passenger train Jenkins
1
9
7
25-May-93 Egypt Cairo Bomb found in 
subway
Bomb Station Below 0 0 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Bomb found on the tracks at al-Marj subway 
station and deactivated
Jenkins
1
9
8
24-May-93 Egypt Cairo Bomb near Cairo train 
station
Bomb Station Above 20 7 al-Gamya  
al-Islamiya
Car bomb explodes outside of Masr train station Jenkins
1
9
9
12-May-93 Philippines Manila Rail bombings in 
metro Manila
Bomb Station Above 23 Abu Sayyaf Bombs explode on commuter trains and in the 
train terminal in Pasay City
Jenkins
2
0
0
6-May-93 Cambodia Khmer Rouge attack 
train
Gun/
Bomb
Train Above 80 13 Khmer Rouge Guerrillas bombed a train and opened fire on the 
occupants
Jenkins
2
0
1
26-Mar-93 Mexico Guadalajara Blast at Guadalajara 
station
Bomb Station 1 A guard was injured when he picked up a 
package in the station
Jenkins
2
0
2
22-Mar-93 India Calcutta Railway terminus blast 
in Calcutta
Bomb Station 12 1 A man was carrying a suitcase that detonated as 
he got off of the train
Jenkins
2
0
3
16-Mar-93 Egypt Abu Tig Bombs found on train Bomb Train Above 0 0 A suitcase full of explosives found on train Jenkins
2
0
4
12-Mar-93 India Bombay Bomb blasts in 
Victoria railway 
station
Bomb Station Series of bombs explode throughout Bombay Jenkins
2
0
5
1-Mar-93 Russia Gudermes Baku-bound train 
bombing kills 13
Bomb Train Above 12 13 Bomb explodes in passenger train Jenkins
2
0
6
11-Feb-93 Myanmar Ye Rebels blow up train, 
nine dead
Bomb Train Above 18 9 New Mon 
State Party
Cargo train bombed Jenkins
2
0
7
4-Feb-93 United 
Kingdom 
London Bomb explodes on 
train
Bomb Station Below 0 0 PIRA Bomb in Kensington Tube station explodes after 
evacuation
Jenkins
2
0
8
3-Feb-93 United 
Kingdom 
IRA bombs London to 
Kent train
Bomb Train Above 0 0 IRA Train evacuated before a bomb exploded Jenkins
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2
0
9
23-Dec-92 United 
Kingdom 
London IRA bombs 
Hampstead tube
Bomb Station Below 0 0 IRA Bomb explodes at Hampstead Station Jenkins
2
1
0
18-Dec-92 India Borivli Four injured in 
Bombay train blast
Bomb Train 4 Bomb explodes in train Jenkins
2
1
1
9-Dec-92 United 
Kingdom 
London PIRA bomb subway 
station
Bomb Station PIRA Bomb detonated near Woodside Park subway 
station
Jenkins
2
1
2
1-Dec-92 Brazil Rio de Janeiro Bomb in Rio’s train 
station
Bomb Station 2 0 Bomb carried into the central railway station in a 
bag and detonated
Jenkins
2
1
3
26-Oct-92 Turkey Tatvan-Elazig Passenger train hits 
PKK mine, plunges 
into river
Bomb Train Above 3 47 PKK (Kurdish 
Workers Party)
Train hit a mine, derailing it into a river Jenkins
2
1
4
22-Oct-92 United 
States 
Chicago Hand grenade 
discovered at a rail 
platform
Bomb Station 0 0 Grenade found at a station Jenkins
2
1
5
22-Oct-92 United 
Kingdom 
London IRA bombs London 
rail lines
Bomb Line Above 3 0 IRA Bombing of track as passenger train passed Jenkins
2
1
6
21-Oct-92 United 
Kingdom 
London PIRA bomb railway Bomb Line Above 0 0 PIRA Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
1
7
20-Oct-92 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast IRA bombs train line in 
Belfast
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
1
8
14-Oct-92 India Assam Train bombing in 
Assam kills 25
Bomb Train Above 50 25 BSF (Bodo 
Security Force)
Two bombs exploded in separate compartments 
of a passenger train
Jenkins
2
1
9
6-Oct-92 Egypt Bomb explodes on 
train in Dayrut
Bomb Train 10 3 al-Gamya al-
Islamiya
Bomb explodes in train Jenkins
2
2
0
2-Oct-92 Turkey Istanbul Bomb at Istanbul’s 
train station
Bomb Station 0 0 Bomb explodes in empty car at station Jenkins
2
2
1
1-Sep-92 Turkey Mus PKK derails passenger 
train
Train Above 4 0 PKK (Kurdish 
Workers Party)
Train derailed Jenkins
2
2
2
28-Aug-92 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast IRA bomb hits Belfast 
train
Bomb Station Above 0 0 IRA Bomb left in car as station was evacuated Jenkins
2
2
3
28-Aug-92 United 
Kingdom 
London IRA bomb threat halts 
London trains
Threat 0 0 IRA Bomb threat causes evacuation Jenkins
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2
2
4
19-Aug-92 Pakistan Karachi Trains searched for 
bombs
Threat Train Above 0 0 Bomb threat forces evacuation Jenkins
2
2
5
19-Aug-92 South Africa Soweto Soweto train attack, 
one dead
Gun Train Above 5 1 Gunman opened fire in train Jenkins
2
2
6
28-Jul-92 Argentina Villa 
Gobernador 
Galvez
Bomb defused on 
Mitre rail line
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bomb defused on tracks Jenkins
2
2
7
11-Jun-92 United 
Kingdom 
London London Tube hit by 
IRA bomb hoaxes
Threat Below 0 0 IRA Threats to Underground Jenkins
2
2
8
21-May-92 Russia St. Petersburg Terrorists bomb 
railroad station
Bomb Station Above 12 1 Palestinian 
militants
Bomb placed in trash can near ticket office Jenkins
2
2
9
8-May-92 United 
Kingdom 
London Victoria Station in 
London evacuated for 
bomb search
Threat Station Above 0 0 IRA Victoria Station evacuated due to threat Jenkins
2
3
0
29-Apr-92 Pakistan Hyderabad Ten die in Sind train 
attack
Rocket/
Gun
Train Above 30 10 Rockets and small arms fire on passenger train Jenkins
2
3
1
17-Apr-92 Malaysia Sedenak Rail lines sabotaged Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Saboteurs damaged tracks Jenkins
2
3
2
3-Apr-92 Kenya Nairobi Explosion at train 
station
Bomb Station Above 0 0 Bomb in unused toilet near main station Jenkins
2
3
3
2-Apr-92 Peru Puno SL attacks train near 
Bolivia border
Train Above 4 1 Shining Path Terrorists attack train near Bolivia Jenkins
2
3
4
1-Apr-92 Argentina Buenos Aires Bomb on train line Bomb Line Above 0 0 Striking Rail 
workers
Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
3
5
26-Mar-92 Greece Athens Bombs hit train 
carrying BMW cars
Bomb Train Above 0 0 November 17 Bomb explodes in Ath Rendis train station, 
damaging shipments of BMW’s
Jenkins
2
3
6
10-Mar-92 United 
Kingdom 
London Bombing near train 
station
Bomb Line 0 0 IRA Bomb exploded on the tracks near Wandsworth 
Common Station, disrupting rail service
Jenkins
2
3
7
2-Mar-92 United 
Kingdom 
London Three IRA bombs over 
weekend
Bomb Station Above 0 0 IRA Bomb found on the tracks at White Hart Lane 
Station
Jenkins
2
3
8
1-Mar-92 United 
Kingdom 
Bomb hoaxes delay 
peace trains
Threat Train 0 0 IRA Bomb threats on tracks Jenkins
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2
3
9
28-Feb-92 United 
Kingdom 
London At least 25 wounded 
in London subway 
blast
Bomb Station Below 28 0 IRA Bomb exploded in the toilet of the London 
Bridge subway station. 
Jenkins
2
4
0
8-Feb-92 India Narwana Six die, 50 hurt in train 
blast
Bomb Train Above 6 50 Sikh 
separatists
Bomb on train Jenkins
2
4
1
7-Feb-92 United 
Kingdom 
London Incendiary device on 
east London track
Fire Line Below 0 0 IRA Incendiary device ignited on the subway tracks 
at Barking
Jenkins
2
4
2
30-Jan-92 United 
Kingdom 
London Unexploded firebomb Fire Train Below 0 0 IRA Firebomb found under seat of subway car Jenkins
2
4
3
29-Jan-92 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast IRA bomb causes 
Belfast train chaos
Bomb Station 0 0 IRA Bombing on tracks near central station Jenkins
2
4
4
18-Jan-92 India Samana Bomb derails train Bomb Station Above 7 Sikh 
separatists
Bombing at Golwar railway station causes 
derailment
Jenkins
2
4
5
6-Jan-92 Italy Leece Time bomb aimed at 
mass casualty 
explodes
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bombing on tracks just before passenger train 
arrived
Jenkins
2
4
6
28-Dec-91 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin IRA bombs railroad to 
end ceasefire
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
4
7
23-Dec-91 United 
Kingdom 
London Incendiary devices 
discovered on 
commuter train
Fire Train 0 0 PIRA Incendiary devices found hidden on commuter 
train
Jenkins
2
4
8
16-Dec-91 United 
Kingdom 
London Bomb explodes at rail 
station
Bomb Station Above 0 0 PIRA Bombing near Clapham Junction Station Jenkins
2
4
9
11-Nov-91 India Kalyan Bomb blast on train 
near Bombay
Bomb Train Above 60 12 Bombing in train as it pulled into a station Jenkins
2
5
0
5-Nov-91 South Africa Johannesburg Bomb damages 
railway line as strike 
continues
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
5
1
24-Oct-91 South Africa Soweto Train attack in Soweto Gun Train Above 36 9 Gunmen attack commuter train Jenkins
2
5
2
9-Sep-91 India Goodwill Train 
attacked again
Train Above 3 0 Sikh 
separatists
Train attacked Jenkins
2
5
3
6-Sep-91 India Goodwill Train 
Attacked
Train Above 1 Sikh 
separatists
Train attacked Jenkins
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2
5
4
29-Aug-91 United 
Kingdom 
London Three bombs found in 
subway car
Bomb Train Below 0 0 PIRA Incendiary devices found under seats of subway 
train
Jenkins
2
5
5
17-Aug-91 Spain Bomb explodes on 
Madrid-Irun railway 
track
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Bomb knocks over electric pylon causing it to fall 
across the tracks and collide with freight train
Jenkins
2
5
6
31-Jul-91 Soviet Union Moscow-Baku Passenger train 
bombed
Bomb Train Above 16 14 Bomb concealed in a briefcase and left in a 
reserved compartment exploded
Jenkins
2
5
7
29-May-91 Peru Lima Shining Path torches a 
railroad station
Fire Station Shining Path Torched railroad station Jenkins
2
5
8
1-Mar-91 Australia Bomb threat on 
subway station
Threat Station Below 0 0 Threat of bombing on subway stations Jenkins
2
5
9
25-Feb-91 United 
Kingdom 
St. Albans PIRA suspected in 
railway bombing
Bomb Line Above 0 0 PIRA Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
6
0
18-Feb-91 United 
Kingdom 
London PIRA claim 
responsibility for 
explosions
Bomb Station Below 43 1 PIRA Victoria and Paddington stations bombed, one 
on a scaffolding and the other in a trash can
Jenkins
2
6
1
9-Feb-91 Austria Innsbruck Stretch of track 
bombed
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Track bombed because it is used by U.S. military Jenkins
2
6
2
3-Dec-90 France Three incendiary 
devices went off along 
railway line
Fire Line Above Jenkins
2
6
3
3-Nov-90 South Africa Bloernfontein Two explosions cause 
railway damage
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
6
4
20-Aug-90 Spain Leon Railroad tracks near 
Leon bombed
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
6
5
15-Aug-90 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin Army defuse bomb Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bomb defused on tracks Jenkins
2
6
6
15-Aug-90 Spain Two bomb explosions Bomb Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Bombs explode Jenkins
2
6
7
6-May-90 Pakistan Lahore Bomb explodes on 
express train
Bomb Train Above 35 11 Afghan Agents Express train bombed Jenkins
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2
6
8
14-Sep-89 Spain France-Spain railway 
bombed
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
6
9
20-Jul-89 India Assam Bombing kills eight 
people
Bomb Station 22 8 Bodo militants Bomb explodes in Kokrajhar Railroad station Jenkins
2
7
0
30-Jun-89 France Paris-Madrid Bomb explodes on 
railway line
Bomb Line Above Iparretarak Bombing on tracks Jenkins
2
7
1
26-Jun-89 China Explosion on train kills 
20 people
Bomb Train Above 11 20 Dynamite placed in wash basin of train Jenkins
2
7
2
2-Jun-89 Thailand/ 
Malaysia 
Narathiwat Bomb explodes as 
train passes by
Bomb Line Above 3 0 Pulo Pattini A remote control bomb derails train Jenkins
2
7
3
26-Apr-89 Czechoslo-
vakia 
Bomb explodes on 
international express 
train
Bomb Train Above 0 0 Bombing on train Jenkins
2
7
4
19-Apr-89 India Jhansi Train derails killing at 
least 67 people
Sabotage Line Above 137 67 Express train derailed Jenkins
2
7
5
9-Apr-89 Spain Cioridia Bombs explode at 
railroad tracks in 
Navarre region
Bomb Infra-
structure
Above 0 0 Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Bombings target rail power lines Jenkins
2
7
6
1-Dec-88 Peru Cuzco-Machu 
Picchu
Guerrillas sabotage a 
VIP tourist train
Sabotage Train Above 9 2 Sendero 
Luminoso
Train sabotaged Jenkins
2
7
7
14-Oct-88 Sri Lanka Kadugannawa Bomb destroys part of 
railway station
Bomb Station Above 0 0 Sinhalese 
People’s 
Liberation 
Front
Bomb explodes in station Jenkins
2
7
8
4-Sep-88 Pakistan Karachi Bomb explodes at 
train station
Bomb Station Above 5 0 Bomb explodes at Karachi train station Jenkins
2
7
9
3-Sep-88 Pakistan Islamabad-
Peshawar
Bomb goes off on 
train
Bomb Train Above 13 3 Bomb explodes on train Jenkins
2
8
0
19-Jul-88 Peru Chosica-Lima Bombing on railway 
track
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bomb explodes on tracks Jenkins
2
8
1
27-Apr-88 Germany U.S. military train 
damaged by blast
Bomb Train Above 1 0 PFLP-GC Bomb explodes on tracks as military train passed Jenkins
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2
8
2
11-Apr-88 Pakistan Peshawar Bomb explodes on 
train
Bomb Train Above 3 2 Bomb explodes on train Jenkins
2
8
3
1988-1989 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin More than 60 
bombings disrupt rail 
service
Bomb Line Above IRA Between 1988 and 1989, more than 60 
bombings on the Belfast-Dublin line
Jenkins
2
8
4
31-Dec-87 Mozambique Attack on train kills 22 
people
Train Above 71 22 Train attacked by guerrillas Jenkins
2
8
5
22-Dec-87 Pakistan Bomb discovered on 
railroad track
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Bomb found on tracks and disarmed Jenkins
2
8
6
27-Nov-87 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin Bomb disrupts rail 
service
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bomb explodes next to track as freight train 
passed
Jenkins
2
8
7
26-Sep-87 Brazil Rio de Janeiro Homemade bomb 
injures 11 people
Bomb Station Above 11 0 Bomb explodes at a station Jenkins
2
8
8
1-Sep-87 Germany Bomb goes off on 
railroad tracks
Bomb Line Above 0 0 PFLP-GC Bomb explodes on tracks, damaging freight train Jenkins
2
8
9
5-Jul-87 Pakistan Lahore Three bombings in 
Lahore
Bomb Station 50 6 Bomb explodes in a trash can on a railroad 
platform and by a kiosk just outside of a station
Jenkins
2
9
0
15-Apr-87 India New Delhi Police defuse bomb Bomb Station 0 0 Sikh 
separatists
Bomb found in crowded station waiting room Jenkins
2
9
1
15-Mar-87 India Madras Bombing under 
railway bridge
Bomb Bridge Above 150 25 Tamil Exiles Bomb explodes on bridge as train passed over it Jenkins
2
9
2
15-Feb-87 Germany U.S. passenger train 
sabotaged
Sabotage Infra-
structure
Above 0 0 Overhead cables disabled Jenkins
2
9
3
27-Oct-86 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin Bombing derails 
freight train
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bomb derails freight train Jenkins
2
9
4
20-Oct-86 Pakistan Peshawar Explosion injures two 
people
Bomb Station 2 Bomb on train explodes at station Jenkins
2
9
5
30-Sep-86 Peru Lima Three bombings Bomb Line Above 1 0 Bombing on tracks Jenkins
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2
9
6
4-Sep-86 France Paris Bomb planted on 
subway train
Bomb Train Below 0 0 CSPPA (The 
Committee of 
Solidarity with 
the Arab and 
Middle East 
Political 
Prisoners)
Bomb failed to explode on subway Jenkins
2
9
7
15-May-86 Bangladesh Bheramara Train sabotaged; 25 
people killed
Sabotage Train Above 45 25 Marxist 
Sarbahara
Express train derailed Jenkins
2
9
8
21-Mar-86 France Paris Bomb defused in 
commuter train in 
Paris
Bomb Train 0 0 CSPPA (The 
Committee of 
Solidarity with 
the Arab and 
Middle East 
Political 
Prisoners)
Bomb found and defused on a commuter line Jenkins
2
9
9
18-Mar-86 France Paris High-speed train 
bombed
Bomb Train Above 10 0 Islamic Jihad High-speed train bombed Jenkins
3
0
0
1-Dec-85 Japan Radical leftists cut 
communication cables
Sabotage Infra-
structure
0 0 Middle Core 
Faction
Cut communication lines, disrupting operations Jenkins
3
0
1
25-Nov-85 India Punjab Bombing on train kills 
2, injures 18
Bomb Train Above 18 2 Sikh 
separatists
Bomb on a train Jenkins
3
0
2
13-Aug-85 Chile Santiago Two bombs explode Bomb Station 1 0 Bombs explode in Valparaiso and Valencia 
stations
Jenkins
3
0
3
2-Aug-85 Mozambique Suspected train 
sabotage kills 58 
people
Sabotage Train Above 160 58 Sabotage on train Jenkins
3
0
4
3-Jun-85 Switzerland Geneva Explosion at Geneva 
railway station
Bomb Station Martyrs of  
Tel Al-Zaltar
Bombing of the Geneva Railway station Jenkins
3
0
5
26-Mar-85 Canada Toronto Threats by ASALA to 
bomb city’s subway 
system
Threat ASALA 
(Armenian 
Secret Army 
for the 
Liberation of 
Armenia)
Threats to Toronto’s subway system Jenkins
3
0
6
25-Jan-85 South  
Africa / 
Mozambique 
Maputo Bomb severs rail 
bridge
Bomb Bridge Above 0 0 Bomb explodes on bridge Jenkins
3
0
7
20-Jan-85 Sri Lanka Mankulam-
Murukandy
Guerrillas attack train, 
killing 36 people
Gun/
Bomb
Train Above 36 Tarnil 
Separatists
Bomb explodes, stopping train, and terrorists 
began firing on train
Jenkins
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3
0
8
24-Dec-84 Italy Florence-
Bologna
Train bombing kills at 
least 15 people
Bomb Train Below 80 15 Neo-fascist 
terrorist
Bomb explodes on a train in the Direttissima 
tunnel
Jenkins
3
0
9
1-Sep-84 Canada Montreal Bomb explodes in 
Montreal main 
railroad station
Bomb Station 29 3 Bomb in Montreal main railroad station Jenkins
3
1
0
19-Aug-84 France Grenoble M-5 group bombs 
Grenoble train station
Bomb Station 0 0 M-5 Bomb in Grenoble station Jenkins
3
1
1
13-Aug-84 France Lyons Bomb explodes in 
railway station in 
Lyons
Bomb Station 0 0 ASALA 
(Armenian 
Secret Army 
for the 
Liberation of 
Armenia)
Bomb in locker of Central Railway Station in 
Lyons
Jenkins
3
1
2
26-Apr-84 India Punjab Bombs exploded 
along northern railway 
sections
Bomb Line Above Sikh 
separatists
Bombings on railway line Jenkins
3
1
3
15-Apr-84 India Punjab Multiple arson attacks Fire Station Dashmesh 
Regiment
Group torched 37 stations in Punjab Jenkins
3
1
4
15-Feb-84 France Basques sabotage 
Paris-Madrid Express 
train
Sabotage Line Above 0 0 Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Line sabotaged, causing derailment Jenkins
3
1
5
31-Dec-83 France Marseilles Bombs in Marseilles 
railroad station killed 
six people
Bomb Station 6 Ilyich Ramirez 
Sanchez AKA 
Carlos
Bomb explodes in Marseilles Station and aboard 
a train, killing six and injuring scores more
Jenkins
3
1
6
14-Sep-83 India New Delhi Bomb thrown at 
crowded platform 
injures 19
Bomb Station Above 19 0 Sikh 
separatists
Bomb thrown onto a crowded platform of the 
main station
Jenkins
3
1
7
28-Jul-83 France Lyons ASALA threats against 
French government
Threat Station 0 0 ASALA 
(Armenian 
Secret Army 
for the 
Liberation of 
Armenia)
Threat evacuates Perrache Station Jenkins
3
1
8
11-Aug-82 United 
Kingdom 
Armagh 
County,  
No. Ireland
Bombing at railroad Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Bomb explodes on freight line Jenkins
3
1
9
29-Mar-82 France Paris-Toulouse Bomb exploded on 
train, killing five 
passengers
Bomb Train Above 27 5 Explosives on train Jenkins
3
2
0
14-Feb-82 United 
Kingdom 
Portadown Bomb damages rail 
station
Bomb Station Above 0 0 IRA Bomb damages Portadown Station Jenkins
ID Date Country City/Region Event Summary Device Facility
Above/
Below 
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3
2
1
18-Nov-81 France Paris Bomb threat at Paris 
Gare du Nord
Threat Station 0 0 Orly 
Organization
Bomb threat at Gare du Nord Jenkins
3
2
2
16-Nov-81 France Paris Bomb in train station Bomb Station Above 2 0 Orly 
Organization
Bomb in locker of Gare de l’Est terminal Jenkins
3
2
3
5-Nov-81 France Paris Bomb explodes in 
train station
Bomb Station Below 1 0 Orly 
Organization
Bomb in locker in underground section of Gare 
de Lyon Station
Jenkins
3
2
4
16-Sep-81 Germany Time bombs on rail 
line defused
Bomb Line Above 0 0 Red Army 
Faction
Bomb defused on tracks at U.S. Base Jenkins
3
2
5
6-Aug-81 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin Bombings at several 
locations
Bomb Line Above IRA Bombs on rail line Jenkins
3
2
6
31-Jul-81 Pakistan Karach-Lahore Train derailed Line Above 30 Anti-Muslim 
group
Train carrying Muslims during Ramadan derailed Jenkins
3
2
7
22-Jul-81 Switzerland Geneva Bombs in Geneva 
railway station
Bomb Station Above 4 0 Ninth of June 
Organization
Two bombs left in lockers explode in main 
Geneva rail station
Jenkins
3
2
8
18-Jul-81 India Dangarva Train sabotaged, 35 
people killed
Sabotage Train Above 35 Derailment Jenkins
3
2
9
29-Jun-81 South Africa Natal Bomb explodes on 
Richards Bay rail line
Bomb Line Above 0 0 ANC Explosion on Richards Bay rail line, closing 
freight service
Jenkins
3
3
0
27-Jan-81 United 
Kingdom 
Belfast-Dublin Bombings on Belfast-
Dublin rail line
Bomb Line Above 0 0 IRA Explosion on rail line, closing service Jenkins
3
3
1
21-Dec-80 United 
States 
New York City Pipe bombs in 
Pennsylvania Station, 
New York City
Bomb Station 0 0 Puerto Rican 
Armed 
Resistance 
(RAP)
Pipe bombs in locker explode, no injuries Jenkins
3
3
2
21-Oct-80 Switzerland Paris-Interlaken Attempted bombing 
of train
Bomb Train Above 0 0 October 3 
Organization
Bomb placed on train and failed to explode Jenkins
3
3
3
2-Aug-80 Italy Bologna Bologna train station 
bombed
Bomb Station Above 200 84 Station bombing Jenkins
3
3
4
10-Jun-80 Cambodia Battanbang-
Phnom Panh
Train attack results in 
at least 150 deaths
Gun/
Bomb
Train Above 250 150 Khmer Rouge Stopped train with a bomb or missile and 
opened fire when train stopped
Jenkins
3
3
5
26-Apr-80 France Paris-Moscow Right-wing group 
attacks train
Fire Train Above National Youth 
Front
Molotov cocktails thrown at Paris-Moscow 
express train
Jenkins
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3
3
6
2-Nov-79 Israel Tel Aviv Passenger train 
explosion
Bomb Train Above 0 Palestinian 
Military
Bomb explodes under train Jenkins
3
3
7
2-Jul-79 France St. Jean de Luz Train attacked Gun Train Above Basque 
Separatist 
Movement 
(ETA)
Terrorists fire on train Jenkins
3
3
8
4-Mar-79 Israel Jerusalem-Tel 
Aviv
Rail service suspended Bomb Line Above Palestinian 
Military
Bomb explodes on a track, derailing a train Jenkins
3
3
9
26-Dec-77 France Paris Bombs explode in 
Christmas attack
Bomb Station Above Corsican 
National 
Liberation 
Front
Bomb explodes at Villepinte railway station Jenkins
3
4
0
5-Dec-77 Yugoslavia Bomb aboard train 
from West Germany
Bomb Train Above Bomb found on West German railways train, 
intentionally detonated
Jenkins
3
4
1
4-Dec-77 Austria Spiefeld Bomb aboard train Bomb Train Above Bomb explodes in express train lavatory Jenkins
3
4
2
23-May-77 Netherlands Groningen South Moluccan 
terrorists seize express 
train
Hijack Train Above 2 Free South 
Moluccan 
Youths
Fifty-six people taken hostage before police 
raided and killed two terrorists
Jenkins
3
4
3
9-Mar-77 Egypt Al-Alamein Police arrest five 
bombing suspects
Bomb Line Above Libyan 
Intelligence 
Service
Jenkins
3
4
4
14-Aug-76 Egypt Alexandria Bomb on train kills 
eight passengers
Bomb Train Above 59 8 Libyan 
Intelligence 
Service
Time bomb Jenkins
3
4
5
18-Mar-76 United 
Kingdom 
London Subway station 
bombing
Bomb Station Below 1 IRA Wood Green Station Jenkins
3
4
6
15-Mar-76 United 
Kingdom 
London Explosive on subway Bomb Train Below 1 2 IRA West Ham Station Jenkins
3
4
7
4-Mar-76 United 
Kingdom 
London IRA bomb explodes 
on commuter train
Bomb Train Above IRA Minutes after Cannon Street Station Jenkins
3
4
8
12-Feb-76 United 
Kingdom 
London IRA bomb defused Bomb Station Below IRA Oxford Circus Station Jenkins
3
4
9
2-Dec-75 Netherlands Beilen Armed extremists kill 
passengers and take 
hostage on train
Hijack Train Above 2 3 Free South 
Moluccan 
Youths
Jenkins
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3
5
0
9-Oct-75 United 
Kingdom 
London Bomb explosion kills 
one person, injures 20
Bomb Station Above 20 1 IRA Jenkins
3
5
1
4-Aug-74 Italy Florence-
Bologna
Train bombing kills 12 
people, injures 48
Bomb Train Below 48 12 Right Wing 
Extremists
Jenkins
3
5
2
17-Apr-74 Austria Vienna Bomb threat on train 
bound for Rome
Threat Train Above Justice 
Guerrillas
Jenkins
3
5
3
6-Apr-74 United 
Kingdom 
Birmingham Bombing in railway 
station, shops
Bomb Station IRA Jenkins
3
5
4
8-Sep-73 United 
Kingdom 
London Bombing at Victoria 
Station
Bomb Station 4 IRA Jenkins
3
5
5
8-Sep-73 United 
Kingdom 
London Bombing at King’s 
Cross and Euston 
stations
Bomb Station 13 IRA Jenkins
3
5
6
27-Jan-72 Austria Vienna-Zagreb Croatian terrorists 
bomb train
Bomb Train Above 6 Croatian Jenkins
ID Date Country City/Region Event Summary Device Facility
Above/
Below 
Ground
Injuries Fatalities Responsible Party Terrorist Event Description Source
 Appendix B: Respondent Titles
Mineta Transportation Institute
223
APPENDIX B: RESPONDENT TITLES
Administrative, Management, Director, Chief Positions Security, Safety, Risk, Emergency Preparedness
Administrative Analyst 1 AGM Public & Operation Safety 1
Administrative Officer 1 Chief of Police/Director of Security 1
Administrator 1 Chief of Protective Services 1
Assistant Director 1 Chief of Security 3
Assistant General Manager 2 Chief Safety/Security Officer 1
Chief 2 Deputy Director of Safety 1
Chief of Staff 1 Director of Safety 1
Chief Operating Officer 1 Director of Safety & Training 1
Director 1 Director of Safety & Security 1
Executive Director 5 Director of Security 1
General Manager 7 Director of Transportation/Safety & Security 1
Public Transportation Administrator 1 Director Risk Management & Security 1
Public Transportation Director 1 Director, Security Programs 1
Superintendent 1 Emergency Preparedness Manager 1
Transit Administration Manager 1 Homeland Security Officer/Manager 2
Transit Director 2 Interim Risk Manager 1
Transit Service Manager 1 Lieutenant-Commander Emergency Preparedness 1
Transportation Coordinator 1 Lieutenant 1
Transportation Director 1 Manager of Safety & Instruction 1
32 Manager of Safety & Security 4
Operations/Maintenance Manager of Security 2
Assistant General Manager, Operations 1 Manager Protective Services 1
Deputy Chief of Operations 1 Manager Public Safety 4
Director of Operations 3 Manager Safety & Training 2
Director of Operations & Maintenance 1 Manager, Health, Safety & Environmental 1
Director of Transit Operations 1 Operations Safety & Security Coordinator 1
Maintenance Manager 1 Police Officer 1
Maintenance Superintendent 1 Risk Management Analyst 1
Manager of Operations 4 Risk Manager 3
Manager of Operations Support 1 Safety & Security Officer 1
Operations & Grants Manager 1 Safety, Training & Security Coordinator 1
15 Security Coordinator 1
Other Security Superintendent 1
Chief Engineer 1 Senior Security Engineer 1
Consultant 1 Supervisor of Risk Management 1
Director of Customer & Community Services 1 Transit Safety Supervisor 1
Director, Service Development 1 VP Safety 1
Facilities & Procurement Director 1 VP Safety & Security 1
Information Systems Manager 1 51
Manager of Special Projects 1
Manager, Central Communications 1
Project Manager, Technical 1
Senior Deputy General Counsel 1
Special Projects Coordinator 1
Transit Planner 1
Transportation & Parking Director 1
Transportation Planner 2
VP Legal Affairs 1
16
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF CPTED STRATEGIES FOR SYSTEM 
COMPONENTS
CPTED Strategies for Platforms
Most respondents mentioned lighting as the primary CPTED strategy for platforms. Good 
visibility (uninterrupted lines of sight) is considered essential, which includes keeping 
platforms clear of obstacles (some do not permit trash receptacles, pay phones, or newspaper 
boxes) and eliminating hidden corners and dead areas. Control over ingress and egress by 
limiting foot access paths is suggested. Security cameras were also mentioned by a number of 
respondents.
CPTED Strategies for Entrances and Exits
Cameras, lighting, electronic control, good visibility with clear sight lines (predominant use 
of glass and natural light around entrances), limited number of entrances and exits, proper 
alignment of walls and doors to minimize hiding places.
CPTED Strategies for Elevators
Cameras, emergency telephones, lighting, clear lines of sight, glass or clear material for shaft 
and cab.
CPTED Strategies for Escalators
Lighting, clear lines of sight, monitored by security personnel.
CPTED Strategies for Restrooms
Cameras, lighting, curved entrances with no exterior doors, clear sight paths to entrance and 
exit, located where staff can monitor entrances.
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CPTED Strategies for Trash Cans
Containers can be see-through and/or bomb (explosive) resistant, and they are often relocated 
away from benches and loading areas, or eliminated completely in high-density areas.
CPTED Strategies for Pathways
Lighting, clear lines of sight, kept clear of debris and obstacles (vegetation), minimal 
landscaping, common access.
CPTED Strategies for Parking Lots
Cameras, lighting, fencing, limited (controlled) access points, security guards, clear lines of 
sight with visibility from street, low landscaping, emergency phones.
CPTED Strategies for Vehicles
Cameras, emergency (panic) alarms, public information signage, low platform buses with large 
windows, parked in secure spaces with clear lines of sight, vandal- and graffiti-proof interiors.
CPTED Strategies for Vending Machines
Machines are placed in form-fitting recessed alcoves to limit side and back access and to allow 
them to be gated if needed. They can be relocated away from restrooms and other areas of 
congregation, and monitored with cameras and alarms.
CPTED Strategies for Gates
Cameras, lighting, electronic access control (card readers), security personnel, good signage, 
configure location of gates to be able to close off sections of station.
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
TRANSIT SECURITY SURVEY 
CODEBOOK
Survey Content by Camille Fink 
Codebook/Coding by Norman Wong 
UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies 
www.its.ucla.edu/security
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Transit Security Online Survey Instructions 
You have been selected by your general manager as a key staff person 
knowledgable about security issues at your agency. We are asking for your help 
in conducting a comparative study of domestic and international transit security 
strategies.
This questionnaire will not take long for you to complete. It should take 
approximately 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire if your agency does not
provide rail service and approximately 40 minutes if your agency does provide 
rail service. 
You can log off and return to the questionnaire at any time using your username 
and password. Each page of the survey is saved when you click "Next." If you 
click "Logoff" all changes to that page will be lost so if you choose to logoff, we 
suggest that you do so immediately after clicking "Next". Also, please DO NOT
press Return/Enter at anytime. Doing so will log you out of the survey. 
When you have completed the entire questionnaire, you will have the following
options:
1. You can save and check over your answers by clicking on "Return to 
Start."
2. You can save what you have entered so far and return later to complete 
and submit the survey by clicking on "Save."
3. Or you can finalize and submit the survey by clicking on "Finalize
Survey." When you click on "Finalize Survey" your responses will be 
recorded and you will no longer be able to change your answers.
If you are not sure about an answer to a particular question, please select the 
“Don’t know/Not sure” option to return to it at a later time or tell us who we should 
contact for more information at the end of the survey. All responses in this survey 
will be remain confidential unless you specify otherwise. 
If you have any questions about this survey, please contact Camille Fink at 
UCLA at 310.903.3278 or its@spa.ucla.edu.
For questions regarding the website, please contact Norman Wong at 
310.903.3278 or nwong@ucla.edu.
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Please use the following definitions for terms used throughout this survey: 
 Terrorism: “The unlawful use of force or violence committed by a group(s) 
of two or more individuals, against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives.” (FBI) 
 Multi-modal transfer facility: A station, terminal, or facility with two or 
more public transit modes (transit modes typically include bus rapid transit, 
commuter rail, dial-a-ride, express bus, light-rail transit, local bus, and 
subway) where public transit passengers transfer from one transit vehicle 
to another during the course of their journey.
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We begin this survey by asking you a series of general questions 
about the transportation modes your agency operates and features 
of your systems.
Q1.  Which modes of transportation does your agency provide (either directly or 
by contract)? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) Commuter Rail 
(b) Heavy Rail
(c) Light Rail
(d) Bus 
(e) Ferry
(f) Paratransit
Other:
Next
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 Q2. Does your rail system have the following types of stations? (Please 
check ALL that apply)
(a) Elevated
(b) Below-ground/subway
(c) At grade
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q3_1.  What is the name of the busiest station in your system (i.e., the station 
with the most boardings and alightings)?
(n) Don't know/Not Sure 
 Q3_2. What year was this station built?
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q3_3.  Does your bus service operate out of an enclosed bus terminal or 
multi-modal transfer facility?
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
(n) Don't know/Not sure 
Now we would like to ask you about threat and vulnerability
assessments at your agency. This series of questions will help us 
understand how and why different agencies assess threats and 
vulnerabilities in their systems.
 Q4.  Has your agency ever conducted threat and vulnerability assessments of 
its key infrastructure (e.g., stations, tracks, vehicles, power stations, rights-of-
way, bridges, tunnels, yards and shops, control centers, etc.)?
(a) Yes, comprehensive (covering all elements of the system) 
(b) Yes, moderate (covering most elements of the system) 
(c) Yes, partial (covering some elements of the system) 
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Page 2 
(d) No
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 If you answered "No" in the previous question, why has your agency not 
conducted a threat and vulnerability assessment? 
Back Next
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 Q5.  How often does your agency conduct threat and vulnerability 
assessments?
(a) More than once a year 
(b) Once a year 
(c) Once every 2 years 
(d) Once every 3 years 
(e) Other (Please specify) 
Q5_Text
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q6.  What year was the most recent threat and vulnerability assessment 
conducted?
Q6_Text
(year) (n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q7.  What was the purpose of this most recent threat and vulnerability 
assessment? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) To assess terrorism-related vulnerabilities
(b) To assess natural disaster-related vulnerabilities (e.g. earthquake, 
flood, hurricane) 
(c) To assess crime-related vulnerabilities 
(d) Other (Please describe below) 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Other:
 Q7_1.  How did your agency use the results of this threat and vulnerability 
assessment? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) To identify effective security technology and procedures
(b) To support preparation of budgets
© 2004 UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies  Updated 071204
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(c) To support decision-making at the executive level
(d) To fulfill the requirements of the System Security Program Plan and/or 
the State Safety Oversight Program
(e) To apply for Urban Area Security Intiative grants
(f) To support FTA's security outreach and technical assistance program
(g) Other (Please describe below) 
(h) We have not yet used this threat and vulnerability assessment 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back
Other:
 Q8.  Who conducted this threat and vulnerability assessment? (Please check
ALL that apply)
(a) In-house team 
(b) Sheriff's or police department 
(c) Contracted security consultants 
(d) Contracted other consultants (Please specify below) 
(e) Other: (Please explain below)
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Other:
 Other than threat and vulnerability assessments, how does your agency seek
to identify and assess security vulnerabilities in your transit system?
Next
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This next section asks about general security strategies at your 
agency.
Logout
Transit security strategies can be grouped into four general categories: 
 policing
 public education and user outreach
 security hardware and technology
 environmental design strategies
 How important were each of these strategies in your agency's security 
planning before September 11th, 2001?
(a)
Central
to
security
planning
(b)
Significant,
but not 
central
(c) Part 
of
security
planning,
but a 
minor
part
(d) Not 
a part of 
security
planning
(n) Don't 
know/Not
Sure
Q10A.  Policing 
Q10B.  Public 
Education/User
Outreach
Q10C.  Security 
Hardware/Technology
Q10D.
Environmental Design
Strategies
 Did the emphasis on each of these strategies change in your agency after
September 11th, 2001?
(a)
Central
to
security
planning
(b)
Significant,
but not 
central
(c) Part 
of
security
planning,
but a 
minor
part
(d) Not 
a part of 
security
planning
(n) Don't 
know/Not
Sure
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Q11A. Policing
Q11B. Public
Education/User
Outreach
Q11C. Security
Hardware/Technology
Q11D.
Environmental Design
Strategies
[Q11_1x appears for each Q10a not equal to Q11a]
 You indicated a change in your agency's emphasis to the following strategies 
before and after September 11th. Please indicate how they have changed:
Policing
Public Education/User Outreach
Security Hardware/Technology
Environmental Design Strategies
 Q12.  In general, how does your agency tend to consider anti-terrorism and 
anti-crime strategies?
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g
(a) The strategies (anti-terrorism and anti-crime) are considered 
completely separate from one another 
(b) The strategies partly overlap with one another
(c) Both sets of strategies are generally considered hand-in-hand
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Comments:
Back Next
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 Who provides policing for your system? (Total must equal 100%)
Sworn transit law enforcement %
Non-sworn transit police (i.e. private 
security) %
Contracted local police %
Dedicated bureau of local law enforcement %
No formal security, rely exclusively on local 
law enforcement %
Other (please describe below) %
TOTAL %
Q13.  If you indicated "Other", please specify: 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q14.  How many full-time equivalent (FTE) security/police personnel does 
your agency contract for or employ?
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q14_1.  In your view, how effective do you think policing strategies are in 
preparing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective 
(c) Not effective at all 
(n) Don't know/Not sure 
Back Next
© 2004 UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies
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 Q15.  Do you have an information and outreach strategy to educate transit 
riders about general emergency and safety issues?
(a) Yes, we have an extensive information and outreach strategy 
(b) Yes, we have a modest information and outreach strategy 
(c) No, we do not have an information and outreach strategy 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you selected "yes", please describe this information and outreach strategy 
 Q16.  Do you have an information and outreach strategy to educate transit 
riders specifically about dealing with terrorist attacks?
(a) Yes, we have an extensive information and outreach strategy 
(b) Yes, we have a modest information and outreach strategy 
(c) No, we do not have an information and outreach strategy 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you selected "yes", please describe this information and outreach strategy 
 Q18.  In your view, how effective do you think information and outreach 
strategies are in preparing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective 
(c) Not effective at all 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
© 2004 UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies  Updated 071204
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Next we would like to ask you about the security hardware and 
technology strategies your agency uses.
Logout
 Which of the following security hardware strategies does your agency employ 
in your system? You may also write in your own security hardware strategy in 
the boxes provided.
(0) Not 
in our 
system
(a)
1
(b)
2
(c)
3
(d)
4
(e)
5
(n) Don't 
know/Not sure 
Q19A. Closed-circuit (CCTV)
cameras
Q19B. Emergency telephones 
Q19C. Emergency
alert/notification systems on 
transit vehicles 
Q19D. Personnel radio 
communications systems
Q19E. Public address system 
Q19F. Chemical/biological (C/B) 
sensors
Q19G. Reversible fans
Q19H. Metal detectors at
entrance and exit points 
Q19I. Intrusion detection systems 
(e.g., at tunnel entrances)
Q19J. Automatic track and signal 
monitoring systems 
Q19K. GPS locators 
Q19L. Electronic access control 
Q19M. Portable explosive 
detection equipment
Other 1 
Q19N_Text
Other 2 
Q19O_Text
Other 3 
Q19P_Text
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 Q20. In your view, how effective do you think security and hardware are in 
preparing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective
(b) Somewhat effective 
(c) Not effective at all 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back Next
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The last set of strategies we would like to ask you about are the 
environmental design strategies your agency uses.
Logout
 Q21.  The term “crime prevention through environmental design” (CPTED) 
can mean different things to different people. How would you define this 
term?
(a) I am familiar with the term and I would define it as: 
(b) I have heard the term, but I'm not certain what it means. 
(n) Don't know/Not sure.
 Q22.  Does your agency currently use CPTED strategies in its security 
planning?
(a) Yes, we have an extensive CPTED strategy program 
(b) Yes, we have a moderate CPTED strategy program 
(c) No, we do not have a CPTED strategy program 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
[Q22A and Q23 appear IF Q22 = a or b] 
 Q22A. In your view, how important are CPTED strategies in your agency's 
overall security planning?
(a) Very important 
(b) Somewhat important 
(c) Not important at all 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q23. For which components of your system's stations/bus terminal(s) has
your agency used CPTED strategies? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) Platforms
(b) Entrances and exits 
(c) Elevators 
(d) Escalators 
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(e) Restrooms
(f) Trash cans 
(g) Pathways 
(h) Parking lots 
(i) Vehicles
(j) Vending machines 
(k) Gates
(l) Other 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back
If you indicated "Other" above, please specify:
Next
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The last set of strategies we would like to ask you about are the 
environmental design strategies your agency uses.
Logout
[Q23x appears FOR EACH option selected (a-l) in Q23] 
 You indicated the following components in your system. Please describe the 
CPTED strategies used in each component.
Platforms
Entrances and Exits
Elevators
Escalators
Restrooms
Trash cans
Pathways
Parking lots
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Vehicles
Vending Machines
Gates
blah
 Previously, you listed one or more CPTED security strategies used by your 
system. Please list and rank the one, two, or three strategies that you believe 
provide the most "bang for the buck" in terms of transit security.
Example
1. Most "bang for the buck"
2. Second most "bang for the buck"
3. Third most "bang for the buck"
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Comments
[Q24_1 for Rail only] 
 Q24_1.  For which components of your rail system has your agency used 
CPTED strategies? (Please check ALL that apply)
(a) Tracks 
(b) Station Tunnels 
(c) Control Center(s) 
(d) Maintenance Facilities (yards and shops)
(e) Traction Power Stations and Distribution 
(f) Other 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you indicated "Other" above, please specify:
 Q25.  In your view, how effective do you think CPTED strategies are in 
preventing for terrorist attacks on your system?
(a) Very effective 
(b) Somewhat effective 
(c) Not effective at all 
(n) Don't know/Not sure
 Q26.  Does your agency have CPTED guidelines in place?
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(a) Yes 
(b) No 
(n) Don't know/Not sure 
[Q26A appears IF Q26 = a] 
 Q26A.  If yes, how were these guidelines developed?
(a) In-house team 
(b) Sheriff's or police department 
(c) Contracted security consultants 
(d) Other (please specify below)
(n) Don't know/Not sure
If you chose "Other", please explain: 
[Q26B appears IF Q26A = a] 
 Q26B.  Which department in your agency led the development of these 
guidelines?
(n) Don't know/Not sure
Back Next
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[This page is rail/agencies with multi-modal transfer facility only] 
This next section asks about past incidents experienced on your 
system and perceived threats.
Logout
 Q27. To your knowledge, has your rail system ever experienced any of the 
following incidents?
(a) Identification of explosive device on system 
(b) Detonation of explosive device on system 
(c) Use of arson/incendiary devices on system 
(d) Identification of chemical or biological contaminants on system 
(e) Identification of nuclear device or radiological contaminants on system 
(f) Vehicle hijacking 
(g) Hostage/barricade situation 
(h) Employee sabotage 
(i) Breach of essential computer/software systems 
(j) Shooting incident with multiple victims 
(l) Other (please specify)
(k) None of the above 
(n) Don’t know/Not sure
If you indicated "Other", please specify: 
Back Next
© 2004 UCLA Institute of Transportation Studies
 Appendix D: Survey Instrument
Mineta Transportation Institute
249
The last set of strategies we would like to ask you about are the 
environmental design strategies your agency uses.
Logout
[Q27x_A thru Q27x_D appears for each incident indicated in Q27 (a-l) and only 
for Rail/Agencies with multi-modal transfer facility] 
 You indicated the following incidents. For each incident, please answer the 
following questions.
Identification of explosive device on system 
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27A (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
Q27A (b)Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27A_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
Q27A (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27A (d)Don't
know/Not sure 
Detonation of explosive device on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27B (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27B (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27B_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
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(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
Q27B (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27B (d) Don't 
know/Not sure 
Use of arson/incendiary devices on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27C (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27C (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27C_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
Q27C (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27C (d)
Don't know/Not sure 
Identification of chemical or biological contaminants on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27D (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27D (b) Don't know/Not sure 
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3. Q27D_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
Q27D (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27D (d) Don't 
know/Not sure 
Identification of nuclear device or radiological contaminants on system
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27E (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27E (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27E_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27E (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27E (d) Don't 
know/Not sure 
Vehicle hijacking 
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27F (a) Don't know/Not sure 
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2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27F (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27F_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27F (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27F (d) Don't
know/Not sure 
Hostage/barricade situation 
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27G (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27G (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27G_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27G (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27G (d) Don't 
know/Not sure 
Employee sabotage 
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1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27H (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27H (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27H_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27H (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27H (d) Don't 
know/Not sure 
Breach of essential computer/software systems 
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27I (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27I (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27I_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27I (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27I (d) Don't
know/Not sure 
Shooting incident with multiple victims
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1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27J (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27J (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27J_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27J (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27J (d) Don't
know/Not sure 
Other
1. How many times has this type of incident occurred in the last 
decade?  Q27K (a) Don't know/Not sure 
2. What was the year of the most recent incident? 
 Q27K (b) Don't know/Not sure 
3. Q27K_C. Where did this incident occur on your rail system? 
(Please check ALL that apply) 
(a) At a station
(b) On a vehicle 
(c) On the tracks 
(d) Other 
 Q27K (c) Don't know/Not sure 
4. Briefly describe the incident: 
 Q27K (d) Don't 
know/Not sure 
[End Rail/Agencies with multi-modal transfer facilities question block]
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 Q27_bomb. How many credible threats (e.g. bomb, chemical, biological, fire 
attacks, etc) has your agency had in the last year?
(n) Don't know/Not sure
[Q28x appears for each option selected in Q1 (a-g)] 
 In your view, how vulnerable to terrorist attack is each of the modes in your 
system?
(a)
1
(b)
2
(c)
3
(d)
4
(e)
5
(n) Don't 
know/Not
sure
Q28A.  Commuter rail 
Q28B.  Heavy rail 
Q28C.  Light rail 
Q28D.  Bus 
Q28E.  Ferry
Q28F.  Paratransit
Q28G.  [OTHER] 
 In your view, how vulnerable to terrorist attack is each of these rail system 
components in your system?
(0)
Does
not
apply
(a)
1
(b)
2
(c)
3
(d)
4
(e)
5
(n) Don't 
know/Not
sure
Q29A.  Rail stations 
Q29B.  Multi-modal terminals 
(e.g. bus and rail stations) 
Q29C.  Bridges/tunnels 
Q29D.  Tracks and rail lines 
Q29E.  Vehicles 
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Thank you for completing the survey! 
You now have three ways to proceed:
1. You can check over your answers by clicking on "Return to Start."
2. You can save what you have entered so far and return later to complete 
and submit the survey by clicking on "Save."
3. Or you can finalize and submit the survey by clicking on "Finalize
Survey." (When you click on "Finalize Survey" your responses will be 
recorded and you will no longer be able to change your answers.) 
If you indicated "Don't know/Not sure" for any of the questions or you think that 
someone else in your organization could add additional information to this nearly 
completed survey, please indicate their name(s) and contact information below 
and click on "Save" or "Finalize Survey." 
Thanks again for your time and attention. 
Back Return to Start Save Finalize Survey Reset
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TRANSIT SECURITY SURVEY NEW USER 
REGISTRATION FORM 
Transit Agency Information 
Transit Agency Name 
AGENCY
Agency City
AGENCYCITY
Agency State 
AGENCYSTATE
Mailing Address
MAILING1
MAILING2
City
CITY
State
STATE
Zip
ZIP
Personal Information 
(Individual filling out the survey)
First Name 
FIRSTNAME
Last Name 
LASTNAME
Title
TITLE
Email
EMAIL
Telephone Number (xxx-xxx-xxxx)
PHONE
Choose a username (10 characters or 
less)
USERNAME
Choose a password (10 characters or 
less)
PASSWORD
Confirm password 
PASSWORD
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Data Dictionary for Misc. Fields 
USERID: Primary key internal to Access Db 
TOTALLOGINS: Total number of logins to survey 
LASTIP: Last IP address of User 
LASTBROWSER: Identifies browser of user 
LASTLOGIN: Date/time of last login 
HASRAIL: Checkbox specifies whether transit agency indicated rail
LASTPAGE: Last page user was on before logging out 
DONE: Checkbox specifies whether user clicked “Finalize Survey” 
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Login
Pages 1-2 Page 8 Page 9
Page 11
Page 10
Final
No CPTED/No Rail
No CPTED/Has Rail
Page 3 Page 4
Pages 5…7
No threat
assessment
Has Rail
No Rail
Has Rail
Has CPTED
No CPTED
Has threat assessment
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIA American Institute of Architects
ALAMYS Latin American Association of Underground Networks and Subways
ALARP As low as reasonably practical
APTA American Public Transportation Association 
ATM Automated teller machine
AVE Alta Velocidad Española (Spain’s high-speed rail system)
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit
BTP British Transport Police
Caltrans California Department of Transportation
CBNR Chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological agents
CCTV Closed-circuit television
CD-ROM Compact disc read-only memory
CERTU Centre d’Études sur les Reseaux de Transport et l’Urbanisme (France’s Ministry of 
Transportation)
CODATU Cooperation for the Continuing Development of Urban and Suburban 
Transportation 
CPTED Crime prevention through environmental design
CRTM Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid
CTAA Community Transportation Association of America
DOT Department of Transportation
DHS Department of Homeland Security
Eole Est-Ouest Liaison Express. A rail line that will link the east and west suburbs of 
Paris.
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a Basque paramilitary terrorist group. Initials translate to 
“Basque Country and Liberty.”
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EU European Union
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FTA Federal Transit Administration
GAO Government Accountability Office; previously called General Accounting Office
GIA Armed Islamic Group (responsible for bombings in Paris)
GSA General Services Administration
IED Improvised explosive device
ISAC Information Sharing Analysis Center
IRA Irish Republican Army
IRT Interborough Rapid Transit
IT Information Technology
MARC Maryland Rail Commuter
MARTA Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
MBTA Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
Météor Métro Est-Ouest Rapide, a new subway line in Paris
MTA Metropolitan Transportation Authority (New York City)
NCPC National Capital Planning Commission
New Jersey 
Barrier
A tapered concrete barrier that is used in many narrow highway medians to 
prevent vehicle crossovers into oncoming traffic.
NRSP National Railway Security Program
NYCTA New York City Transit Authority
NYPD New York Police Department
OSS Office of Safety and Security
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PATH Port Authority Trans-Hudson (a subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey)
PIRA Provincial Irish Republican Army
PRESS Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards
PROTECT Program for Response Options and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/
Biological Terrorism in Subways
PTS Public transit security
RATP Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens, Paris’ transit system
RENFE La Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles (National Network of the Spanish 
Railways)
RER Réseau Express Régional, a part of Paris’ transit system
RTP Regional Transport Police
SCP Situational crime prevention
SEPP Security and Emergency Preparedness Program
SEPTA Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Agency
SNCF Societe National des Chemins de Fer Francais (French Railways)
SPIE International Society of Optical Engineering
ST-ISAC Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center
TfL Transport for London
TRANSEC Transportation Security (part of the United Kingdom’s Department for Transport)
TSA Transportation Security Administration
UCR Uniform Crime Reporting
UITP International Union of Public Transport
VTA Valley Transportation Authority
WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
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